outcome hearing in California

2023(See In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 , 611; In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769 , 779- 782, review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.) Until the court does so, we will apply this court’s decision in Benjamin M. 6 whatever the outcome of the inquiry may be.” (Ricky R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 680.) The Department argues no prejudicial error occurred under this court’s decisions in Benjamin M. and Ricky R., because those cases involve distinguishable facts.

2022(See In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 , 611; In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769 , 779- 782, review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.) Until the court does so, we will apply this court’s decision in Benjamin M. 6 whatever the outcome of the inquiry may be.” (Ricky R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 680.) The Department argues no prejudicial error occurred under this court’s decisions in Benjamin M. and Ricky R., because those cases involve distinguishable facts.

2008(See Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 590 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 904 P.2d 1205 ]; Horne v. Peckham (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 404, 417 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 714 ]; Fazio v. Hayhurst (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 200, 203 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 370 ].) “[I]f the propriety of an attorney’s advice is contingent on the outcome of a claim by or against the client, the client does not sustain actual injury until the claim is resolved adversely, which indicates both that the attorney erred and that the error caused harm.” (Van Dyke v. Dunker & Aced (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 446, 453 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 862 ]; see also Baltins v. J

2008(See Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 590 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 904 P.2d 1205 ]; Horne v. Peckham (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 404, 417 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 714 ]; Fazio v. Hayhurst (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 200, 203 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 370 ].) “[I]f the propriety of an attorney’s advice is contingent on the outcome of a claim by or against the client, the client does not sustain actual injury until the claim is resolved adversely, which indicates both that the attorney erred and that the error caused harm.” (Van Dyke v. Dunker & Aced (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 446, 453 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 862 ]; see also Baltins v. J

2016Reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable the jury would have returned a different verdict absent the error or errors complained of. [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 867-868, fn. omitted.) “[E]vidence sufficient to warrant an instruction on a lesser included offense does not necessarily amount to evidence sufficient to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the instruction been given. [Citations.]” (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1161 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 391, fn. 3 .) Here, t

2014(See id. at p. 1267 [reasonable probability of a different outcome standard generally applies to erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense]; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 872 [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard may apply when omission of lesser included offense instruction deprived defendant of right to present complete defense].) The rationale for requiring instruction on lesser included offenses is to avoid forcing the jury into an " 'unwarranted all-or-nothing choice' " which creates the risk the jury will convict on the charged offense even though one of

2022“Ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment entails deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a similarly objective standard of a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the deficient performance.” (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1202, fn. 11 , citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687–696 (Strickland).) Because we conclude that any prosecutorial misconduct was harmless, defendant cannot meet his burden of showing a reasonable probability of a different outcome had

2022If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of Defendant’s alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for the same reason. 7 “Ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment entails deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a similarly objective standard of a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the deficient performance.” (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1202, fn. 11 , citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687–696 (

2020The deputy’s remark constituted “an error in the trial process,” and is readily distinguishable from errors that have been viewed as structural, such as “denial of counsel or of self-representation, racial discrimination in jury selection, and trial before a biased judge.” (Aranda, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 364.) Nor does appellant demonstrate that any error was prejudicial under either Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard] or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [reasonable probability that the error did not affect the outcome standard]

2016If the intervening cause is a normal and reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s act, it is deemed “dependent” and will not relieve defendant of liability. 13 In Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th 1113 , the court found the failure to instruct on second degree murder harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 , noting that evidence sufficient to warrant an instruction on a lesser included offense does not necessarily amount to evidence sufficient to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the instruction been given.

2026(Breverman, at p. 165; Watson, at p. 836.) Moreover, “evidence sufficient to warrant an instruction on a lesser included offense does not necessarily amount to evidence sufficient to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the instruction been given.” (Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1161 , italics added; accord, People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 929 ; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177.) Where the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict of guilt is so relatively strong, 32 “and the evidence supporting a different outcome [is] so comparatively weak . . . there is no

2014(See People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 929 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 , 153 P.3d 955 ]; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 176 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ].) Here, there is no reasonable probability that the evidence of an argument between defendant and Foster, minimal as it was, would have led the jury, had it been properly instructed, to conclude that defendant shot Foster at the ATM out of malice unrelated to any robbery.

