dual standard in Tennessee

2016Under this dual standard, “[t]he determination that a particular order ultimately disposes of a separable claim is a question of law reviewed de novo, while the finding of no just reason for delay is only reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” GenCorp., 23 F.3d at 1027 .

2010The Middle Section of this Court in Brown v. John Roebuck & Associates, Inc., No. M2008-02619-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4878621 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2009)(no perm. app. filed), recently determined that a dual standard of review distinguishing between the legal question of whether a judgment disposes of a claim or party and the fact- or equity-based determination of whether just reason for delay exists is the appropriate standard to apply when reviewing certification under Rule 54.02, finding support for its decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s decision in General

2020The preliminary determination as to “whether a particular order disposes of a distinct and separable ‘claim’ that is subject to Rule 54.02 certification is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Ingram, 379 S.W.3d at 238 ; Brown, 2009 WL -5- 4878621, at *5).

2012However, we note that the result would be the same under the common law analysis in Van Tran. -7- Regardless of whether the Van Tran analysis tracks the statutory language, the court there also examined whether the result was dictated by precedent at the time the defendant’s conviction became final, Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 811 , and, as we have noted above, Padilla created a new rule under this standard.

2000The trial court made a dual analysis under both the “substantial harm” framework of Bond v. McKenzie, 896 S.W.2d 546 (Tenn. 1995) and the factors -2- under the parenting plan legislation codified as T.C.A.