outcome challenge in Pennsylvania

2019Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 704 (Pa. 2008).

2017Therefore, in order to establish prejudice for an ineffectiveness claim involving the waiver of a jury trial, the Mallory Court held that a defendant “must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s constitutionally deficient service, the outcome of the waiver proceeding would have been different, i.e., that he would not have waived his right to a jury trial.” Id. at 704 .

2025To have a substantial interest, the concern in the outcome of the challenge must surpass “the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.” Id.

2024Res., 555 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1989); Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165, 1168 (Pa. 1981)). 47 Pittsburgh Palisades Park, 888 A.2d at 659 -60 (citing In re Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243 ; City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 577 ). 48 Id. at 660 . 49 FOAC, 261 A.3d at 481 (quoting Donahue, 98 A.3d at 1229 ). [J-43-2023] - 16 PSEA’s averments easily establish the traditional requisites of a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of its challenge to PSERB’s Resolution.

2024Res., 555 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1989); Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165, 1168 (Pa. 1981)). 47 Pittsburgh Palisades Park, 888 A.2d at 659 -60 (citing In re Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243 ; City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 577 ). 48 Id. at 660 . 49 FOAC, 261 A.3d at 481 (quoting Donahue, 98 A.3d at 1229 ). [J-43-2023] - 16 PSEA’s averments easily establish the traditional requisites of a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of its challenge to PSERB’s Resolution.

2024Res., 555 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1989); Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165, 1168 (Pa. 1981)). 47 Pittsburgh Palisades Park, 888 A.2d at 659 -60 (citing In re Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243 ; City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 577 ). 48 Id. at 660 . 49 FOAC, 261 A.3d at 481 (quoting Donahue, 98 A.3d at 1229 ). [J-43-2023] - 16 PSEA’s averments easily establish the traditional requisites of a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of its challenge to PSERB’s Resolution.

2024Res., 555 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1989); Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165, 1168 (Pa. 1981)). 47 Pittsburgh Palisades Park, 888 A.2d at 659 -60 (citing In re Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243 ; City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 577 ). 48 Id. at 660 . 49 FOAC, 261 A.3d at 481 (quoting Donahue, 98 A.3d at 1229 ). [J-43-2023] - 16 PSEA’s averments easily establish the traditional requisites of a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of its challenge to PSERB’s Resolution.

2024Res., 555 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1989); Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165, 1168 (Pa. 1981)). 47 Pittsburgh Palisades Park, 888 A.2d at 659 -60 (citing In re Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243 ; City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 577 ). 48 Id. at 660 . 49 FOAC, 261 A.3d at 481 (quoting Donahue, 98 A.3d at 1229 ). [J-43-2023] - 16 PSEA’s averments easily establish the traditional requisites of a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of its challenge to PSERB’s Resolution.

2008It has long been established that "[w]here a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive." Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 63 , 192 A.2d 367, 369 (1963). [10] This Court has explained that "where a statutory remedy exists, it is exclusive unless the jurisdiction of the courts is preserved thereby." Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 541 , 417 A.2d 260, 264 (1980) (emphasis added) (holding that a litigant could not avoid the procedure prescribed by statute in favor of a clas

2008It has long been established that "[w]here a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive." Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 63 , 192 A.2d 367, 369 (1963). [10] This Court has explained that "where a statutory remedy exists, it is exclusive unless the jurisdiction of the courts is preserved thereby." Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 541 , 417 A.2d 260, 264 (1980) (emphasis added) (holding that a litigant could not avoid the procedure prescribed by statute in favor of a clas

2008It has long been established that "[w]here a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive." Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 63 , 192 A.2d 367, 369 (1963). [10] This Court has explained that "where a statutory remedy exists, it is exclusive unless the jurisdiction of the courts is preserved thereby." Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 541 , 417 A.2d 260, 264 (1980) (emphasis added) (holding that a litigant could not avoid the procedure prescribed by statute in favor of a clas

2008It has long been established that "[w]here a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive." Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 63 , 192 A.2d 367, 369 (1963). [10] This Court has explained that "where a statutory remedy exists, it is exclusive unless the jurisdiction of the courts is preserved thereby." Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 541 , 417 A.2d 260, 264 (1980) (emphasis added) (holding that a litigant could not avoid the procedure prescribed by statute in favor of a clas

2024Res., 555 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1989); Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165, 1168 (Pa. 1981)). 47 Pittsburgh Palisades Park, 888 A.2d at 659 -60 (citing In re Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243 ; City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 577 ). 48 Id. at 660 . 49 FOAC, 261 A.3d at 481 (quoting Donahue, 98 A.3d at 1229 ). [J-43-2023] - 16 PSEA’s averments easily establish the traditional requisites of a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of its challenge to PSERB’s Resolution.

