adversary hearing (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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adversary hearing in Arizona

15 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. Salernogreen
scotus · 1987 · cited in 3 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2004–2018
2 sentences

2018Cf. Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71 , 81-82, 112 S.Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (invalidating Louisiana's continued detention of insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill because, "[u]nlike the sharply focused scheme" in Salerno , which involved individualized assessment, Louisiana's scheme does not include "an adversary hearing at which the State must prove ... that [the acquittee] is demonstrably dangerous to the community"); Salerno , 481 U.S. at 742-43, 747 , 750 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 (finding that the Bail Reform Act was narrowly focused on preventing danger to the community be

2018Cf. Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71 , 81-82, 112 S.Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (invalidating Louisiana's continued detention of insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill because, "[u]nlike the sharply focused scheme" in Salerno , which involved individualized assessment, Louisiana's scheme does not include "an adversary hearing at which the State must prove ... that [the acquittee] is demonstrably dangerous to the community"); Salerno , 481 U.S. at 742-43, 747 , 750 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 (finding that the Bail Reform Act was narrowly focused on preventing danger to the community be

13
Powers v. Isleygreen
ariz · 1947 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1975–1976
2 sentences

1976A.R.S. § 12-252 provides in part: “A. The salary of the adult probation officers shall be fixed by the presiding judge of the superior court with the approval of the board of supervisors.” Article 3 of the Arizona Constitution states that government powers are to be divided into three areas, the legislative, executive and judicial branches, and that “no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.” The Legislature may, however, designate the judicial branch as its agent for certain purposes: “The Constitution of the State of Arizona at the incep

1976A.R.S. § 12-252 provides in part: “A. The salary of the adult probation officers shall be fixed by the presiding judge of the superior court with the approval of the board of supervisors.” Article 3 of the Arizona Constitution states that government powers are to be divided into three areas, the legislative, executive and judicial branches, and that “no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.” The Legislature may, however, designate the judicial branch as its agent for certain purposes: “The Constitution of the State of Arizona at the incep

12
A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansasgreen
scotus · 1964 · cited in 2 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1971–1974
2 sentences

1974In the case of Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 , 84 S.Ct. 1723 , 12 L.Ed.2d 809 (1964),'the Supreme Court of the United States held that the adversary proceeding was required to avoid “danger of abridgment of the right of the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of non-obscene books.” In the case at bench the City of Phoenix has attempted to create a procedure by which it could obtain evidence required to pursue prosecution and at the same time not restrain distribution until there could be a determination of obscenity.

1974In the case of Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 , 84 S.Ct. 1723 , 12 L.Ed.2d 809 (1964),'the Supreme Court of the United States held that the adversary proceeding was required to avoid “danger of abridgment of the right of the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of non-obscene books.” In the case at bench the City of Phoenix has attempted to create a procedure by which it could obtain evidence required to pursue prosecution and at the same time not restrain distribution until there could be a determination of obscenity.

12
Hernandez v. Lynchgreen
arizctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016See also Hernandez, 216 Ariz. at 476, ¶21 , 167 P.3d 1264 ("In Salerno, for example, the United States Supreme Court upheld the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, which permitted, among other things, 'a federal court to detain an arres-tee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions "will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the community.” ’ ") (citation omitted). .

2016See also Hernandez, 216 Ariz. at 476, ¶21 , 167 P.3d 1264 ("In Salerno, for example, the United States Supreme Court upheld the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, which permitted, among other things, 'a federal court to detain an arres-tee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions "will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the community.” ’ ") (citation omitted). .

11
Clark v. City of Fremont, Nebraskagreen
ned · 1974 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
1 sentence

1980Sec. 12-911, there must be a judicial determination in an adversary hearing of whether the performance giving rise to the suspension constitutes gross sexuality and thus within the permissible limits of regulation as set forth in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 , 93 S.Ct. 390 , 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), as was recently stated: ‘[T]he First Amendment requires prompt judicial determination in such cases “because of the independence of the judiciary and because of the ‘sensitive tools’ which the judiciary brings to the delicate task of distinguishing between protected and unprotected speech.” ’ Cl

11
People v. De Renzygreen
calctapp · 1969 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
2 sentences

1972This result is unreasonable and should be avoided.” People v. De Renzy, 275 Cal. App.2d 380 , 79 Cal.Rptr. 777, 779 (1969).

1972This result is unreasonable and should be avoided.” People v. De Renzy, 275 Cal. App.2d 380 , 79 Cal.Rptr. 777, 779 (1969).

11
Gable v. Jenkinsgreen
gand · 1970 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1971–1971
2 sentences

1971Petitioners mention lack of specific statutory authority for holding the constitutionally required adversary hearing, but we think this argument is adequately answered in cases such as Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F.Supp. 998, 1001 , at note 3' (N.D.Ga. 1969) (three-judge court), affirmed, 397 U.S. 592 , 90 S.Ct. 1351 , 25 L.Ed.2d 595 (1970), which indicate that an adversary hearing by any available means is acceptable.

