adversary hearing in Florida

2003The Supreme Court in Gerstein observed that the sole issue in an initial probable cause hearing is "whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings," which, the Court concluded, "can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing." 420 U.S. at 120 , 95 S.Ct. 854 .

2003The Supreme Court in Gerstein observed that the sole issue in an initial probable cause hearing is "whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings," which, the Court concluded, "can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing." 420 U.S. at 120 , 95 S.Ct. 854 .

1977Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 , 61 S.Ct. 999 , 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941).” Additionally the record shows that petitioner consented to an informal proceeding under Section 120.57(2).

1977Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 , 61 S.Ct. 999 , 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941).” Additionally the record shows that petitioner consented to an informal proceeding under Section 120.57(2).

1969Metzger v. Pearcy, supra, relies on the case of A Quantity of Copies of Books v. State of Kansas, supra. In that case the procedural development is extremely important to the holding.

1969Metzger v. Pearcy, supra, relies on the case of A Quantity of Copies of Books v. State of Kansas, supra. In that case the procedural development is extremely important to the holding.

2016In Cherry, after the adversary hearing, the prosecuting attorney met with the Commission during its deliberations and submitted advisory memoranda, much of which the Commission adopted in its final order. 652 So.2d at 803 . 5 .

2006Rejecting the more expansive approach originally adopted by our supreme court in Baker v. State, 336 So.2d 364 (Fla.1976), the Evidence Code, section 90.804(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), as subsequently itself adopted by court rule, excepts declarations against penal interest from the rule excluding hearsay only when the declarant is unavailable to testify and when corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement.

1991E.g., McCaskill v. McMillian, 563 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

1989The key to that conclusion rests in another conclusion, that the presumption of irreparable harm in such noncompete cases as was enunciated in Capraro v. Lanier Business Products, Inc., 466 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1985), is not an irrebuttable presumption but is, after a full adversary hearing on the issue as was held in this case below, subject to proof sufficient to dissipate the presumption.

1988Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So.2d 1217 (Fla.1987).

1988Gallucci was reaffirmed by the supreme court in Burns v. GCC Beverages (Burns II), which approved the result reached in this court’s en banc opinion in Burns I, which appears at 469 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), but disapproved the underlying rationale.

1986In Gallucci v. Milavic, 100 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1958), we determined that a magistrate's finding of probable cause after an adversary hearing constituted a conclusive presumption of the existence of probable cause in a subsequent malicious prosecution action, absent fraud or other corrupt means employed to obtain the warrant.

1985We note that the Third District, in Bothmann v. Harrington, 458 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (cited in this opinion, supra ), in a case involving disparagement of title or property by the improper filing of a notice of lis pendens, alluded to the distinction between "an improper filing in a procedural sense," and a "wrongful filing in a substantive sense," holding in that case that only the latter will support an action for disparagement of property, "because only it meets the requisite falsehood element of the action." 458 So.2d at 1168 .

1985We note that the Third District, in Bothmann v. Harrington, 458 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (cited in this opinion, supra ), in a case involving disparagement of title or property by the improper filing of a notice of lis pendens, alluded to the distinction between "an improper filing in a procedural sense," and a "wrongful filing in a substantive sense," holding in that case that only the latter will support an action for disparagement of property, "because only it meets the requisite falsehood element of the action." 458 So.2d at 1168 .

1982(Emphasis added.) In arriving at its conclusion, the circuit court relied on three cases: Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit v. Board of County Commissioners of Bradford County, 401 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 1981); State ex rel. *609 Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516 , 194 So. 613 (Fla. 1939); Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577 , 140 So. 459 (Fla. 1932).

1982(Emphasis added.) In arriving at its conclusion, the circuit court relied on three cases: Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit v. Board of County Commissioners of Bradford County, 401 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 1981); State ex rel. *609 Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516 , 194 So. 613 (Fla. 1939); Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577 , 140 So. 459 (Fla. 1932).

1982(Emphasis added.) In arriving at its conclusion, the circuit court relied on three cases: Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit v. Board of County Commissioners of Bradford County, 401 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 1981); State ex rel. *609 Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516 , 194 So. 613 (Fla. 1939); Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577 , 140 So. 459 (Fla. 1932).

1982(Emphasis added.) In arriving at its conclusion, the circuit court relied on three cases: Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit v. Board of County Commissioners of Bradford County, 401 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 1981); State ex rel. *609 Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516 , 194 So. 613 (Fla. 1939); Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577 , 140 So. 459 (Fla. 1932).

1982(Emphasis added.) In arriving at its conclusion, the circuit court relied on three cases: Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit v. Board of County Commissioners of Bradford County, 401 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 1981); State ex rel. *609 Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516 , 194 So. 613 (Fla. 1939); Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577 , 140 So. 459 (Fla. 1932).

1981Cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 , 80 S.Ct. 1502 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960), in which the court analogized the proceedings of a grand jury to those of the Civil Rights Commission in rejecting the contention of persons who were the subjects of the commission's investigation that they were entitled to the due process rights available in adjudicatory proceedings.

1981Cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 , 80 S.Ct. 1502 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960), in which the court analogized the proceedings of a grand jury to those of the Civil Rights Commission in rejecting the contention of persons who were the subjects of the commission's investigation that they were entitled to the due process rights available in adjudicatory proceedings.

1981It is apparent, then, that Florida Statute 231.36(6) is not unconstitutional insofar as it provides for the suspension without pay of a teacher charged with incompetency or willful neglect of duty, because such a suspension does not involve the deprivation of a property right without a hearing." Appellant relies heavily upon the case of Thurston v. Dekel, 531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.1976), and particularly the portion of the opinion in which the court stated, at page 1273: " Arnett and Davis [v. Vandiver, 494 F.2d 830 ] guide us to focus on procedures which will minimize the risk of improper termin

1981It is apparent, then, that Florida Statute 231.36(6) is not unconstitutional insofar as it provides for the suspension without pay of a teacher charged with incompetency or willful neglect of duty, because such a suspension does not involve the deprivation of a property right without a hearing." Appellant relies heavily upon the case of Thurston v. Dekel, 531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.1976), and particularly the portion of the opinion in which the court stated, at page 1273: " Arnett and Davis [v. Vandiver, 494 F.2d 830 ] guide us to focus on procedures which will minimize the risk of improper termin

1981Cf., however, West v. Board of County Commissioners, supra (14 month delay while employee “in limbo” impermissible.) In a case such as this, in contrast, the closing of a licensee may result in a loss of reputation and would certainly cause a loss of income for neither of which the state would be liable even if it were shown at an adversary hearing that its previous action was unjustified.

1978We are fully cognizant of Cameron v. State, 338 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1976) which was decided subsequent to the adoption of the present rule.

1974See Siciliano v. Hunerberg, Fla.App.1961, 135 So.2d 750 ; Boyette v. Reliable Finance Company, Fla.App.1966, 184 So.2d 200 .