2024(Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 8.) Notice enables the tribe to decide whether a child is Indian “and, if so, whether to intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the 32 In re DEZI C.

2024(Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 8.) Notice enables the tribe to decide whether a child is Indian “and, if so, whether to intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the 32 In re DEZI C.

2017Third, Cervantes argues that the sentence imposed on him is the functional equivalent of life without possibility of parole and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment under Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 [ 176 L.Ed.2d 825 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 ] (Graham) and People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 [ 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 , 282 P.3d 291 ] (Caballero).

2017Third, Cervantes argues that the sentence imposed on him is the functional equivalent of life without possibility of parole and therefore violates the Eighth 2 Amendment under Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 (Graham) and People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Caballero).

2016Reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable the jury would have returned a different verdict absent the error or errors complained of. [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 867-868, fn. omitted.) “[E]vidence sufficient to warrant an instruction on a lesser included offense does not necessarily amount to evidence sufficient to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the instruction been given. [Citations.]” (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1161 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 391, fn. 3 .) Here, t

2015(Watson, at pp. 836-837.) “[E]vidence sufficient to warrant an instruction on a lesser included offense does not necessarily amount to evidence sufficient to create a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the instruction been given.” (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1161 , abrogated on another point by People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 391, fn. 3 .) In that case, the court stated that even when there was “‘some evidence’” to the contrary, 6 “the far more plausible inference” supported the jury’s verdict, and the trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included of

2015(People v. Salas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 984 [prejudice test for failure to instruct on defense not yet determined]; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 871-872 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ] [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies when error deprives defendant of right to present complete defense]; People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 23 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407 , 137 P.3d 229 ].) The key disputed issue at trial was whether the amount of marijuana grown and possessed by defendant exceeded a legitimate medical purpose.

2014(See People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089 ; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 868, fn. 16, 872 ; see also People v. Salas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 984 .) Given our reversal even under the state law standard, we need not discuss defendant's contentions that the failure to instruct on self- 15 apparently finding defendant either did not threaten to harm Daniel, or if she did, she was merely expressing her anger at him and did not mean for Daniel to take it seriously.

2013(See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. (1988) 485 U.S. 439, 445 ["A fundamental and long-standing principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them"].) Such an 56 approach also allows for the possibility that any future litigation over the validity of the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction over the development mandated by the Nuisance Abatement Ordinance will be unencumbered by what might well become essentially an advisory opinion from this court concerning the related, but dist

2013(See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. (1988) 485 U.S. 439, 445 ["A fundamental and long-standing principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them"].) Such an 56 approach also allows for the possibility that any future litigation over the validity of the Commission's exercise of jurisdiction over the development mandated by the Nuisance Abatement Ordinance will be unencumbered by what might well become essentially an advisory opinion from this court concerning the related, but dist

2013(See, e.g., People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 381 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 949 P.2d 947 ] [“The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause returnable before the Orange County Superior Court, and it ordered that the appeal be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the hearing on the order to show cause.”]; Eddins v. Redstone (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 290, 302, fn. 6 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 863 ] [“This court deferred consideration of the appeal plaintiffs filed from the trial court’s ruling denying class certification, and that appeal will become moot upon the finality of this decision.”]; Medit

2013(See, e.g., People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 381 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 949 P.2d 947 ] [“The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause returnable before the Orange County Superior Court, and it ordered that the appeal be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the hearing on the order to show cause.”]; Eddins v. Redstone (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 290, 302, fn. 6 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 863 ] [“This court deferred consideration of the appeal plaintiffs filed from the trial court’s ruling denying class certification, and that appeal will become moot upon the finality of this decision.”]; Medit

