outcome hearing in Connecticut

2015Depending on the outcome of the analysis, the conviction on some charges may be allowed to stand, while others may be reversed.’’ State v. Spencer, 275 Conn. 171, 182 , 881 A.2d 209 (2005).

2015Depending on the outcome of the analysis, the conviction on some charges may be allowed to stand, while others may be reversed.’’ State v. Spencer, 275 Conn. 171, 182 , 881 A.2d 209 (2005).

2026We conclude that the outcome of this claim is controlled by this court’s recent decision in White v. Commissioner of Correction, 236 Conn. App. 67 , 347 A.3d 214 , cert. granted, 354 Conn. 901 , 348 A.3d 813 (2026).11 In White, the petitioner was convicted of various crimi- nal offenses following a home invasion and robbery.

2026We conclude that the outcome of this claim is controlled by this court’s recent decision in White v. Commissioner of Correction, 236 Conn. App. 67, 347 A.3d 214, cert. granted, 354 Conn. 901, 348 A.3d 813 (2026).11 In White, the petitioner was convicted of various crimi- nal offenses following a home invasion and robbery.

2015See, e.g., Hartford v. Hart- ford Municipal Employees Assn., 134 Conn. App. 559 , 39 A.3d 1146 (2012), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012); Board of Police Commission- ers v. Stanley, 92 Conn. App. 723 , 887 A.2d 394 (2005); Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 77 Conn. App. 832 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003); South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, 41 Conn. App. 649 , 677 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926 , 683 A.2d 22 (1996); State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn. App. 635 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992). 11 In 2007, the Department of Mental Retardatio

2015See, e.g., Hartford v. Hart- ford Municipal Employees Assn., 134 Conn. App. 559 , 39 A.3d 1146 (2012), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012); Board of Police Commission- ers v. Stanley, 92 Conn. App. 723 , 887 A.2d 394 (2005); Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 77 Conn. App. 832 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003); South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, 41 Conn. App. 649 , 677 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926 , 683 A.2d 22 (1996); State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn. App. 635 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992). 11 In 2007, the Department of Mental Retardatio

2015See, e.g., Hartford v. Hart- ford Municipal Employees Assn., 134 Conn. App. 559 , 39 A.3d 1146 (2012), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012); Board of Police Commission- ers v. Stanley, 92 Conn. App. 723 , 887 A.2d 394 (2005); Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 77 Conn. App. 832 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003); South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, 41 Conn. App. 649 , 677 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926 , 683 A.2d 22 (1996); State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn. App. 635 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992). 11 In 2007, the Department of Mental Retardatio

2015See, e.g., Hartford v. Hart- ford Municipal Employees Assn., 134 Conn. App. 559 , 39 A.3d 1146 (2012), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012); Board of Police Commission- ers v. Stanley, 92 Conn. App. 723 , 887 A.2d 394 (2005); Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 77 Conn. App. 832 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003); South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, 41 Conn. App. 649 , 677 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926 , 683 A.2d 22 (1996); State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn. App. 635 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992). 11 In 2007, the Department of Mental Retardatio

2015See, e.g., Hartford v. Hart- ford Municipal Employees Assn., 134 Conn. App. 559 , 39 A.3d 1146 (2012), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012); Board of Police Commission- ers v. Stanley, 92 Conn. App. 723 , 887 A.2d 394 (2005); Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 77 Conn. App. 832 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003); South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, 41 Conn. App. 649 , 677 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926 , 683 A.2d 22 (1996); State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn. App. 635 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992). 11 In 2007, the Department of Mental Retardatio

2015See, e.g., Hartford v. Hart- ford Municipal Employees Assn., 134 Conn. App. 559 , 39 A.3d 1146 (2012), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012); Board of Police Commission- ers v. Stanley, 92 Conn. App. 723 , 887 A.2d 394 (2005); Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 77 Conn. App. 832 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003); South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, 41 Conn. App. 649 , 677 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926 , 683 A.2d 22 (1996); State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn. App. 635 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992). 11 In 2007, the Department of Mental Retardatio

2015See, e.g., Hartford v. Hart- ford Municipal Employees Assn., 134 Conn. App. 559 , 39 A.3d 1146 (2012), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012); Board of Police Commission- ers v. Stanley, 92 Conn. App. 723 , 887 A.2d 394 (2005); Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 77 Conn. App. 832 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003); South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, 41 Conn. App. 649 , 677 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926 , 683 A.2d 22 (1996); State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn. App. 635 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992). 11 In 2007, the Department of Mental Retardatio

2015See, e.g., Hartford v. Hart- ford Municipal Employees Assn., 134 Conn. App. 559 , 39 A.3d 1146 (2012), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012); Board of Police Commission- ers v. Stanley, 92 Conn. App. 723 , 887 A.2d 394 (2005); Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 77 Conn. App. 832 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003); South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, 41 Conn. App. 649 , 677 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926 , 683 A.2d 22 (1996); State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn. App. 635 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992). 11 In 2007, the Department of Mental Retardatio

