adversary hearing in Massachusetts

2013See Commonwealth v. Trigones, 397 Mass. 633, 640 (1986) (“postindictment order to obtain a blood sample for identification purposes should be based on a showing of probable cause made at an adversary hearing”).

2004The precise language in Commonwealth v. Trigones, 397 Mass. 633, 640 (1986), is: “A postindictment order to obtain a blood sample for identification purposes should be based on a showing of probable cause made at an adversary hearing. ...

1983Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ ” Id. at 55 , quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).

1982Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).” In Withrow v. Larkin, supra, the United States Supreme Court considered a due process challenge to the procedures used by the Wisconsin Examining Board in suspending a physician’s license.

1990See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975) (“mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of [a disciplinary board] at a later adversary hearing”).

1983We relied on Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1972), where the United States Supreme Court determined: “The mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of [an agency’s] members at a later adversary hearing.

2016See Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 851-852 (1973) (“primary function of the probable cause hearing of screening out ‘an erroneous or improper prosecution,’ .. . can only be effectuated by an adversary hearing where the defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and to raise *490 any affirmative defenses he may have” [citation omitted]).

2002The centrality of the screening function, moreover, “can only be effectuated by an adversary hearing where the defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses and to raise any affirmative defenses he may have.” Id. at 852 .

2010See Matter of Lavigne, 418 Mass. 831, 835-836 (1994).

2010Cf. Matter ofLavigne, 418 Mass. 831, 835 (1994).

2007The omission in his order of findings specific to the considerations noted in Commonwealth v. Williams, supra at 685 , is of no concern because his order was preceded by an adversary hearing and the record supports the order authorizing the extraction of the defendant’s blood.

2007See id. at 685-686 . 2.

2006See Commonwealth v. Maxwell, supra at 778 .

2001General Laws c. 278, § 18, so provides. 11 See Commonwealth v. Rotonda, 434 Mass. 211 (2001); Commonwealth v. Pyles, 423 Mass. 717, 719-720 (1996).

1997See Commonwealth v. Beldotti, 409 Mass. 553, 557-559 (1991). 3 Certainly no taint of bad faith acceleration of discovery by the police is present here.

1997We conclude that had an adversary hearing been conducted by the Superior Court judge and the Lavigne criteria applied, approval of the request for the taking of the defendant’s blood was inevitable or “certain as a practical matter.” Commonwealth v. O’Connor, 406 Mass. 112, 117 (1989).

1996Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be [peoplel of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ ” 390 Mass. at 198 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (1972)).

1996Craven v. State Ethics Commission, 390 Mass. 191, 198 (1983), established that‘‘[t]he mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of [an agency’s] members at a later adversary hearing.

1990See also Commonwealth v. Valliere, 366 Mass. 479, 483 (1974) *330 (judge who read transcript of related proceeding need not be disqualified); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 587 (1977) (judge in criminal action need not recuse himself because he presided over previous criminal trial involving same defendant). 4.

1990See also Commonwealth v. Valliere, 366 Mass. 479, 483 (1974) *330 (judge who read transcript of related proceeding need not be disqualified); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 587 (1977) (judge in criminal action need not recuse himself because he presided over previous criminal trial involving same defendant). 4.

1986See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-761 , 763 n.6 (1985); Commonwealth v. DiMarzo, 364 Mass. 669, 676 (1974).

1986See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-761 , 763 n.6 (1985); Commonwealth v. DiMarzo, 364 Mass. 669, 676 (1974).

1978Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).” See also Mayor of Everett v. Superior Court, 324 Mass. 144, 150-151 (1949). (c) Use of subpoena power.

1976While it is true that “[a]fter an appeal the finding or sentence of the District Court has no force and effect for any purpose on a judge of the Superior Court” (Mann v. Commonwealth, 359 Mass. 661, 666 [1971]), the appeal does not negative or detract from the fact that a District Court judge, after hearing evidence at an adversary hearing at which the defendant was represented by counsel and had a right to cross-examine the witnesses and to present evidence if he chose to do so, was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the offense charged.