29 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1982–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
S.J.S. v. M.J.S.green2 sentences2021Mother cites S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541 (Pa. Super. 2013), for the proposition that the trial court may conduct a dual analysis of the custody and relocation factors when fashioning a custody order, rendering separate consideration of each individual factor unnecessary. 2018When a custody arrangement is only in dispute because one parent is choosing to relocate, a dual analysis of the custody factors and the relocation factors is appropriate, “with the best interest standard as the guide.” S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541, 550 (Pa. Super. 2013). | 2 | 5 |
Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, Inc.green2 sentences1994The dual instruction assures that the jury has the applicable law for whatever factual scenario they find occurred.” Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, 550 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 (E.D.Pa.1982), affirmed without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.1983) (emphasis in original); Potenburg v. Varner, 284 Pa.Super. 19 , 424 A.2d 1370 (1981). 1994"The dual instruction assures that the jury has the applicable law for whatever factual scenario they find occurred.” Papandrea v. Hartman, 352 Pa.Super. 163, 170 , 507 A.2d 822, 826 (1986) (citing Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, 550 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 (E.D.Pa.1982), affirmed without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.1983)). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2020“This dual requirement of probable cause and exigency is an established part of our state constitutional jurisprudence.” Hernandez, 935 A.2d at 1280 . 2011In Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 594 Pa. 319 , 935 A.2d 1275 (2007), our Supreme Court’s most recent decision on this topic, restated Pennsylvania’s limited automobile exception as follows: Warrantless vehicle searches in this Commonwealth must be accompanied not only by probable cause, but also by exigent circumstances beyond mere mobility; ‘one without the other is insufficient.’ This dual requirement of probable cause plus exigency is an established part of our state constitutional jurisprudence. | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences2020As to the renewed application of this principle, we share the confidence expressed by Justice Todd in her dissenting opinion in Gary, specifically that police officers are “eminently capable as trained professionals of making the basic assessment of whether it is reasonably practicable for them to seek a warrant, under all of the circumstances existing at the time they wish to search an automobile.” Gary, 91 A.3d at 159 (Todd, J., dissenting). 2014In Commonwealth v. Gary, - Pa. -, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa.2014), our Supreme Court held as follows: In sum, our review reveals no compelling reason to interpret Article I, Sec tion. 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution as providing greater protection with, regard to warrantless searches of motor vehicles than does the Fourth Amendment. | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2020“Thus, a dual inquiry, both parts requiring affirmative answers[,] must be made: first, whether there existed probable cause to search; and secondly, whether exigent circumstances can be found to excuse the obtaining of a warrant.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 137 (Pa. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).3 The Commonwealth’s substantive argument is succinct: Commonwealth respectfully submits that law enforcement officers not only possessed probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify their entry, but also were justified under the public servant exception to th | 1 | 1 |
McMillen v. McMillengreen1 sentence2018Our Supreme Court has explained, “[a]lthough the express wishes of a child are not controlling in custody decisions, such wishes do constitute an -5- J-S78030-17 important factor that must be carefully considered in determining the child's best interest.” McMillen v. McMillen, 602 A.2d 845, 847 (Pa. 1992) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lindegreen2 sentences2008Commonwealth v. Linde, 448 Pa. 230 , 293 A.2d 62, 63-64 (1972) (citations omitted). 2008Commonwealth v. Linde, 448 Pa. 230 , 293 A.2d 62, 63-64 (1972) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Butlergreen2 sentences2003Butler, 571 Pa. at 445 , 812 A.2d at 633 (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). •In Butler , the Supreme Court also discussed the dual requirement of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 2003Butler, 571 Pa. at 445 , 812 A.2d at 633 (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). •In Butler , the Supreme Court also discussed the dual requirement of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Yohegreen2 sentences1998A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action is obligated to prove either that the defendant failed to employ the skill and knowledge required of a medical professional or the care and judgment of a reasonable person: “[T]he burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove either (1) that the physician did not possess and employ the required skill or knowledge or (2) that he did not exercise the care and judgment of a reasonable man in like circumstances . . . .” Smith v. Yohe, 412 Pa. 94, 99 , 194 A.2d 167, 170 (1963). 1998A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action is obligated to prove either that the defendant failed to employ the skill and knowledge required of a medical professional or the care and judgment of a reasonable person: “[T]he burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove either (1) that the physician did not possess and employ the required skill or knowledge or (2) that he did not exercise the care and judgment of a reasonable man in like circumstances . . . .” Smith v. Yohe, 412 Pa. 94, 99 , 194 A.2d 167, 170 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Baranowskigreen1 sentence1986See Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73 , 265 A.2d 108 (1970); Commonwealth v. Green, 294 Pa. 573 , 144 A. 743 (1929). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Winebrennergreen1 sentence1986See Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73 , 265 A.2d 108 (1970); Commonwealth v. Green, 294 Pa. 573 , 144 A. 743 (1929). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Starksgreen1 sentence1984This Court in Commonwealth v. Beaver, 317 Pa.Super. 88 , 463 A.2d 1097 (1983) adopted the narrower standard propounded in Oregon v. Kennedy, stating: We find that the dual standard of (“intent” or “bad faith”) review first articulated with any degree of clarity in Commonwealth v. Starks [ 490 Pa.Super. 336 , 340, 416 A.2d 498, 500 (1980) ], supra, being premised upon federal case law that has been subsequently “clarified” (to one of “intent” only), is rendered somewhat suspect by Oregon v. Kennedy, supra. See generally Commonwealth v. Wallace [ 500 Pa.Super. 270 , 455 A.2d 1187 (1983)], supra | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. McCree
green
2 sentences2011McCree, 924 A.2d at 629-30 . 2008McCree, 924 A.2d at 629-30 . | 5 | 2007–2011 |
Com., Dept. of Transp. v. Boros
green
2 sentences2000This court, however, cannot raise said violation sua sponte, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Dept, of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Bo-ros, 533 Pa. 214 , 620 A.2d 1139 (1993). 2000This court, however, cannot raise said violation sua sponte, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Dept, of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Bo-ros, 533 Pa. 214 , 620 A.2d 1139 (1993). | 2 | 1994–2000 |
Doe v. Colautti
green
2 sentences1994The dual instruction assures that the jury has the applicable law for whatever factual scenario they find occurred.” Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, 550 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 (E.D.Pa.1982), affirmed without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.1983) (emphasis in original); Potenburg v. Varner, 284 Pa.Super. 19 , 424 A.2d 1370 (1981). 1994"The dual instruction assures that the jury has the applicable law for whatever factual scenario they find occurred.” Papandrea v. Hartman, 352 Pa.Super. 163, 170 , 507 A.2d 822, 826 (1986) (citing Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, 550 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 (E.D.Pa.1982), affirmed without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.1983)). | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Papandrea v. Hartman
green
2 sentences1994"The dual instruction assures that the jury has the applicable law for whatever factual scenario they find occurred.” Papandrea v. Hartman, 352 Pa.Super. 163, 170 , 507 A.2d 822, 826 (1986) (citing Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, 550 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 (E.D.Pa.1982), affirmed without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.1983)). 1994"The dual instruction assures that the jury has the applicable law for whatever factual scenario they find occurred.” Papandrea v. Hartman, 352 Pa.Super. 163, 170 , 507 A.2d 822, 826 (1986) (citing Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, 550 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 (E.D.Pa.1982), affirmed without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.1983)). | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Arelt
green
2 sentences1984This Court in Commonwealth v. Beaver, 317 Pa.Super. 88 , 463 A.2d 1097 (1983) adopted the narrower standard propounded in Oregon v. Kennedy, stating: We find that the dual standard of (“intent” or “bad faith”) review first articulated with any degree of clarity in Commonwealth v. Starks [ 490 Pa.Super. 336 , 340, 416 A.2d 498, 500 (1980) ], supra, being premised upon federal case law that has been subsequently “clarified” (to one of “intent” only), is rendered somewhat suspect by Oregon v. Kennedy, supra. See generally Commonwealth v. Wallace [ 500 Pa.Super. 270 , 455 A.2d 1187 (1983)], supra 1984This Court in Commonwealth v. Beaver, 317 Pa.Super. 88 , 463 A.2d 1097 (1983) adopted the narrower standard propounded in Oregon v. Kennedy, stating: We find that the dual standard of (“intent” or “bad faith”) review first articulated with any degree of clarity in Commonwealth v. Starks [ 490 Pa.Super. 336 , 340, 416 A.2d 498, 500 (1980) ], supra, being premised upon federal case law that has been subsequently “clarified” (to one of “intent” only), is rendered somewhat suspect by Oregon v. Kennedy, supra. See generally Commonwealth v. Wallace [ 500 Pa.Super. 270 , 455 A.2d 1187 (1983)], supra | 2 | 1983–1984 |
Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass'n
green
1 sentence2023Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Association, 840 A.2d 1059 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Criss v. Wise
green
1 sentence2018Criss v. Wise, 781 A.2d 1156 [, 1159] (Pa. 2001) [(setting forth the principles governing appeals nunc pro tunc, and stating that an appellate court may grant a party an appeal nunc pro tunc, in “certain extraordinary,” “non-negligent circumstances”)]. *** While this case does not involve an untimely appeal, but rather an untimely [P]ost-sentence [M]otion and [Rule] 1925 [S]tatement, given this dual waiver, and in light of the negotiated plea agreement and [Bower’s] failure to challenge the validity of his plea, it does not appear a lesser nunc pro tunc standard applies. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Marvin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
green
1 sentence2017As stated above, we review Father’s arguments particularly recognizing that “we are bound by findings supported in the record, and may reject conclusions drawn by the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.” Saintz, supra at 512 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Castillo