2013(See, e.g., People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 381 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 949 P.2d 947 ] [“The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause returnable before the Orange County Superior Court, and it ordered that the appeal be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the hearing on the order to show cause.”]; Eddins v. Redstone (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 290, 302, fn. 6 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 863 ] [“This court deferred consideration of the appeal plaintiffs filed from the trial court’s ruling denying class certification, and that appeal will become moot upon the finality of this decision.”]; Medit

2013(See, e.g., People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 381 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 949 P.2d 947 ] [“The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause returnable before the Orange County Superior Court, and it ordered that the appeal be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the hearing on the order to show cause.”]; Eddins v. Redstone (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 290, 302, fn. 6 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 863 ] [“This court deferred consideration of the appeal plaintiffs filed from the trial court’s ruling denying class certification, and that appeal will become moot upon the finality of this decision.”]; Medit

2013(See, e.g., People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 381 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 949 P.2d 947 ] [“The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause returnable before the Orange County Superior Court, and it ordered that the appeal be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the hearing on the order to show cause.”]; Eddins v. Redstone (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 290, 302, fn. 6 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 863 ] [“This court deferred consideration of the appeal plaintiffs filed from the trial court’s ruling denying class certification, and that appeal will become moot upon the finality of this decision.”]; Medit

2013(See, e.g., People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 381 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 850 , 949 P.2d 947 ] [“The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause returnable before the Orange County Superior Court, and it ordered that the appeal be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the hearing on the order to show cause.”]; Eddins v. Redstone (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 290, 302, fn. 6 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 863 ] [“This court deferred consideration of the appeal plaintiffs filed from the trial court’s ruling denying class certification, and that appeal will become moot upon the finality of this decision.”]; Medit

2022“Ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment entails deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a similarly objective standard of a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the deficient performance.” (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1202, fn. 11 , citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687–696 (Strickland).) Because we conclude that any prosecutorial misconduct was harmless, defendant cannot meet his burden of showing a reasonable probability of a different outcome had

2022If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of Defendant’s alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for the same reason. 7 “Ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment entails deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a similarly objective standard of a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the deficient performance.” (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1202, fn. 11 , citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687–696 (

2024(Id. at pp. 739-741 & 740, fn. 2.) Thus, under Morongo, we presume the Board’s impartiality, unless Stronghold can overcome the presumption “by specific evidence demonstrating actual bias or a particular combination of circumstances creating an unacceptable risk of bias.” ( Morongo, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 741-742.) Stronghold has failed to present such evidence. 10 Relying on Ward v. Monroeville (1972) 409 U.S. 57 (Ward), Stronghold suggests that Salameh and the Board had a financial interest in the outcome of the hearing because penalties are paid to the City.

2018In citing Todd with approval, our Supreme Court stated, "A councilman has not only a *580 right but an obligation to discuss issues of vital concern with his constituents ...." ( City of Fairfield v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 768 , 780, 122 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 537 P.2d 375 .) Unless a decisionmaker has a financial interest in the outcome of the hearing, he or she is presumed to be impartial. ( Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 731 , 737, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 610 , 199 P.3d 1142 .) Bias and prejudice must be established by clear evidence. ( Break

2020The deputy’s remark constituted “an error in the trial process,” and is readily distinguishable from errors that have been viewed as structural, such as “denial of counsel or of self-representation, racial discrimination in jury selection, and trial before a biased judge.” (Aranda, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 364.) Nor does appellant demonstrate that any error was prejudicial under either Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard] or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [reasonable probability that the error did not affect the outcome standard]

2014Therefore, we apply the Watson15 standard: we must decide whether there is a reasonable 14 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . 15 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 . 19 probability that, had Mother been allowed to represent herself at the section 366.26 hearing, the outcome of the hearing would have been different.

