dual standard in Kansas

2008“An investigative detention must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. [Citation omitted.]” State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 734 , 952 P.2d 1276 (1998). “ ‘To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we make a dual inquiry, asking first “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,” and second “whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” [Citations omitted.]’ ” State v. Mitchell, 265 Kan. 238, 241 , 960 P.2d 200 (1998).

2008“An investigative detention must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. [Citation omitted.]” State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 734 , 952 P.2d 1276 (1998). “ ‘To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we make a dual inquiry, asking first “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,” and second “whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” [Citations omitted.]’ ” State v. Mitchell, 265 Kan. 238, 241 , 960 P.2d 200 (1998).

2004State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 418 , 904 P.2d 951 (1995).

2004State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 418 , 904 P.2d 951 (1995).

2017In re M.R., 272 Kan. 1335, 1342 , 38 P.3d 694 (2002).

2017In re M.R., 272 Kan. 1335, 1342 , 38 P.3d 694 (2002).

2002We apply a de novo review to determine whether the alleged conduct is contemptuous. [Citation omitted.] We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the sanctions imposed. [Citation omitted.]" 263 Kan. at 356 .

2002We apply a de novo review to determine whether the alleged conduct is contemptuous. [Citation omitted.] We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the sanctions imposed. [Citation omitted.]” 263 Kan. at 356 .

2022In response, the State argues that the district court appropriately considered the evidence presented at the motion hearing and found the testimony of Banister's trial attorney to be credible. 3 We review a district court's decision on whether an exception under Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733 , applies under a dual standard.

2021"A district court abuses its discretion when: (1) no reasonable person would take its view; (2) its ruling is based on an error of law; or (3) substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which the exercise of discretion is based." State v. Vonachen, 312 Kan. 451 , 471, 476 P.3d 774 (2020).

2020State v. Smith, 303 Kan. 673, 677 , 366 P.3d 226 (2016).

2020State v. Smith, 303 Kan. 673, 677 , 366 P.3d 226 (2016).

2017Given the unsettled state of the law and because we conclude that either test can be satisfied in this case, we will assume but not determine that due process is implicated and apply the dual standard of the Chapman constitutional harmless error test and the harmless error test of K.S.A. 60-261." 281 Kan. at 927 .

2014But, as the majority noted, as a practical matter, we are ultimately called upon to apply the federal constitutional harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.

2014But, as the majority noted, as a practical matter, we are ultimately called upon to apply the federal constitutional harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.

2014The court followed State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113 , 119 P.3d 1148 (2005), and held that the two-part instruction impermissibly lowered the State’s burden of proving the element of intent because the instruction stated that the prosecution was required only to prove that the murder was a foreseeable consequence of another criminal act-—not that the murder was premeditated.

2014The court followed State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113 , 119 P.3d 1148 (2005), and held that the two-part instruction impermissibly lowered the State’s burden of proving the element of intent because the instruction stated that the prosecution was required only to prove that the murder was a foreseeable consequence of another criminal act-—not that the murder was premeditated.

2014Alejandro refers to language contained in State v. Overstreet, 288 Kan. 1 , 200 P.3d 427 (2009), where the trial court provided a dual instruction on aiding and abetting: “ ‘A person who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids, abets or procures another to commit a crime with the intent to promote or assist in its commission, is criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of the person’s participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime. “ ‘A person who intentionally aids another to commit a crime is also responsible for any other crim

2014Alejandro refers to language contained in State v. Overstreet, 288 Kan. 1 , 200 P.3d 427 (2009), where the trial court provided a dual instruction on aiding and abetting: “ ‘A person who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids, abets or procures another to commit a crime with the intent to promote or assist in its commission, is criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of the person’s participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime. “ ‘A person who intentionally aids another to commit a crime is also responsible for any other crim

2008“An investigative detention must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. [Citation omitted.]” State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 734 , 952 P.2d 1276 (1998). “ ‘To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we make a dual inquiry, asking first “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,” and second “whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” [Citations omitted.]’ ” State v. Mitchell, 265 Kan. 238, 241 , 960 P.2d 200 (1998).

2008“An investigative detention must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. [Citation omitted.]” State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 734 , 952 P.2d 1276 (1998). “ ‘To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we make a dual inquiry, asking first “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,” and second “whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” [Citations omitted.]’ ” State v. Mitchell, 265 Kan. 238, 241 , 960 P.2d 200 (1998).

2003State v. Dang, 267 Kan. 198, 199 , 978 P.2d 277 (1999).

2003State v. Dang, 267 Kan. 198, 199 , 978 P.2d 277 (1999).

1998In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we make a dual inquiry, considering first ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,’ and second ‘whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S. Ct. at 1879 . ‘The government has the burden of demonstrating that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.’ United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3

1998In evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we make a dual inquiry, considering first ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,’ and second ‘whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S. Ct. at 1879 . ‘The government has the burden of demonstrating that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.’ United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3

1982Furthermore, a minimizing effect of the distinction is the adoption by some courts of a dual standard requiring not only good faith as to the decision regarding settlement, but also ordinary care in the investigation leading to such decision, [cites omitted] We further noted . . . that in the more recent cases the two tests have tended to coalesce, so that even those courts which reject the negligence test and apply exclusively the test of good faith, nonetheless, consider the insurer’s negligence relevant in determining whether or not the insurer exercised the requisite good faith.” 202 Kan.