adversary hearing in Pennsylvania

1995The Supreme Court held that "[t]he mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing.” Id. at 55 , 95 S.Ct. at 1468 .

1995The Supreme Court held that "[t]he mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing.” Id. at 55 , 95 S.Ct. at 1468 .

1984Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ United States v. Morgan, 313 US 409, 421 , 85 L.Ed 1429, 61 S.Ct. 999 (1941).

1984Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ United States v. Morgan, 313 US 409, 421 , 85 L.Ed 1429, 61 S.Ct. 999 (1941).

1971There was absolutely no indication of any immediate and irreparable injury “. . . as to justify the abandonment of the precious safeguard of an adversary hearing. . . .” Id. at 381 , 248 A. 2d at 47 .

1971There was absolutely no indication of any immediate and irreparable injury “. . . as to justify the abandonment of the precious safeguard of an adversary hearing. . . .” Id. at 381 , 248 A. 2d at 47 .

1973In Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 , 84 S.Ct. 1723 (1964), the Supreme Court held that an ex parte securing of a search warrant “did not focus searchingly on the question of obscenity” and that the seizure of the allegedly obscene material was unconstitutional since an adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity had not been held prior to seizure.

1973In Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 , 84 S.Ct. 1723 (1964), the Supreme Court held that an ex parte securing of a search warrant “did not focus searchingly on the question of obscenity” and that the seizure of the allegedly obscene material was unconstitutional since an adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity had not been held prior to seizure.

2012Edwards, 703 A.2d at 1059 . (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275 , 68 S.Ct. 499 ).

2012Edwards, 703 A.2d at 1059 . (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275 , 68 S.Ct. 499 ).

2012Edwards, 703 A.2d at 1059 . (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275 , 68 S.Ct. 499 ).

1984It would also appear to us that the question of due process vis-a-vis dismissals for failure to prosecute was adequately addressed in Link v. Wabash Railroad Company, 370 U.S. 626 , 82 S.Ct. 1386 , 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) (district court may dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute even without affording notice of its intention to do so or providing an adversary hearing before acting).

1984It would also appear to us that the question of due process vis-a-vis dismissals for failure to prosecute was adequately addressed in Link v. Wabash Railroad Company, 370 U.S. 626 , 82 S.Ct. 1386 , 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) (district court may dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute even without affording notice of its intention to do so or providing an adversary hearing before acting).

1979We rejected this same argument in Duggan, supra, where it was argued that "the adversary hearing on the preliminary injunction was full and complete, and hence the hearing on the permanent injunction would be little more than a formality." That argument was answered by pointing out that "the fact that there was an adversary hearing at the preliminary injunctive stage does not vitiate the need for a requirement of a specific guarantee of prompt and final adjudication." 447 Pa. at 291 , 288 A.2d at 755 .

1979We rejected this same argument in Duggan, supra, where it was argued that "the adversary hearing on the preliminary injunction was full and complete, and hence the hearing on the permanent injunction would be little more than a formality." That argument was answered by pointing out that "the fact that there was an adversary hearing at the preliminary injunctive stage does not vitiate the need for a requirement of a specific guarantee of prompt and final adjudication." 447 Pa. at 291 , 288 A.2d at 755 .

1978“Although a consent decree is not a legal determination by the court of the matters in controversy, Universal Builders Supply, Inc. v. Shaler Highlands Corp., 405 Pa. 259, 265 , 175 A.2d 58 (1961), it binds the parties with the same force and effect as if a final decree has been rendered after a full hearing upon the merits, Baran et a1. v. Baran, 166 Pa.Super. 532, 537 , 72 A.2d 623 (1950).

1978“Although a consent decree is not a legal determination by the court of the matters in controversy, Universal Builders Supply, Inc. v. Shaler Highlands Corp., 405 Pa. 259, 265 , 175 A.2d 58 (1961), it binds the parties with the same force and effect as if a final decree has been rendered after a full hearing upon the merits, Baran et a1. v. Baran, 166 Pa.Super. 532, 537 , 72 A.2d 623 (1950).

1978First, this application for extension was a “form petition” of the variety which this court specifically condemned in Commonwealth v. Ray, 240 Pa.Super. 33 , 360 A.2d 925 (1976).

1978First, this application for extension was a “form petition” of the variety which this court specifically condemned in Commonwealth v. Ray, 240 Pa.Super. 33 , 360 A.2d 925 (1976).

1978“Although a consent decree is not a legal determination by the court of the matters in controversy, Universal Builders Supply, Inc. v. Shaler Highlands Corp., 405 Pa. 259, 265 , 175 A.2d 58 (1961), it binds the parties with the same force and effect as if a final decree has been rendered after a full hearing upon the merits, Baran et a1. v. Baran, 166 Pa.Super. 532, 537 , 72 A.2d 623 (1950).

1978“Although a consent decree is not a legal determination by the court of the matters in controversy, Universal Builders Supply, Inc. v. Shaler Highlands Corp., 405 Pa. 259, 265 , 175 A.2d 58 (1961), it binds the parties with the same force and effect as if a final decree has been rendered after a full hearing upon the merits, Baran et a1. v. Baran, 166 Pa.Super. 532, 537 , 72 A.2d 623 (1950).

1973Commonwealth v. DeMichel, 442 Pa. 553 (1971), held that a trial judge may reconsider the admissibility of evidence already ruled upon in a suppression hearing where there is new and different evidence at the time of trial.

1972“Since prior restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment rights can be exercised through . . . arrest (with or without a warrant) of the alleged offender or through the threat of either or both seizure and arrest, the conclusion is irresistible in logic and in law that none of these may be constitutionally undertaken prior to an adversary judicial determination of obscenity.” (citing cases) In Milky Way Products, Inc. et al. v. Leary et al. and New York Feed Company et al. v. Leary et al., 305 F. Supp. 288 (1969), affirmed 397 U.S. 98 , 90 Supreme Ct. 817, the court, at page 296, directs it

1972The only evidence offered to the examiner was Mrs. Calko’s letter of August 6th and her uncorroborated testimony concerning her husband’s “drinking habits.” The Liquor Code, in section 493(1), 47 PS §4-493(1), makes it unlawful for any licensee, his servants, agents or employes to sell alcoholic beverages to “persons of known intemperate habits.” In Commonwealth v. Zelt, 138 Pa. 615 , 215 Atl. 7 (1891), the Supreme Court wrestled with the interpretation to be placed upon “persons of known intemperate habits” as those words were employed by the legislature to determine a class of persons to who

1972“Since prior restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment rights can be exercised through . . . arrest (with or without a warrant) of the alleged offender or through the threat of either or both seizure and arrest, the conclusion is irresistible in logic and in law that none of these may be constitutionally undertaken prior to an adversary judicial determination of obscenity.” (citing cases) In Milky Way Products, Inc. et al. v. Leary et al. and New York Feed Company et al. v. Leary et al., 305 F. Supp. 288 (1969), affirmed 397 U.S. 98 , 90 Supreme Ct. 817, the court, at page 296, directs it

1972In Smith v. Crumlish, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 516 , 218 A. 2d 596 (1966), our Court held that the seizure of a movie without a prior adversary hearing was unconstitutional.

1972In Smith v. Crumlish, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 516 , 218 A. 2d 596 (1966), our Court held that the seizure of a movie without a prior adversary hearing was unconstitutional.