dual inquiry in Massachusetts

2025MCR also does not improperly “lump” the Defendants together but details factual allegations relating to each with respect to identifiable cannabis cultivators. -10- parties.”); Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 563 (2008) (“As a threshold matter, analysis of the applicability of G.L. c. 93A, § 11, requires a dual inquiry whether there was a commercial transaction between a person engaged in trade or commerce and another person engaged in trade or commerce, such that they were acting in a ‘business context.’”); Szalla v. Locke, 421 Mass. 448, 451-452 (1995) (“[Chapter] 93A re

2025L. c. 93A, § 11, requires a dual inquiry whether there was a commercial transaction between a person engaged in trade or commerce and another person engaged in trade or commerce, such that they were acting in a 'business context'"; concluding plaintiff's discussions with successor corporations in effort to secure repayment of trade debt did not satisfy criteria for viable c. 93A claim); Linkage Corp. v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 22-25 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1015 (1997) (interaction between parties involving contract was not an intra-enterprise dispute but a commercial transactio

2025MCR also does not improperly “lump” the Defendants together but details factual allegations relating to each with respect to identifiable cannabis cultivators. -10- parties.”); Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 563 (2008) (“As a threshold matter, analysis of the applicability of G.L. c. 93A, § 11, requires a dual inquiry whether there was a commercial transaction between a person engaged in trade or commerce and another person engaged in trade or commerce, such that they were acting in a ‘business context.’”); Szalla v. Locke, 421 Mass. 448, 451-452 (1995) (“[Chapter] 93A re

2014To bring a claim under the statute, there must be “a dual inquiry whether there was a commercial transaction between a person engaged in trade or commerce and another person engaged in trade or commerce, such that they were acting in a ‘business context.’ ” Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 563 (2008). 1 ‘Inter-enterprise” disputes, including those stemming from an employment relationship or between or among fellow shareholders, are essentially private in nature, and thus not considered “commercial transactions” within the meaning of c. 93A.

2025Co. v. 7 Loomer, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 169, 175-176 (2005) ("To be actionable under G.

2008L. c. 93A, § 11, requires a dual inquiry whether there was a commercial transaction between a person engaged in trade or commerce and another person engaged in trade or commerce, such that they were acting in a “business context.” See Linkage Corp. v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 425 Mass. 1, 22-23 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1015 (1997); Szalla v. Locke, 421 Mass. 448, 451 (1995); Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Loomer, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 169, 174-175 (2005).

2003Once it has been established that a commercial transaction exists, then [the court] addressfes] whether the individuals were acting in a ‘business context’ and applies] the test discussed in Begelfer v. Najarian, 381 Mass. 177, 190-191 (1980).’ ” Given that the subject transactions in this case were commercial undertakings involving a corporation engaged in granting loans, a business engaged in commercial sales, a national bank, a consulting business, and a law firm providing professional and business-related services, the “commercial interaction” prong of the two-pronged Linkage Corp. standar

1997Once it has been established that a commercial transaction exists, then [the court] address [es] whether the individuals were acting in a ‘business context’ and applies] the test discussed in Begelfer v. Najarian, 381 Mass. 177, 190-191 (1980).” Szalla v. Locke, 421 Mass. 448, 451-452 (1995). (i) Commercial transaction.

2013Thus, the dual requirement of an honest and reasonable predicate for the affirmative defense of mistaken ownership or abandonment in a larceny prosecution is patent in Anslono, 5 Cf. Commonwealth v. Titus, 116 Mass. 42, 44-45 (1874) (“[I]f, at the time of first taking [lost goods] into his possession, [the defendant] has a felonious intent to appropriate them to his own use and to deprive the owner of them, and then knows or has the reasonable means of knowing or ascertaining . . . who the owner is, he may be found guilty of larceny”).

2006“It is clear as matter of law that. . . internal disputes that are intra-enterprise, i.e., between parties in the same venture, do not fall within the scope of c. 93A, § 11.” Steele v. Kelley, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 712, 726 (1999).

2004See also Town of Danvers, 3 M.L.C. 1559, 1572 (1977) (“[§] 7 by its very language poses a dual test ... a matter must be . . . within the scope of [§] 6 [and] it must be determined whether there is a conflict between that matter and the enumeration of [§] 7”); Labor Relations Comm’n v. Natick, 369 Mass. 431, 441-442 (1976) (discussing nature of the various statutes Usted in § 7 [<7]); Burlington v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 390 Mass. 157, 159-167 (1983) (where tradition and statutes establish that district attorneys have prosecutorial duties, no violation of G.

2004See also Town of Danvers, 3 M.L.C. 1559, 1572 (1977) (“[§] 7 by its very language poses a dual test ... a matter must be . . . within the scope of [§] 6 [and] it must be determined whether there is a conflict between that matter and the enumeration of [§] 7”); Labor Relations Comm’n v. Natick, 369 Mass. 431, 441-442 (1976) (discussing nature of the various statutes Usted in § 7 [<7]); Burlington v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 390 Mass. 157, 159-167 (1983) (where tradition and statutes establish that district attorneys have prosecutorial duties, no violation of G.

2004Assn. of Firefighters v. Framingham, 442 Mass. 463, 476 (2004), quoting from Town of Danvers, 3 M.L.C. 1559, 1572 (1977) (“[§] 7 by its very language poses a dual test... a matter must be . . . within the scope of [§]6 [and] it must be determined whether there is a conflict between that matter and the enumeration of [§] 7”).

2000Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 17 Mass.App.Ct. 316, 318 (1983).

1985In that light, I am troubled by the court’s failure to confront more fully the principle of Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).

1985In that light, I am troubled by the court's *798 failure to confront more fully the principle of Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).

1982Commonwealth v. McColl, 375 Mass. 316, 324-325 (1978).

1975It is presumed that they take as tenants in common (Edwards v. Edwards, 39 Pa. 369, 384-386 [1861]; compare G.

1975In determining whether the mandatory death penalty is constitutional in this context, I divide my analysis into two mutually supportive and interlocking parts: one relying on due process concepts derived from arts. 1, 10 and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the other on the “cruel or unusual punishments” clause of art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 1 This dual analysis is possible here where these two concepts are “so close as to merge” because the “due process argument reiterates what is essentially the primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

1975In determining whether the mandatory death penalty is constitutional in this context, I divide my analysis into two mutually supportive and interlocking parts: one relying on due process concepts derived from arts. 1, 10 and 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the other on the "cruel or unusual punishments" clause of art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. [1] This dual analysis is possible here where these two concepts are "so close as to merge" because the "due process argument reiterates what is essentially the primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clau

1970See Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass. 724 ; Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769, at 779 ; Opinion of the Justices, 344 Mass. 766 .