2024Res., 555 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa. 1989); Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165, 1168 (Pa. 1981)). 47 Pittsburgh Palisades Park, 888 A.2d at 659 -60 (citing In re Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243 ; City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 577 ). 48 Id. at 660 . 49 FOAC, 261 A.3d at 481 (quoting Donahue, 98 A.3d at 1229 ). [J-43-2023] - 16 PSEA’s averments easily establish the traditional requisites of a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of its challenge to PSERB’s Resolution.

2021Id. at 1005-06 .

2020In Commonwealth v. Walker, this Court concluded that the prejudice at issue in a claim that counsel was ineffective when providing advice regarding the defendant’s testimony is whether the outcome of the waiver proceeding would have been different, that is, whether the defendant would have testified at trial. 110 A.3d 1000, 1005 (Pa.Super. 2015).

2015See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 597 Pa. 240 , 951 A.2d 267, 281-282 (2008) (applying the prejudice standard in Mallory to claim that counsel ineffectively caused the appellant to unknowingly and involuntarily waive his right to present mitigation evidence at his death penalty hearing; stating, “[i]n short, he has not shown that the outcome of his waiver of mitigation would have been different but for counsel’s inaction.”); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17 , 18 A.3d 244, 263-264 (2011) (applying the prejudice standard announced in Mallory to a claim that counsel’s ineffectiveness caused the appell

2015See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 597 Pa. 240 , 951 A.2d 267, 281-282 (2008) (applying the prejudice standard in Mallory to claim that counsel ineffectively caused the appellant to unknowingly and involuntarily waive his right to present mitigation evidence at his death penalty hearing; stating, “[i]n short, he has not shown that the outcome of his waiver of mitigation would have been different but for counsel’s inaction.”); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17 , 18 A.3d 244, 263-264 (2011) (applying the prejudice standard announced in Mallory to a claim that counsel’s ineffectiveness caused the appell

2026See Com[monwealth] v. Rodriquez, 462 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Pa. Super. 1983) … (“Additionally, in assessing the defendant’s credibility, the factfinder could consider that the defendant had a vital interest in the outcome of the trial.”)[.] [The juvenile court] weighed [Appellant]’s interest in the outcome of the hearing and the lack of evidence of any motive by C.M. to fabricate th[e] incident.

2026See Com[monwealth] v. Rodriquez, 462 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Pa. Super. 1983) … (“Additionally, in assessing the defendant’s credibility, the factfinder could consider that the defendant had a vital interest in the outcome of the trial.”)[.] [The juvenile court] weighed [Appellant]’s interest in the outcome of the hearing and the lack of evidence of any motive by C.M. to fabricate th[e] incident.

2024Further, a PCRA petitioner “may not obtain post-conviction relief by claiming that he lied during his waiver colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 645 A.2d 274, 277 (Pa.Super. 1994).

2022Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 131 A.3d 54, 58 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Alleyne does not invalidate a mandatory minimum sentence when presented in an untimely PCRA petition.” (citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988 , 995-96 (Pa. Super. 2014))).

2020In Commonwealth v. Towles, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to determine whether this was the appropriate standard for such a claim. 208 A.3d 988, 1003 (Pa. 2019).

2020See Commonwealth v. Sodomsky, 137 A.3d 620, 629 (Pa. Super. 2016). -6-

2020Id. at 292 ; see also Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1273 (Pa. 2014) (affirming denial of PCRA relief because the defendant, who did not testify at the PCRA hearing, “presented no testimony or evidence at the PCRA hearing indicating trial counsel advised [the defendant] that, if he pled - 26 - guilty, absolutely no evidence of the sexual offenses would be presented to the jury during the guilt or penalty phases.”).

2015See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 597 Pa. 240 , 951 A.2d 267, 281-282 (2008) (applying the prejudice standard in Mallory to claim that counsel ineffectively caused the appellant to unknowingly and involuntarily waive his right to present mitigation evidence at his death penalty hearing; stating, “[i]n short, he has not shown that the outcome of his waiver of mitigation would have been different but for counsel’s inaction.”); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17 , 18 A.3d 244, 263-264 (2011) (applying the prejudice standard announced in Mallory to a claim that counsel’s ineffectiveness caused the appell

2015See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 597 Pa. 240 , 951 A.2d 267, 281-282 (2008) (applying the prejudice standard in Mallory to claim that counsel ineffectively caused the appellant to unknowingly and involuntarily waive his right to present mitigation evidence at his death penalty hearing; stating, “[i]n short, he has not shown that the outcome of his waiver of mitigation would have been different but for counsel’s inaction.”); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17 , 18 A.3d 244, 263-264 (2011) (applying the prejudice standard announced in Mallory to a claim that counsel’s ineffectiveness caused the appell

2014Sokolsky, 93 A.3d at 870-71 (internal citations omitted).

2011Vale Chemical Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 512 Pa. 290 , 516 A.2d 684, 688 (1986).

2011Vale Chemical Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 512 Pa. 290 , 516 A.2d 684, 688 (1986).