green
2 sentences2008In Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395 , 888 A.2d 775 (2005), the Supreme Court reiterated that the Lord/Butler rule remained necessary. 2008In Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395 , 888 A.2d 775 (2005), the Supreme Court reiterated that the Lord/Butler rule remained necessary. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hershey Chocolate Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences2000Claimant relies on a footnote in this Court's opinion in Hershey Chocolate Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Lasher), 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 23 , 638 A.2d 336 (1994), reversed, 546 Pa. 27 , 682 A.2d 1257 (1996) which addressed the mental/mental standard and stated: We also note that the dual standard clearly violates the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 . 2000Claimant relies on a footnote in this Court's opinion in Hershey Chocolate Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Lasher), 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 23 , 638 A.2d 336 (1994), reversed, 546 Pa. 27 , 682 A.2d 1257 (1996) which addressed the mental/mental standard and stated: We also note that the dual standard clearly violates the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Hershey Chocolate Co. v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2000Claimant relies on a footnote in this Court's opinion in Hershey Chocolate Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Lasher), 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 23 , 638 A.2d 336 (1994), reversed, 546 Pa. 27 , 682 A.2d 1257 (1996) which addressed the mental/mental standard and stated: We also note that the dual standard clearly violates the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 . 2000Claimant relies on a footnote in this Court's opinion in Hershey Chocolate Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Lasher), 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 23 , 638 A.2d 336 (1994), reversed, 546 Pa. 27 , 682 A.2d 1257 (1996) which addressed the mental/mental standard and stated: We also note that the dual standard clearly violates the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Potenburg v. Varner
green
2 sentences1994The dual instruction assures that the jury has the applicable law for whatever factual scenario they find occurred.” Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, 550 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 (E.D.Pa.1982), affirmed without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.1983) (emphasis in original); Potenburg v. Varner, 284 Pa.Super. 19 , 424 A.2d 1370 (1981). 1994The dual instruction assures that the jury has the applicable law for whatever factual scenario they find occurred.” Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, 550 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 (E.D.Pa.1982), affirmed without opinion, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.1983) (emphasis in original); Potenburg v. Varner, 284 Pa.Super. 19 , 424 A.2d 1370 (1981). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Green
green
1 sentence1986See Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73 , 265 A.2d 108 (1970); Commonwealth v. Green, 294 Pa. 573 , 144 A. 743 (1929). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Commonwealth v. Wallace
green
1 sentence1984This Court in Commonwealth v. Beaver, 317 Pa.Super. 88 , 463 A.2d 1097 (1983) adopted the narrower standard propounded in Oregon v. Kennedy, stating: We find that the dual standard of (“intent” or “bad faith”) review first articulated with any degree of clarity in Commonwealth v. Starks [ 490 Pa.Super. 336 , 340, 416 A.2d 498, 500 (1980) ], supra, being premised upon federal case law that has been subsequently “clarified” (to one of “intent” only), is rendered somewhat suspect by Oregon v. Kennedy, supra. See generally Commonwealth v. Wallace [ 500 Pa.Super. 270 , 455 A.2d 1187 (1983)], supra | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Commonwealth v. Beaver
green
2 sentences1984This Court in Commonwealth v. Beaver, 317 Pa.Super. 88 , 463 A.2d 1097 (1983) adopted the narrower standard propounded in Oregon v. Kennedy, stating: We find that the dual standard of (“intent” or “bad faith”) review first articulated with any degree of clarity in Commonwealth v. Starks [ 490 Pa.Super. 336 , 340, 416 A.2d 498, 500 (1980) ], supra, being premised upon federal case law that has been subsequently “clarified” (to one of “intent” only), is rendered somewhat suspect by Oregon v. Kennedy, supra. See generally Commonwealth v. Wallace [ 500 Pa.Super. 270 , 455 A.2d 1187 (1983)], supra 1984This Court in Commonwealth v. Beaver, 317 Pa.Super. 88 , 463 A.2d 1097 (1983) adopted the narrower standard propounded in Oregon v. Kennedy, stating: We find that the dual standard of (“intent” or “bad faith”) review first articulated with any degree of clarity in Commonwealth v. Starks [ 490 Pa.Super. 336 , 340, 416 A.2d 498, 500 (1980) ], supra, being premised upon federal case law that has been subsequently “clarified” (to one of “intent” only), is rendered somewhat suspect by Oregon v. Kennedy, supra. See generally Commonwealth v. Wallace [ 500 Pa.Super. 270 , 455 A.2d 1187 (1983)], supra | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1982The “reasonable and articulable suspicion” standard was first articulated in Terry v. Ohio, supra. In that case, the court noted that a dual inquiry was necessary in determining the reasonableness of a search; “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 . 1982The “reasonable and articulable suspicion” standard was first articulated in Terry v. Ohio, supra. In that case, the court noted that a dual inquiry was necessary in determining the reasonableness of a search; “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.