2025(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966 .) Marks’s presence would not have affected the outcome of the hearing, especially when the jury instructions and verdict entirely established that he was the sole direct perpetrator who intended to kill the victims. 10 DISPOSITION We affirm the trial court’s order denying Marks’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.

2022Thus, if the trial court erred in failing to admit such evidence, the court violated state statutory law and its error was harmless unless defendant can show it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. ( Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, at p. 973 [“when an ‘error is purely one of state law, the Watson harmless error test applies’ ”]; People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688 , 706 [evidentiary error at § 1170.95 order to show cause hearing assessed under Watson standard]; People v. Johnson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 953, 968 [applying Watson test to trial

2020(Ibid.) The court stated: “Even the ‘mere probability’ that a certain event would have happened will not furnish the foundation for malpractice damages. ‘ “ ‘Damages to be subject to a proper award must be such as follows the act complained of as a legal certainty.’ ” [Citations.]’ (Barnard v. Langer 27. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1453 , 1461-1462, italics omitted.)” (Shopoff, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1511 .) Reading the opinion as a whole, we conclude Shopoff’s reference to “legal certainty” means the certainty established under the preponderance of the evidence standard.

2008Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1223 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 ].) Even the “mere probability” that a certain event would have happened will not furnish the foundation for malpractice damages. “ ‘ “Damages to be subject to a proper award must be such as follows the act complained of as a legal certainty.” ’ [Citations.]” (Barnard v. Langer (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1461-1462 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 175 ], italics omitted.) *1512 The trial court recognized that Hyon “may be able to state damages,” particularly associated with the $2.6 million debt he incurred in the GSA, and thus granted him the opportun

2017(See Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1091, 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 135 [court's minute order is final ruling unless it includes a provision directing a party to prepare a formal order].) In its response to our request for additional briefing on the issue of invited error, PCM also suggests it was simply complying with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 ( rule 3.1312 ), when it submitted its proposed *1208 order.

2017(See Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074 , 1091, 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 135 [court's minute order is final ruling unless it includes a provision directing a party to prepare a formal order].) In its response to our request for additional briefing on the issue of invited error, PCM also suggests it was simply complying with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 ( rule 3.1312 ), when it submitted its proposed *1208 order.

2015(Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177 .) Indeed, the jury expressly rejected the theory that Pereira was guilty of the lesser included theft offense.

2014(See People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 929 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865 , 153 P.3d 955 ]; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 176 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ].) Here, there is no reasonable probability that the evidence of an argument between defendant and Foster, minimal as it was, would have led the jury, had it been properly instructed, to conclude that defendant shot Foster at the ATM out of malice unrelated to any robbery.

2014(People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171 , 217–218.) This requires more than a showing that, as the conservatee argues, the advice “precluded him from presenting to the court information and argument he felt was urgent.” Rather, the conservatee must show that the outcome of the hearing likely would have been different had his counsel not rendered ineffective assistance.

1996(In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1264-1266 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 491 , 774 P.2d 164 ]; In re Cordero, supra, 46 Cal.3d 161, 180 ; see also People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 191-227 [cumulative error held to be prejudicial in habeas corpus proceedings consolidated with the defendant’s appeal].) In examining whether the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s errors at the guilt phase of the trial undermines our confidence in the outcome under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 694 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-698 ], our analysis is framed by those specific cont

2014(In re James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 911, fn. 1, 918-919.) This language was considered in In re Esmeralda S. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 84 , which concluded that the “outcome of the proceeding” referred, not to the outcome of the appointment of the guardian, but rather the outcome of the hearing from which the appeal was properly taken.

2011(See In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 915 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 174 P.3d 180 ], quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 150 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 409 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 ]; see also Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 760 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 407 ] [denial of mother’s request for contested selection and implementation hearing was not subject to harmless error analysis].) Although we do not speculate on the outcome of the hearing on remand, we note the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion in resolving the conflicting paternity interests will be constrained by “