1971See Gable v. Jenkins, supra. At this point it is important to realize that in the usual course and but for the “prior restraint” and “adversary hearing” rule only recently articulated by the United States Supreme Court, the film would be subject to seizure pursuant to a warrant issued ex parte to the City on a showing of probable cause.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (15)

CaseCitedYears
Withrow v. Larkin green
scotus · 1975
2 sentences

2017By contrast, “[c]learly, if the initial view of the facts based on the evidence derived from nonadversarial processes as a practical or legal matter foreclosed fair and effective consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading to ultimate decision, a substantial due process question would be raised.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58 , 95 S.Ct. 1456 . ¶ 22 Here the initial determination was subject to de novo review by the ALJ, but the ALJ’s determination was not final.

2017By contrast, “[c]learly, if the initial view of the facts based on the evidence derived from nonadversarial processes as a practical or legal matter foreclosed fair and effective consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading to ultimate decision, a substantial due process question would be raised.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58 , 95 S.Ct. 1456 . ¶ 22 Here the initial determination was subject to de novo review by the ALJ, but the ALJ’s determination was not final.

42005–2017
Foucha v. Louisiana green
scotus · 1992
2 sentences

2018Cf. Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71 , 81-82, 112 S.Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (invalidating Louisiana's continued detention of insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill because, "[u]nlike the sharply focused scheme" in Salerno , which involved individualized assessment, Louisiana's scheme does not include "an adversary hearing at which the State must prove ... that [the acquittee] is demonstrably dangerous to the community"); Salerno , 481 U.S. at 742-43, 747 , 750 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 (finding that the Bail Reform Act was narrowly focused on preventing danger to the community be

2018Cf. Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71 , 81-82, 112 S.Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (invalidating Louisiana's continued detention of insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill because, "[u]nlike the sharply focused scheme" in Salerno , which involved individualized assessment, Louisiana's scheme does not include "an adversary hearing at which the State must prove ... that [the acquittee] is demonstrably dangerous to the community"); Salerno , 481 U.S. at 742-43, 747 , 750 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 (finding that the Bail Reform Act was narrowly focused on preventing danger to the community be

12018–2018
United States v. Allied Oil Corp. green
scotus · 1951
2 sentences

2004That statute allowed the federal courts to deny bail to persons charged with certain felonies "if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions `will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the community.'" Id. at 741 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 (citations omitted).

2004That statute allowed the federal courts to deny bail to persons charged with certain felonies “if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions ‘will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the community.’ ” Id. at 741 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 (citations omitted).

12004–2004
California v. LaRue green
scotus · 1973
2 sentences

1980Sec. 12-911, there must be a judicial determination in an adversary hearing of whether the performance giving rise to the suspension constitutes gross sexuality and thus within the permissible limits of regulation as set forth in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 , 93 S.Ct. 390 , 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), as was recently stated: ‘[T]he First Amendment requires prompt judicial determination in such cases “because of the independence of the judiciary and because of the ‘sensitive tools’ which the judiciary brings to the delicate task of distinguishing between protected and unprotected speech.” ’ Cl

1980Sec. 12-911, there must be a judicial determination in an adversary hearing of whether the performance giving rise to the suspension constitutes gross sexuality and thus within the permissible limits of regulation as set forth in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 , 93 S.Ct. 390 , 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), as was recently stated: ‘[T]he First Amendment requires prompt judicial determination in such cases “because of the independence of the judiciary and because of the ‘sensitive tools’ which the judiciary brings to the delicate task of distinguishing between protected and unprotected speech.” ’ Cl

11980–1980
United States v. Dionisio green
scotus · 1973
2 sentences

1977This aspect is important so as to avoid the "mini trial" feared in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 764 , 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973).

1977This aspect is important so as to avoid the "mini trial" feared in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 764 , 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973).

11977–1977
In the Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975. Appeal of Abraham E. Freedman green
ca3 · 1976
2 sentences

1977Judge Seitz also stressed (as did the same court in a later opinion, Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 , 96 S.Ct. 2203 , 48 L.Ed.2d 816 ) that the court review of the subpoena was not to be an adversary hearing.

1977Judge Seitz also stressed (as did the same court in a later opinion, Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 , 96 S.Ct. 2203 , 48 L.Ed.2d 816 ) that the court review of the subpoena was not to be an adversary hearing.

11977–1977
Seminara v. United States green
scotus · 1976
2 sentences

1977Judge Seitz also stressed (as did the same court in a later opinion, Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 , 96 S.Ct. 2203 , 48 L.Ed.2d 816 ) that the court review of the subpoena was not to be an adversary hearing.

1977Judge Seitz also stressed (as did the same court in a later opinion, Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 , 96 S.Ct. 2203 , 48 L.Ed.2d 816 ) that the court review of the subpoena was not to be an adversary hearing.

11977–1977
Star Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission green
scotus · 1976
2 sentences

1977Judge Seitz also stressed (as did the same court in a later opinion, Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 , 96 S.Ct. 2203 , 48 L.Ed.2d 816 ) that the court review of the subpoena was not to be an adversary hearing.