2015See, e.g., Hartford v. Hart- ford Municipal Employees Assn., 134 Conn. App. 559 , 39 A.3d 1146 (2012), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012); Board of Police Commission- ers v. Stanley, 92 Conn. App. 723 , 887 A.2d 394 (2005); Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 77 Conn. App. 832 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003); South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, 41 Conn. App. 649 , 677 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926 , 683 A.2d 22 (1996); State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn. App. 635 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992). 11 In 2007, the Department of Mental Retardatio

2015See, e.g., Hartford v. Hart- ford Municipal Employees Assn., 134 Conn. App. 559 , 39 A.3d 1146 (2012), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 904 , 44 A.3d 180 (2012); Board of Police Commission- ers v. Stanley, 92 Conn. App. 723 , 887 A.2d 394 (2005); Metropolitan District Commission v. Local 184, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 77 Conn. App. 832 , 825 A.2d 218 (2003); South Windsor v. South Windsor Police Union, 41 Conn. App. 649 , 677 A.2d 464 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 926 , 683 A.2d 22 (1996); State v. Council 4, AFSCME, 27 Conn. App. 635 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992). 11 In 2007, the Department of Mental Retardatio

2015The defendant relies on Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 , 229–30, 74 S. Ct. 450 , 98 L.

2015The defendant relies on Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 , 229–30, 74 S. Ct. 450 , 98 L.

2014Waiters’ testimony in addition to that other testimony would have in and of itself changed the outcome of the hearing.’’ Similarly, the court found that ‘‘even accepting everything . . . [Cooper] said, all she said was that the victim claimed, they set me up’’ and that there was ‘‘no real likelihood that it would have had any effect on the outcome of the trial because all it would seem to indicate was that the victim expected to meet somebody there, and then what he expected to happen didn’t happen.’’ Finally, the court noted that Browne’s testimony was simply that Browne ‘‘wasn’t at the area

2014In order to warrant such a hearing, a defendant must produce prima facie evidence, direct or circumstantial, of a Brady violation unascertainable at trial.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173 , 182 n.7, 989 A.2d 1048 (2010). 7 Practice Book § 66-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The appellate clerk shall forward the motion for rectification . . . and the opposition, if any, to the trial judge who decided, or presided over, the subject matter of the motion for rectification . . . for a decision on the motion.

2014In order to warrant such a hearing, a defendant must produce prima facie evidence, direct or circumstantial, of a Brady violation unascertainable at trial.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ouellette, 295 Conn. 173 , 182 n.7, 989 A.2d 1048 (2010). 7 Practice Book § 66-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The appellate clerk shall forward the motion for rectification . . . and the opposition, if any, to the trial judge who decided, or presided over, the subject matter of the motion for rectification . . . for a decision on the motion.

2011Federal case law considering whether an arbitrator's evidentiary ruling deprived a party of a fair *198 hearing is consistent with requiring the moving party to demonstrate substantial prejudice to vacate an award on this ground. * * * "Requiring the moving party to establish substantial prejudice by demonstrating that the decision excluded evidence that was decisive or likely to have altered the outcome of the claim is consistent with the principles underlying arbitration." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport v. Kasper Group, Inc., supra, 278 Conn. at 476-78 , 89

2011Federal case law considering whether an arbitrator's evidentiary ruling deprived a party of a fair *198 hearing is consistent with requiring the moving party to demonstrate substantial prejudice to vacate an award on this ground. * * * "Requiring the moving party to establish substantial prejudice by demonstrating that the decision excluded evidence that was decisive or likely to have altered the outcome of the claim is consistent with the principles underlying arbitration." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport v. Kasper Group, Inc., supra, 278 Conn. at 476-78 , 89

2010We agree with the state and conclude that our recent decision in State v. Wade, 297 Conn. 262 , 998 A.2d 1114 (2010), controls the outcome of this claim.

2010We agree with the state and conclude that our recent decision in State v. Wade, 297 Conn. 262 , 998 A.2d 1114 (2010), controls the outcome of this claim.

2009We begin our analysis with the plaintiffs claim addressing the interpretation of the agreement’s provision to adjust alimony automatically, as the resolution of that issue will influence the outcome of her claim that the trial court improperly excluded extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. 5 See Poole v. *180 Waterbury, 266 Conn. 68, 89 , 831 A.2d 211 (2003) (“[e]xtrinsic evidence is always admissible ... to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2009We begin our analysis with the plaintiffs claim addressing the interpretation of the agreement’s provision to adjust alimony automatically, as the resolution of that issue will influence the outcome of her claim that the trial court improperly excluded extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. 5 See Poole v. *180 Waterbury, 266 Conn. 68, 89 , 831 A.2d 211 (2003) (“[e]xtrinsic evidence is always admissible ... to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2007Regarding the first claim, the plaintiffs argue that because two members of the defendant lived together within a visible distance from the plaintiffs’ property, they had a personal interest in the outcome of the hearing, thereby creating an appearance of impropriety, which, in turn, required the members to disqualify themselves from hearing the matter. “[T]he appearance of impropriety created by a public official’s participation in a matter in which he has a . . . personal interest is sufficient to require disqualification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nazarko v. Conservation Commissi

