outcome hearing in New York

2016We nonetheless agree with defendant that claimant failed to prove a prima facie case of unlawful confinement inasmuch as he failed to present evidence that the testimony of his witnesses “ ‘would have . . . changed the outcome of the hearing’ ” (Moustakos, 133 AD3d at 1270; see Watson v State of New York, 125 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2015]).

2016We nonetheless agree with defendant that claimant failed to prove a prima facie case of unlawful confinement inasmuch as he failed to present evidence that the testimony of his witnesses “ ‘would have . . . changed the outcome of the hearing’ ” (Moustakos, 133 AD3d at 1270; see Watson v State of New York, 125 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2015]).

1998Finally, the record establishes that the Hearing Officer conducted the hearing in a fair and impartial manner, and there is no evidence that he was biased or that the outcome of the hearing flowed from any bias (see, Matter of Parker v Coughlin, 211 AD2d 929 ; Matter of Martinez v Scully, 194 AD2d 679 ).

1998Nor is there any evidence in the record that the Hearing Officer “was biased or that the outcome of the hearing flowed from such bias” (Matter of Parker v Coughlin, 211 AD2d 929 ; see, Matter of Martinez v Scully, 194 AD2d 679 ).

2015“Absent any evidence that the [exculpatory evidence] . . . would have . . . changed the outcome of the hearing, the Court of Claims properly denied claimant’s motion for partial summary judgment” (Watson v State of New York, 125 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2015]; cf. DuBois, 25 Misc 3d at 1142 ).

2015“Absent any evidence that the [exculpatory evidence] . . . would have . . . changed the outcome of the hearing, the Court of Claims properly denied claimant’s motion for partial summary judgment” (Watson v State of New York, 125 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2015]; cf. DuBois, 25 Misc 3d at 1142 ).

2025It can be demonstrated by showing either that the outcome of the hearing — a finding of guilty or not guilty — would have been different but for the delay or that there was prejudice in the [*5]proceedings as a result of the delay — that the penalty was greater than it otherwise would have been but for the delay. ( See Miller v State of New York , 156 AD3d 1067, 1068 [3d Dept 2017] ["claimant failed to establish any prejudice as a result of the delay or that, but for the delay, the outcome of the hearing would have been different"] [emphasis added].) Mr. Padilla therefore needed to establish a

2025It can be demonstrated by showing either that the outcome of the hearing — a finding of guilty or not guilty — would have been different but for the delay or that there was prejudice in the [*5]proceedings as a result of the delay — that the penalty was greater than it otherwise would have been but for the delay. ( See Miller v State of New York , 156 AD3d 1067, 1068 [3d Dept 2017] ["claimant failed to establish any prejudice as a result of the delay or that, but for the delay, the outcome of the hearing would have been different"] [emphasis added].) Mr. Padilla therefore needed to establish a

2017Here, even assuming that the hearing was delayed by one day, claimant failed to establish any prejudice as a result of the delay or that, but for the delay, the outcome of the hearing would have been different such that a cause of action based upon the violation of the pertinent regulation was deemed to occur (see Bottom v State of New York, 142 AD3d 1314, 1316 [2016], appeal dismissed 28 NY3d 1177 [2017]; Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d at 1090 ).

2015Absent any evidence that the chaperone’s testimony would have differed in any meaningful respect from that of the two additional correction officers or otherwise changed the outcome of the hearing, the Court of Claims properly denied claimant’s motion for partial summary judgment (see Senor v State of New York, 23 AD3d 851, 852 [2005]; Vasquez v State of New York, 10 AD3d 825, 826 [2004]; see also Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d 1089, 1090 [2009]).

2016Finally, to the extent that claimant bases his claim on alleged violations of the First Amendment, the claim was properly dismissed inasmuch as the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate federal constitutional torts (see Lakram v State of New York, 206 AD2d 568, 568 [1994]; DuBois v State of New York, 25 Misc 3d 1137, 1138 [2009]).

2016Finally, to the extent that claimant bases his claim on alleged violations of the First Amendment, the claim was properly dismissed inasmuch as the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate federal constitutional torts (see Lakram v State of New York, 206 AD2d 568, 568 [1994]; DuBois v State of New York, 25 Misc 3d 1137, 1138 [2009]).

2016We nonetheless agree with defendant that claimant failed to prove a prima facie case of unlawful confinement inasmuch as he failed to present evidence that the testimony of his witnesses “ ‘would have . . . changed the outcome of the hearing’ ” (Moustakos, 133 AD3d at 1270; see Watson v State of New York, 125 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2015]).

2016We nonetheless agree with defendant that claimant failed to prove a prima facie case of unlawful confinement inasmuch as he failed to present evidence that the testimony of his witnesses “ ‘would have . . . changed the outcome of the hearing’ ” (Moustakos, 133 AD3d at 1270; see Watson v State of New York, 125 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2015]).

2015Finally, we note that claimant improperly contends for the first time in his reply brief that the exculpatory evidence would have changed the outcome of the hearing, and we therefore do not address that contention (see Przesiek v State of New York, 118 AD3d 1326, 1327 [2014]).

2015Finally, we note that claimant improperly contends for the first time in his reply brief that the exculpatory evidence would have changed the outcome of the hearing, and we therefore do not address that contention (see Przesiek v State of New York, 118 AD3d 1326, 1327 [2014]).

