outcome rule in Utah

2013But those are not the facts presented here. 185 Although Johnson allows for a de minimis extension at any point before the conclusion of an otherwise lawful detention, we pause to clarify "that onee the lawful purpose of the stop has concluded, the occupants of the vehicle must be released from their temporary seizure." Baker, 2010 UT 18, 117 , 229 P.3d 650 .

2013But those are not the facts presented here. 185 Although Johnson allows for a de minimis extension at any point before the conclusion of an otherwise lawful detention, we pause to clarify "that onee the lawful purpose of the stop has concluded, the occupants of the vehicle must be released from their temporary seizure." Baker, 2010 UT 18, 117 , 229 P.3d 650 .

2026Thus, while the factual distinction between this case and the above-referenced Pennsylvania case might prompt different outcomes under rule 26(d), it does not form the basis for a different outcome under rule 37(b). ¶44 CMP’s second assertion is that “[t]o the extent that any foreign authority might apply to this situation, Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1997), provides a much more appropriate analysis.” CMP contends—apparently correctly so— that “Payne stands for the proposition that a federal district court acts within the scope of the authority granted it by [r]ule 37(b)(2) of

2025Accordingly, we do not know the outcome of that challenge. (continued . . .) 10 Cite as: 2025 UT 49 Opinion of the Court CONCLUSION ¶31 Talisker alleges that Lenders engaged in a plethora of unsavory behaviors to buy up Talisker’s collateral at bargain prices.

2023But because the changes do not affect our analysis here, we cite the current version. 8 STATE v. OGDEN Cite as 2023 UT 23 ¶32 The fact that the PCRA’s procedural barriers may prevent Ogden from litigating the merits of his claim does not affect the outcome of our analysis.

2021Under these circumstances, Littlejohn has not demonstrated that there exists a reasonable probability that the outcome of the hearing would have been different had the court had access to the Assessment Report. ¶38 For these reasons, we conclude that Littlejohn has not carried his burden of demonstrating that Counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance during sentencing. 20200224-CA 20 2021 UT App 73 State v. Littlejohn CONCLUSION ¶39 We lack appellate jurisdiction to address Littlejohn’s challenges to the propriety of his guilty plea.

2020A. The Prosecution Did Not Suppress Evidence ¶38 Newton argues that the prosecution had “a constitutional obligation to seek out any evidence on [M.F.’s] phone, regardless of whether it thought that the phone would contain anything of value” because “[p]rosecutors have an affirmative duty to seek out, analyze, i.e., look at the evidence solely within the hands of the prosecution team.” The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that “the State did not commit a Brady violation when it did not independently conduct a forensic examination of [M.F.]’s cell phone.” State v. Newton, 2018 U

2020A. The Prosecution Did Not Suppress Evidence ¶38 Newton argues that the prosecution had “a constitutional obligation to seek out any evidence on [M.F.’s] phone, regardless of whether it thought that the phone would contain anything of value” because “[p]rosecutors have an affirmative duty to seek out, analyze, i.e., look at the evidence solely within the hands of the prosecution team.” The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that “the State did not commit a Brady violation when it did not independently conduct a forensic examination of [M.F.]’s cell phone.” State v. Newton, 2018 U

2020And Whytock defended the witness tampering charge by asserting that he did not threaten S.B. at all, and that his statement to Stepfather was simply meant to remind S.B. to 20180440-CA 21 2020 UT App 107 State v. Whytock be “truthful” and to disavow any previous “false” statements she might have made; he never defended against the witness tampering charge by asserting that he had in fact tampered with a witness but had done so with a less culpable mental state. ¶48 When weighing whether prejudice exists, we “consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury and then ask if the def

2020Jeor, 2015 UT 49, ¶ 13 . 16 Id. (“It would be fundamentally unfair for this court to alter course post hoc and foreclose [a party’s] suit simply because [the other party] disagrees with the outcome of the rule.”). 17 1999 UT 49, ¶ 9 .

2020In this context, district courts not only have discretion, they have “broad discretion.” Jones v. Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ¶ 17 , 214 P.3d 859 (emphasis added); see also Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, ¶ 7 , 104 P.3d 1198 (“The outcome of rule 60(b) motions are rarely vulnerable to attack.

2020In this context, district courts not only have discretion, they have “broad discretion.” Jones v. Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ¶ 17 , 214 P.3d 859 (emphasis added); see also Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, ¶ 7 , 104 P.3d 1198 (“The outcome of rule 60(b) motions are rarely vulnerable to attack.

2020And even if we were to consider it, it would not change the outcome of our analysis: Newton points to no testimony—even posttrial testimony—that M.F. sustained injuries during that alleged incident in the forest. 14 Cite at: 2020 UT 24 Opinion of the Court and third elements, we affirm the court of appeals without addressing the second element.

2012Thus, even if the Board did err in treating his motion to reopen the evidence as an appeal, any error was harmless. 3 See Smith v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2010 UT App 382, ¶ 23 , 245 P.3d 758 ("[E]ven resolving any doubt in [claimant's] favor, she has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the hearing." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2012Thus, even if the Board did err in treating his motion to reopen the evidence as an appeal, any error was harmless. 3 See Smith v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2010 UT App 382, ¶ 23 , 245 P.3d 758 ("[E]ven resolving any doubt in [claimant's] favor, she has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the hearing." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2010Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (citing Angell, 750 P.2d at 613 ). 18 The question before us then is whether, resolving any doubt in Smith's favor, Smith has demonstrated that the exclusion of her representative was sufficiently consequential that there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the hearing.