1977Judge Seitz also stressed (as did the same court in a later opinion, Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled January 21, 1975, 529 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 , 96 S.Ct. 2203 , 48 L.Ed.2d 816 ) that the court review of the subpoena was not to be an adversary hearing.

11977–1977
Boyd v. United States red
scotus · 1886
2 sentences

1972(See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-635 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 .) Thus, although seizure of obscene material is conditioned upon a prior adversary hearing, the state would be without power to produce the evidence essential to that hearing.

1972(See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-635 , 6 S.Ct. 524 , 29 L.Ed. 746 .) Thus, although seizure of obscene material is conditioned upon a prior adversary hearing, the state would be without power to produce the evidence essential to that hearing.

11972–1972
NGC Theatre Corporation v. Mummert green
ariz · 1971
2 sentences

1972NGC Theatre Corp. v. Mummert, 107 Ariz. 484, 489 P.2d 823 (1971).

1972NGC Theatre Corp. v. Mummert, 107 Ariz. 484, 489 P.2d 823 (1971).

11972–1972
City of Phoenix v. Fine green
arizctapp · 1966
2 sentences

1971See A Quantity Of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 , 84 S.Ct. 1723 , 12 L.Ed.2d 809 (1964) ; City of Phoenix v. Fine, 4 Ariz.App. 303 , 420 P.2d 26 (1966).

1971See A Quantity Of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 , 84 S.Ct. 1723 , 12 L.Ed.2d 809 (1964) ; City of Phoenix v. Fine, 4 Ariz.App. 303 , 420 P.2d 26 (1966).

11971–1971
Gable v. Jenkins green
scotus · 1970
1 sentence

1971Petitioners mention lack of specific statutory authority for holding the constitutionally required adversary hearing, but we think this argument is adequately answered in cases such as Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F.Supp. 998, 1001 , at note 3' (N.D.Ga. 1969) (three-judge court), affirmed, 397 U.S. 592 , 90 S.Ct. 1351 , 25 L.Ed.2d 595 (1970), which indicate that an adversary hearing by any available means is acceptable.

11971–1971
cluster 290216 green
ca9 · 1970
1 sentence

1971Assuming it to be entirely settled that seizure by prosecution authorities of a single copy of an allegedly obscene movie prior to an adversary hearing on obscenity is an invalid restraint on dissemination, see Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon, 426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1970) (U.S.App.

11971–1971
Snyder v. Ware green
scotus · 1970
1 sentence

1971Petitioners mention lack of specific statutory authority for holding the constitutionally required adversary hearing, but we think this argument is adequately answered in cases such as Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F.Supp. 998, 1001 , at note 3' (N.D.Ga. 1969) (three-judge court), affirmed, 397 U.S. 592 , 90 S.Ct. 1351 , 25 L.Ed.2d 595 (1970), which indicate that an adversary hearing by any available means is acceptable.

11971–1971
Abate v. Mundt green
scotus · 1970
1 sentence

1971Petitioners mention lack of specific statutory authority for holding the constitutionally required adversary hearing, but we think this argument is adequately answered in cases such as Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F.Supp. 998, 1001 , at note 3' (N.D.Ga. 1969) (three-judge court), affirmed, 397 U.S. 592 , 90 S.Ct. 1351 , 25 L.Ed.2d 595 (1970), which indicate that an adversary hearing by any available means is acceptable.

11971–1971

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AZ § Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3961 (4) USC § 18u.s.c.3142 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 94 (1970–2025) CA 74 (1942–2025) NY 68 (1955–2013) FL 35 (1965–2016) OH 27 (1969–2026) OK 26 (1973–2015) LA 25 (1971–2021) MA 21 (1973–2024) MD 21 (1972–2026) PA 21 (1970–2020) MO 20 (1970–2022) NJ 16 (1960–2020) AZ 15 (1971–2018) WA 14 (1971–2024) IL 14 (1973–2020) WI 13 (1926–2023) MN 12 (1964–2016) HI 12 (1962–2018) NC 11 (1978–2022) DC 11 (1971–2016) MI 11 (1969–2018) IN 9 (1972–1996) KY 9 (1917–2021) AL 9 (1848–2024) CO 8 (1971–2019) OR 8 (1963–2016) MT 7 (1922–1984) MS 7 (1979–2019) GA 7 (1970–1994) IA 7 (1973–1991) NV 6 (1971–2020) RI 6 (1965–2007) CT 6 (1979–2000) WV 5 (1974–2004) NM 5 (2014–2022) TN 4 (2000–2018) DE 4 (1971–2023) AR 4 (1972–2010) WY 3 (1983–1995) KS 3 (1975–2004) NH 3 (1986–2013) ID 3 (1983–1994) NE 3 (1973–2024) AK 3 (1981–2013) VA 3 (1920–1976) ME 2 (1978–1993) SD 2 (1973–1976)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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