2014In any event, defendant’s contention is based upon evidence that was available and could have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to the hearing (see CPL 710.40 [4]; People v Wynn, 55 AD3d 1378, 1379 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 901 [2008]), or evidence that would not have changed the outcome of the hearing (see People v Lucie, 49 AD3d 1253, 1254 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 936 [2008]).

2014In any event, defendant’s contention is based upon evidence that was available and could have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to the hearing (see CPL 710.40 [4]; People v Wynn, 55 AD3d 1378, 1379 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 901 [2008]), or evidence that would not have changed the outcome of the hearing (see People v Lucie, 49 AD3d 1253, 1254 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 936 [2008]).

2014Inasmuch as a motion to reopen the suppression hearing would not have been successful, defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel when his first attorney did not make such a motion (see People v Nuffer, 70 AD3d 1299, 1300 [2010]).

2014Inasmuch as a motion to reopen the suppression hearing would not have been successful, defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel when his first attorney did not make such a motion (see People v Nuffer, 70 AD3d 1299, 1300 [2010]).

2014In any event, defendant’s contention is based upon evidence that was available and could have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to the hearing (see CPL 710.40 [4]; People v Wynn, 55 AD3d 1378, 1379 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 901 [2008]), or evidence that would not have changed the outcome of the hearing (see People v Lucie, 49 AD3d 1253, 1254 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 936 [2008]).

2014In any event, defendant’s contention is based upon evidence that was available and could have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to the hearing (see CPL 710.40 [4]; People v Wynn, 55 AD3d 1378, 1379 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 901 [2008]), or evidence that would not have changed the outcome of the hearing (see People v Lucie, 49 AD3d 1253, 1254 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 936 [2008]).

2006Inasmuch as “the surrounding circumstances do not negate the possibility that defendant might have made a meaningful contribution to the colloquy” and the outcome of the hearing was “not wholly favorable” to defendant (People v Favor, 82 NY2d 254, 267 [1993]; see People v Monclavo, 87 NY2d 1029, 1031 [1996]; People v Dokes, supra at 662 ), his presence at the hearing cannot be deemed superfluous.

1995In Favor (supra), the Court of Appeals ruled the defendant was entitled to a new trial as the record was clear that the defendant was not present at the Sandoval hearing and the outcome of the hearing was not wholly favorable to the defendant.

2004Lastly, there is no indication in the record that the Hearing Officer was biased or that the outcome of the hearing flowed from such bias (see Matter of White v Selsky, 3 AD3d 762, 763 [2004]; Matter of Nieves v Goord, 2 AD3d 1173, 1174 [2003]).

2004Moreover, insofar as the misbehavior report and victim’s testimony provide substantial evidence supporting the determination of guilt, there is no indication that the outcome of the hearing flowed from any alleged bias (see Matter of Nieves v Goord, 2 AD3d 1173, 1174 [2003]; Matter of Ramos v Goord, 309 AD2d 1096, 1097 [2003]).

2004The transcript of the disciplinary hearing does not substantiate petitioner’s claims or indicate that the Hearing Officer was biased or that “ ‘the outcome of the hearing flowed from the alleged bias’ ” (Matter of Ramos v Goord, 309 AD2d 1096, 1097 [2003], quoting Matter of James v Goord, 261 AD2d 733, 733 [1999]).

2003The record further fails to support petitioner’s allegations of bias by the Hearing Officer or that “the outcome of the hearing flowed from the alleged bias” (Matter of James v Goord, 261 AD2d 733, 733 [1999] ; see Matter of Burse v Goord, 274 AD2d 678, 679 [2000]).

2004Finally, contrary to petitioner’s further contention, the record does not establish “that the Hearing Officer was biased or that the outcome of the hearing flowed from such bias” (Matter of Parker v Coughlin, 211 AD2d 929, 929 [1995]).

2000In any event, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the outcome of the hearing flowed from the alleged bias (see, Matter of Parker v Coughlin, 211 AD2d 929 ).

2006In any event, the record establishes that petitioner was afforded a fair and impartial hearing and that the outcome of the hearing flowed from the evidence presented, not from any alleged bias on the part of the Hearing Officer (see Matter of Santana v Selsky, 23 AD3d 722, 723 [2005]; Matter of Di Rose v Coombe, 233 AD2d 799, 801 [1996]).

1999In any event, since, inter alia, the determination of guilt was principally based on petitioner’s own admissions, he has failed to demonstrate that the outcome of the hearing flowed from the alleged bias (see, Matter of Di Rose v Coombe, 233 AD2d 799 ).

1996Finally, we find no evidence in the record to support petitioner’s claims of bias or partiality affecting the outcome of the hearing (see, Matter of Joyce v Coughlin, 219 AD2d 777, 778 ) and the presence of Donaghy at the hearing did not violate petitioner’s due process rights (see, Matter of Taylor v Coughlin, 135 AD2d 992, 993-994 ).

1996We find no evidence in the record to support petitioner’s claims of bias or partiality on the part of the Hearing Officer affecting the outcome of the hearing (Matter of Joyce v Coughlin, 219 AD2d 777, 778 ).