outcome hearing in Ohio

2007Miller , supra (notice was sufficient when the appellant failed to show any prejudice as a result of the notice he did receive prior to the revocation hearing); see, also, State v. Hannah (Dec. 15, 1998), Franklin App. No. 98AP-518, citing Long , supra (the plain error doctrine permits an appellate court to reverse the judgment of the trial court if the error is of such nature that the outcome of the hearing would have been otherwise but for the error). {¶ 14} As the record is devoid of any suggestion that appellant did not freely admit to the municipal court conviction as a community control

2004Id. (notice was sufficient when the appellant failed to show any prejudice as a result of the notice he did receive prior to the revocation hearing); see, also, State v. Hannah (Dec. 15, 1998), Franklin App. No. 98AP-518, citing Long, supra, at 97 (the plain error doctrine permits an appellate court to reverse the judgment of the trial court if the error is of such nature that the outcome of the hearing would have been otherwise but for the error).

2020Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694 . {¶ 13} Decker's second assignment of error is sustained.

2003Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 ; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136 . {¶ 31} In order to assess whether the failure of counsel to ensure the admission of this evidence was prejudicial, however, this court must be able to see the evidence.

2026“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” State v. Sanders, 94 Ohio St.3d 150, 151 (2002). {¶ 59} Having determined that the erroneous admission of the bill of sale constituted harmless error, it follows that Prichard cannot show that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome had defense counsel raised additional objections to its admission or had not produced the document in the first place.

2026See State v. Kinney, 2025-Ohio-1620, ¶ 92 (6th Dist.) (“[W]e have already determined that the admission of those statements was harmless error, thus there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had trial 21. counsel objected to those statements.”); State v. Adams, 106 Ohio App.3d 139, 145 (10th Dist. 1995) (“Having determined that the erroneous admission of State’s exhibit No. 4 did not prejudice defendant, the failure to object to the admission of this evidence did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

2026See State v. Cebula, 2014-Ohio-3276, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), citing R.C. 2951.041(A)(1) ("If the trial court 'considers' the ILC motion, the trial court must then hold a hearing to determine if the defendant is -6- Warren CA2025-05-035 eligible."); State v. Branch, 2013-Ohio-2350, ¶ 11 (2nd Dist.) ("If the court elects to consider an offender's request, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the offender is statutorily eligible for ILC and must stay all criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the hearing."). {¶ 18} But suggesting, as Mason does, that the trial court here erred by

2026See State v. Cebula, 2014-Ohio-3276, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), citing R.C. 2951.041(A)(1) ("If the trial court 'considers' the ILC motion, the trial court must then hold a hearing to determine if the defendant is -6- Warren CA2025-05-035 eligible."); State v. Branch, 2013-Ohio-2350, ¶ 11 (2nd Dist.) ("If the court elects to consider an offender's request, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the offender is statutorily eligible for ILC and must stay all criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the hearing."). {¶ 18} But suggesting, as Mason does, that the trial court here erred by

2026See State v. Cebula, 2014-Ohio-3276, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), citing R.C. 2951.041(A)(1) ("If the trial court 'considers' the ILC motion, the trial court must then hold a hearing to determine if the defendant is -6- Warren CA2025-05-035 eligible."); State v. Branch, 2013-Ohio-2350, ¶ 11 (2nd Dist.) ("If the court elects to consider an offender's request, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the offender is statutorily eligible for ILC and must stay all criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the hearing."). {¶ 18} But suggesting, as Mason does, that the trial court here erred by

2026See State v. Cebula, 2014-Ohio-3276, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), citing R.C. 2951.041(A)(1) ("If the trial court 'considers' the ILC motion, the trial court must then hold a hearing to determine if the defendant is -6- Warren CA2025-05-035 eligible."); State v. Branch, 2013-Ohio-2350, ¶ 11 (2nd Dist.) ("If the court elects to consider an offender's request, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the offender is statutorily eligible for ILC and must stay all criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the hearing."). {¶ 18} But suggesting, as Mason does, that the trial court here erred by

2026See State v. Kinney, 2025-Ohio-1620, ¶ 92 (6th Dist.) (“[W]e have already determined that the admission of those statements was harmless error, thus there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had trial 21. counsel objected to those statements.”); State v. Adams, 106 Ohio App.3d 139, 145 (10th Dist. 1995) (“Having determined that the erroneous admission of State’s exhibit No. 4 did not prejudice defendant, the failure to object to the admission of this evidence did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

2020Fletcher, 68 Ohio St.3d at 470. “[A]ssistance of counsel may in some cases be necessary for a fully informed and considered decision to sign.

2020Fletcher, 68 Ohio St.3d at 470 . “[A]ssistance of counsel may in some cases be necessary for a fully informed and considered decision to sign.

2017Greene Nos. 2012CA32, 2012CA33, 2012-Ohio-6049, ¶ 29 (finding that where an incarcerated parent was represented by separate counsel, a record was made, and the parent did not identify additional testimony that the parent would provide that would affect the outcome of the hearing, there was no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to convey); In re M.R., 2d Dist.

2014See Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 836 , 129 S.Ct. 2145 , 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (2009), quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (“ ‘[R]eliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury’ ”). 55 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Moreover, Maxwell fails to show prejudice, as it cannot be said that there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had defense counsel argued Maxwell’s low intelligence as a mitigating factor. b.

2014See Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 836 , 129 S.Ct. 2145 , 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (2009), quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (“ ‘[R]eliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury’ ”). 55 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Moreover, Maxwell fails to show prejudice, as it cannot be said that there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had defense counsel argued Maxwell’s low intelligence as a mitigating factor. b.

2014See Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 836 , 129 S.Ct. 2145 , 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (2009), quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (“ ‘[R]eliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury’ ”). 55 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Moreover, Maxwell fails to show prejudice, as it cannot be said that there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had defense counsel argued Maxwell’s low intelligence as a mitigating factor. b.

2014See Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 836 , 129 S.Ct. 2145 , 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (2009), quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 , 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (“ ‘[R]eliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury’ ”). 55 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Moreover, Maxwell fails to show prejudice, as it cannot be said that there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome had defense counsel argued Maxwell’s low intelligence as a mitigating factor. b.