dual inquiry (Texas) · Go Syfert
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dual inquiry in Texas

48 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2023 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (16)

CaseFollowedCited
Terry v. Ohiogreen
scotus · 1968 · cited in 15 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1988–2014
2 sentences

2014Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).

2007"To determine the reasonableness of such an investigative detention the [United States Supreme] Court adopted a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and, (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Davis , 947 S.W.2d at 242 (citing Terry , 392 U.S. at 19-20 ).

415
Jordan v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1996 · cited in 4 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2000–2003
2 sentences

2001In Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)(footnote omitted), the court stated: While Rule 702 involves the dual inquiry of relevance and reliability, the Supreme Court emphasized that the "overarching subject" of Rule 702 is the scientific validity of the evidence at issue. [ Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2797 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 ].

2001In Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)(footnote omitted), the court stated: While Rule 702 involves the dual inquiry of relevance and reliability, the Supreme Court emphasized that the “overarching subject” of Rule 702 is the scientific validity of the evidence at issue. [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2797 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 ].

34
Corbin v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 2002 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See Corbin , 85 S.W.3d at 277 .

2007See Corbin, 85 S.W.3d at 277 .

33
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green
scotus · 1993 · cited in 6 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1996–2008
2 sentences

2001In Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)(footnote omitted), the court stated: While Rule 702 involves the dual inquiry of relevance and reliability, the Supreme Court emphasized that the “overarching subject” of Rule 702 is the scientific validity of the evidence at issue. [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2797 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 ].

2001In Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)(footnote omitted), the court stated: While Rule 702 involves the dual inquiry of relevance and reliability, the Supreme Court emphasized that the “overarching subject” of Rule 702 is the scientific validity of the evidence at issue. [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 , 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2797 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 ].

26
Walker v. Packergreen
tex · 1992 · cited in 4 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1992–1998
2 sentences

1998Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992).

1996Fortunately, the confusion surrounding the abuse of discretion standard was dispelled by the supreme court's landmark decision in Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.1992), which explained that the abuse of discretion standard is a dual standard, and which aspect of the standard applies depends upon the type of issue involved.

24
Mata v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 2001 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Mata v. State , 46 S.W.3d 902, 908 (Tex. Crim.

2007Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902, 908 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).

22
Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. Maygreen
texcommnapp · 1929 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1983–1992
2 sentences

1992Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jones, 129 Tex. 392 , 104 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1937); Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. May, 15 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.Comm’n App.1929, judgm’t adopted); Herrera v. Texas Employers’ Ins.

1983See Maryland Casualty Company v. Jones, 129 Tex. 392 , 104 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1937); Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. May, 15 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.Comm.App.1929); Buffalo Insurance Co. v. McLendon, 402 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1966, no writ); Traders & General Insurance Company v. Spillers, 88 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth, 1935, writ ref’d).

22
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jonesgreen
tex · 1937 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1983–1992
2 sentences

1992Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jones, 129 Tex. 392 , 104 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1937); Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. May, 15 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.Comm’n App.1929, judgm’t adopted); Herrera v. Texas Employers’ Ins.

1992Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jones, 129 Tex. 392 , 104 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1937); Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. May, 15 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.Comm’n App.1929, judgm’t adopted); Herrera v. Texas Employers’ Ins.

22
Johnson v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 2002 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015As with other probable cause issues, our review of a trial court's decision on a Franks issue is made pursuant to a dual standard: "We give almost total deference to a trial court's rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor while we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor." Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim.

2015Engle complains that Doe was a “transient person” not known to Greenville police and that the law enforcement officers did not corroborate the information Doe gave to them. 9 As with other probable cause issues, our review of a trial court’s decision on a Franks issue is made pursuant to a dual standard: “We give almost total deference to a trial court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor while we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor.”

12
In Re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigationgreen
· 1994 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 748-49 (3d Cir. 1994) (″It is the judge who makes the determination of reasonable reliance, and that for the judge to make the factual determination under Rule 104(a) that an expert is basing his or her opinion on a type of data reasonably relied upon by experts, the judge must conduct an independent evaluation into reasonableness… .

11
Hawkins v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 2004 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004).

11
Bocquet v. Herringgreen
tex · 1998 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 22 (Baker, J., dissenting). 9 .

11
Herrera v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'ngreen
texapp · 1983 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
1 sentence

1988Herrera v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, 653 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).

11
Buffalo Insurance Company v. McLendongreen
texapp · 1966 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
1 sentence

1983See Maryland Casualty Company v. Jones, 129 Tex. 392 , 104 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1937); Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. May, 15 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.Comm.App.1929); Buffalo Insurance Co. v. McLendon, 402 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1966, no writ); Traders & General Insurance Company v. Spillers, 88 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth, 1935, writ ref’d).

11
Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Spillersgreen
texapp · 1935 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
1 sentence

1983See Maryland Casualty Company v. Jones, 129 Tex. 392 , 104 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1937); Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. May, 15 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.Comm.App.1929); Buffalo Insurance Co. v. McLendon, 402 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1966, no writ); Traders & General Insurance Company v. Spillers, 88 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth, 1935, writ ref’d).

11
Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardinergreen
ca5 · 1973 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1977–1977
1 sentence

1977See also Jeteo Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); 2 J.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

CaseCitedYears
Davis v. State green
texcrimapp · 1997
2 sentences

2008Terry , 392 U.S. at 19-20 ; Davis , 947 S.W.2d at 242 .

