11 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Willis v. County of Sherburnegreen2 sentences2016We explained that the district court did not have subject- matter jurisdiction over an unjust-enrichment claim brought by the county because “the outcome of the claim” depended “upon the validity of [a] . . . quasi-judicial decision.” Id. 3 It is true that we characterized the defamation claims from Willis v. County of Sherburne, as “separate and distinct” from the County’s decision to terminate Willis’s employment. 555 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Minn. 1996). 2012Id. | 1 | 2 |
Williams v. Smithgreen1 sentence2016We explained that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over ah unjust-enrichment claim brought by the county because “the outcome of the claim” depended “upon the validity of [a] ... quasi-judicial decision.” Id. at 542 ., Under the rule from County of Washington, “[w]hen the underlying basis of the claim requires review of a municipality’s quasi-judicial decision to determine its-validity” — that is, whether the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious — then the “exclusive method of review is by certiorari under chapter 606.” Id.; see also Williams v. Smith, | 1 | 1 |
Mize v. Kendallgreen1 sentence2016See Mize v. Kendall, 621 N.W.2d 804 , 807–09 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in awarding conduct-based attorney fees to respondent where appellants asserted a claim that could only be resolved after a factual determination), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Dietz v. Dodge Countygreen1 sentence2016We explained that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over ah unjust-enrichment claim brought by the county because “the outcome of the claim” depended “upon the validity of [a] ... quasi-judicial decision.” Id. at 542 ., Under the rule from County of Washington, “[w]hen the underlying basis of the claim requires review of a municipality’s quasi-judicial decision to determine its-validity” — that is, whether the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious — then the “exclusive method of review is by certiorari under chapter 606.” Id.; see also Williams v. Smith, | 1 | 1 |
Correll v. Distinctive Dental Services, P.A.green1 sentence2000See Correll, D.D.S., 594 N.W.2d at 224-25 . | 1 | 1 |
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tullygreen2 sentences1986See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 55 N.Y.2d 364 , 449 N.Y.S.2d 677 , . 434 N.E.2d 1044 (1982), reversed, 466 U.S. 388 , 104 S.Ct. 1856 , 80 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984). 1986See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 55 N.Y.2d 364 , 449 N.Y.S.2d 677 , . 434 N.E.2d 1044 (1982), reversed, 466 U.S. 388 , 104 S.Ct. 1856 , 80 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tullygreen2 sentences1986See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 55 N.Y.2d 364 , 449 N.Y.S.2d 677 , . 434 N.E.2d 1044 (1982), reversed, 466 U.S. 388 , 104 S.Ct. 1856 , 80 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984). 1986See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 55 N.Y.2d 364 , 449 N.Y.S.2d 677 , . 434 N.E.2d 1044 (1982), reversed, 466 U.S. 388 , 104 S.Ct. 1856 , 80 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Heddan v. Dirkswager
green
2 sentences2005Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 60 (citing Montrym, 443 U.S. at 11-12 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ). 6 The other factors from Mathews — the risk of erroneous deprivation and the government’s interest— have not changed since we last approved the constitutionality of the Implied Consent Law. 7 Accordingly, we must determine whether immediately available administrative review, combined with the now unspecified period for judicial review, provides a sufficiently meaningful postre-vocation review that protects the driver’s private interest, and consequently the driver’s due process rights. 1994See id.; Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 59-60 . | 2 | 1994–2005 |
MacKey v. Montrym
green
2 sentences2005Heddan, 336 N.W.2d at 60 (citing Montrym, 443 U.S. at 11-12 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ). 6 The other factors from Mathews — the risk of erroneous deprivation and the government’s interest— have not changed since we last approved the constitutionality of the Implied Consent Law. 7 Accordingly, we must determine whether immediately available administrative review, combined with the now unspecified period for judicial review, provides a sufficiently meaningful postre-vocation review that protects the driver’s private interest, and consequently the driver’s due process rights. 1995As in Montrym , “the driver’s interest is in continued possession and use of his license pending the outcome of the hearing due him.” Id. | 2 | 1995–2005 |
Fedziuk v. Commissioner of Public Safety
green
1 sentence2018The supreme court noted that "[b]y eliminating the requirement for prompt postrevocation judicial review, the 2003 amendments affected the driver's private interest in continued possession and use of the license pending the outcome of a hearing, the first part of the three-part test from Mathews ." Id. at 346 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
County of Washington v. City of Oak Park Heights
green
2 sentences2016We explained that the district court did not have subject- matter jurisdiction over an unjust-enrichment claim brought by the county because “the outcome of the claim” depended “upon the validity of [a] . . . quasi-judicial decision.” Id. 3 It is true that we characterized the defamation claims from Willis v. County of Sherburne, as “separate and distinct” from the County’s decision to terminate Willis’s employment. 555 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Minn. 1996). 2016We explained that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over ah unjust-enrichment claim brought by the county because “the outcome of the claim” depended “upon the validity of [a] ... quasi-judicial decision.” Id. at 542 ., Under the rule from County of Washington, “[w]hen the underlying basis of the claim requires review of a municipality’s quasi-judicial decision to determine its-validity” — that is, whether the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious — then the “exclusive method of review is by certiorari under chapter 606.” Id.; see also Williams v. Smith, | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Dillon v. State
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Dixon v. Love
green
2 sentences1983The court in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 , 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977), recognized this interest as a substantial one, particularly in light of the fact that the state will be unable to make a driver whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by reason of an erroneous suspension. 1983The court in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 , 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977), recognized this interest as a substantial one, particularly in light of the fact that the state will be unable to make a driver whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by reason of an erroneous suspension. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.