2007Regarding the first claim, the plaintiffs argue that because two members of the defendant lived together within a visible distance from the plaintiffs’ property, they had a personal interest in the outcome of the hearing, thereby creating an appearance of impropriety, which, in turn, required the members to disqualify themselves from hearing the matter. “[T]he appearance of impropriety created by a public official’s participation in a matter in which he has a . . . personal interest is sufficient to require disqualification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nazarko v. Conservation Commissi

2007Regarding the first claim, the plaintiffs argue that because two members of the defendant lived together within a visible distance from the plaintiffs’ property, they had a personal interest in the outcome of the hearing, thereby creating an appearance of impropriety, which, in turn, required the members to disqualify themselves from hearing the matter. “[T]he appearance of impropriety created by a public official’s participation in a matter in which he has a . . . personal interest is sufficient to require disqualification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nazarko v. Conservation Commissi

2007Regarding the first claim, the plaintiffs argue that because two members of the defendant lived together within a visible distance from the plaintiffs’ property, they had a personal interest in the outcome of the hearing, thereby creating an appearance of impropriety, which, in turn, required the members to disqualify themselves from hearing the matter. “[T]he appearance of impropriety created by a public official’s participation in a matter in which he has a . . . personal interest is sufficient to require disqualification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nazarko v. Conservation Commissi

2001Pecora v. Zoning Commission , 145 Conn. 435 (1958).

1997The Post article, headlined, "Man with AIDS to be at his slaying trial", stated, in reference to the court's decision, "He apparently accepted the statements of Dr. Edward Blanchette, who said Mercer is not likely to transmit the disease as long as direct physical contact is averted." Id.

1993This evidence and these findings were sufficient to meet the substantial evidence standard set forth in Lawrence v. Kozlowski, supra. III The plaintiff also contends that the DMV ought to have stayed her license suspension until after the outcome of the hearing.

1993Because this court can provide no practical relief to the plaintiff for the suspension which preceded the administrative hearing even if the court decided this issue in her favor, the court regards this claim as moot, Daly v. DelPonte, 27 Conn. App. 495 (1992), pp. 502 and 503.

1991In this case, as in Henderson v. Department of Motor CT Page 7288 Vehicles, 202 Conn. 453 , 521 A.2d 1040 (1987), Although the plaintiff did not actually know the outcome at the hearing when he finally made his motion. . .he may have sensed from the testimony of the witnesses. . .that the adjudicator's decision on the merits would probably be adverse.

1991In this case, as in Henderson v. Department of Motor CT Page 7288 Vehicles, 202 Conn. 453 , 521 A.2d 1040 (1987), Although the plaintiff did not actually know the outcome at the hearing when he finally made his motion. . .he may have sensed from the testimony of the witnesses. . .that the adjudicator's decision on the merits would probably be adverse.

1987Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84-86 , 495 A.2d 1063 (1985); Pinnix v. LaMorte, 182 Conn. 342, 343 , 438 A.2d 102 (1980); Research Associaties, Inc. v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 152 Conn. 137, 140-41 , 204 A.2d 833 (1964).

1987Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84-86 , 495 A.2d 1063 (1985); Pinnix v. LaMorte, 182 Conn. 342, 343 , 438 A.2d 102 (1980); Research Associaties, Inc. v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 152 Conn. 137, 140-41 , 204 A.2d 833 (1964).

1987Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84-86 , 495 A.2d 1063 (1985); Pinnix v. LaMorte, 182 Conn. 342, 343 , 438 A.2d 102 (1980); Research Associaties, Inc. v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 152 Conn. 137, 140-41 , 204 A.2d 833 (1964).

1987Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84-86 , 495 A.2d 1063 (1985); Pinnix v. LaMorte, 182 Conn. 342, 343 , 438 A.2d 102 (1980); Research Associaties, Inc. v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 152 Conn. 137, 140-41 , 204 A.2d 833 (1964).

1987Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84-86 , 495 A.2d 1063 (1985); Pinnix v. LaMorte, 182 Conn. 342, 343 , 438 A.2d 102 (1980); Research Associaties, Inc. v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 152 Conn. 137, 140-41 , 204 A.2d 833 (1964).

1987Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84-86 , 495 A.2d 1063 (1985); Pinnix v. LaMorte, 182 Conn. 342, 343 , 438 A.2d 102 (1980); Research Associaties, Inc. v. New Haven Redevelopment Agency, 152 Conn. 137, 140-41 , 204 A.2d 833 (1964).

1969While a member of a zoning commission or zoning board of appeals is disqualified to act in any matter in which he has a personal or pecuniary interest, “[l]ocal governments would ... be seriously handicapped if any conceivable interest, no matter how remote and speculative, would require the disqualification of a zoning official.” Anderson v. Zoning Commission, 157 Conn. 285, 291 , 253 A.2d 16 .