2007"To determine the reasonableness of such an investigative detention the [United States Supreme] Court adopted a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and, (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Davis , 947 S.W.2d at 242 (citing Terry , 392 U.S. at 19-20 ).

22007–2008
EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Robinson green
tex · 1996
2 sentences

2008See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1995).

2008See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1995).

22008–2008
Product Promotions, Inc. v. Jacques Y. Cousteau green
ca5 · 1974
2 sentences

1977In the case of Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974), the court observed that the decisions have established a dual test for determination whether a court may exercise its jurisdiction without depriving a non-resident defendant of due process of law.

1977In Cousteau, supra, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the relevant federal decisions established a dual test for determining whether a court may exercise its jurisdiction without depriving a non-resident defendant of due process of law: “First, ‘there must be some minimum con tact with the state which results from an affirmative act of the defendant.’ Secondly, ‘it must be fair and reasonable to require the defendant to come into the state and defend the action.’ ” Cousteau, supra, at 494 .

21977–1977
Almanza v. State green
texcrimapp · 1985
1 sentence

2023See Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 460– 61; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 .

12023–2023
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner green
tex · 1997
2 sentences

2015(CCH) P 15,015 , 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 846 (Cite as: 953 S.W.2d 706 ) (1) the extent to which the theory has sidered “novel” are daunting enough to reject ap- been or can be tested; plication of a dual standard.

2015(CCH) P 15,015 , 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 846 (Cite as: 953 S.W.2d 706 ) (1) the extent to which the theory has sidered “novel” are daunting enough to reject ap- been or can be tested; plication of a dual standard.

12015–2015
Emerson v. State green
texcrimapp · 1994
1 sentence

1999In Emerson , the Court said that it would consider the scientific evidence regarding the HGN test to be novel because no case had held that such evidence was reliable. 880 S.W.2d at 763 .

11999–1999
Hartman v. State green
texcrimapp · 1997
2 sentences

1999In reaching this conclusion, the Court, after saying that it found no value in having a different standard of admissibility depending on whether or not evidence is novel, added, “[T]he problems presented in determining whether or not a particular type of evidence is novel are daunting enough to reject application of a dual standard.” Id. at 63 .

1999In reaching this conclusion, the Court, after saying that it found no value in having a different standard of admissibility depending on whether or not evidence is novel, added, "[T]he problems presented in determining whether or not a particular type of evidence is novel are daunting enough to reject application of a dual standard." Id. at 63 .

11999–1999
United States v. Sharpe green
scotus · 1985
2 sentences

1988United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. at 1879 .

1988United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. at 1879 .

11988–1988
Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls green
tex · 1981
2 sentences

1987If the concern is that exemplary damages are too easily obtained, and thus municipalities require a higher degree of protection, the solution is not to create a dual standard, but instead to re-examine Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).

1987If the concern is that exemplary damages are too easily obtained, and thus municipalities require a higher degree of protection, the solution is not to create a dual standard, but instead to re-examine Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.1981).

11987–1987
cluster 376839 green
ca4 · 1980
1 sentence

1983Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 265-266 , 97 S.Ct. 2348, 2357-2358 , 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977); Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transport, 618 F.2d 1037 , 1049 (4th Cir.1980).

11983–1983
Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo green
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

1983Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 265-266 , 97 S.Ct. 2348, 2357-2358 , 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977); Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transport, 618 F.2d 1037 , 1049 (4th Cir.1980).

1983Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 265-266 , 97 S.Ct. 2348, 2357-2358 , 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977); Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transport, 618 F.2d 1037 , 1049 (4th Cir.1980).

11983–1983
U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt green
tex · 1977
1 sentence

1978In that case, Judge Goldberg pointed out that: the decisions “set up a dual test for determining whether a court may take jurisdiction without depriving a defendant of due process of law.” First, “there must be some minimum contact with the state which results from an affirmative act of the defendant.” Secondly, “it must be fair and reasonable to require the defendant to come into the state and defend the action.” This language was quoted with approval by our Supreme Court in U-Anchor, supra. We hold that Check-Out Systems, Inc. conducted business within this state by virtue of its affirmative

11978–1978

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TX § Tex. Penal Code § 49.04 (6) TX § Tex. Penal Code § 49.01 (5) TX § Tex. Transp. Code § 521.021 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 127 (1976–2023) LA 96 (1970–2022) ID 59 (1985–2026) TX 48 (1977–2023) NY 37 (1896–2025) CA 37 (1960–2026) MI 36 (1976–2025) PA 29 (1982–2023) OH 24 (1963–2023) KS 23 (1982–2022) WA 21 (1970–2021) MA 18 (1967–2025) WY 17 (1974–2018) FL 17 (1973–2018) MD 14 (1975–2026) MT 13 (1967–2022) UT 12 (1938–2017) IA 11 (1976–2021) MN 10 (1933–2013) IN 10 (1975–2020) MO 9 (1975–1995) SC 8 (2023–2026) NJ 8 (1979–2022) NM 7 (1990–2008) AZ 6 (1979–2014) OR 6 (1973–2026) DC 6 (1989–2021) KY 6 (1986–2022) TN 6 (2000–2026) CO 5 (1982–2016) GA 5 (1964–2024) DE 5 (1987–2019) HI 5 (2005–2022) OK 5 (1990–2011) NH 4 (1985–2015) NC 4 (2005–2022) MS 3 (1972–1991) WI 3 (2003–2015) ME 2 (1979–1983) CT 2 (1992–2009) ND 2 (1992–2002)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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