6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000In Anderson v. United States, 658 A.2d 1036, 1038 (D.C.1995), this court articulated that to justify a Terry stop or a search for weapons, factors a court should consider include, but are not limited to: (a) time of day, (b) flight, (c) high crime and nature of the location, (d) furtive hand movements, (e) informant’s tip, (f) a person’s reaction to questioning, (g) a report of criminal activity, and (h) viewing of an object or bulge indicating a weapon. 2000In Anderson v. United States, 658 A.2d 1036, 1038 (D.C.1995), this court articulated that to justify a Terry stop or a search for weapons, factors a court should consider include, but are not limited to: (a) time of day, (b) flight, (c) high crime and nature of the location, (d) furtive hand movements, (e) informant's tip, (f) a person's reaction to questioning, (g) a report of criminal activity, and (h) viewing of an object or bulge indicating a weapon. | 2 | 2 |
Illinois v. Wardlowgreen1 sentence2021BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, concurring: While I join the opinion of the court in full, I write separately to caution that the dual factors of “unprovoked flight” and “high crime area,” outlined in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121-26 (2000), not be applied so formulaically that they become a substitute for requiring police officers to have particularized suspicion of an individual’s suspected criminal activity prior to a lawful seizure. | 1 | 1 |
Deandre J. Posey v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021Although our court has adopted and considered the Wardlow factors, we have also held that “more is required for officers to develop reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a stop” than a defendant’s “presence in a high crime neighborhood coupled with his flight from uniformed officers.” See Posey v. United States, 201 A.3d 1198, 1203-04 (D.C. 2019). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Rossgreen1 sentence2001See, e.g., In re Ross, 658 A.2d 209 (D.C. 1995) (thirty-day suspension for failure to notify and pay over funds to third party and another violation,); Matter of Goldstein, 471 A.2d 267 (D.C.1984) (public censure for failure to deliver funds to client, and one other violation). 8 The Board here carefully considered the relevant factors in determining censure to be an appropriate sanction in this dual violation case. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Wallergreen1 sentence2001See In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780, 784-85 (D.C.1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2000In order to determine whether a search and seizure is reasonable, there needs to be a dual inquiry into “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. at 19-20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 . 2000In order to determine whether a search and seizure is reasonable, there needs to be a dual inquiry into “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. at 19-20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Matter of Goldstein
green
1 sentence2001See, e.g., In re Ross, 658 A.2d 209 (D.C. 1995) (thirty-day suspension for failure to notify and pay over funds to third party and another violation,); Matter of Goldstein, 471 A.2d 267 (D.C.1984) (public censure for failure to deliver funds to client, and one other violation). 8 The Board here carefully considered the relevant factors in determining censure to be an appropriate sanction in this dual violation case. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Habtu v. Woldemichael
green
1 sentence2000The dual requirement that the rebuttal meet “something new” that could not have been anticipated serves both to ensure the orderly presentation of proof and to prevent “the most common — and most detrimental — type of surprise[ ] [which arises] where one party seeks to infuse new issues or defenses into the litigation.” Habtu v. Woldemichael, 694 A.2d 846 , 849 n. 4 (D.C.1997). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
cluster 424863
green
1 sentence1989Of course, as the court in Bechtel stated, the extent to which the dual factors of control and consent exist “is evidenced both by the terms of the contract and by the actual dealings between the parties.” Bechtel, supra 717 F.2d at 579 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.