adversary hearing in Connecticut

2000The state argues that the court should apply U.S. v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), as a basis for upholding the state's use of cash bail, in furtherance of protecting the state's "interest in preventing crime and protecting its citizens against the defendant's pre-trial liberty interest." (State's Memorandum, p. 2.) The Court in U.S. v. Salerno , supra, 481 U.S. 755 , held that "[t]he [Bail Reform] Act [also referred to as 18 U.S.C. § 3142 et seq.] authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an advers

2000The state argues that the court should apply U.S. v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), as a basis for upholding the state's use of cash bail, in furtherance of protecting the state's "interest in preventing crime and protecting its citizens against the defendant's pre-trial liberty interest." (State's Memorandum, p. 2.) The Court in U.S. v. Salerno , supra, 481 U.S. 755 , held that "[t]he [Bail Reform] Act [also referred to as 18 U.S.C. § 3142 et seq.] authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an advers

2000The state argues that the court should apply U.S. v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), as a basis for upholding the state's use of cash bail, in furtherance of protecting the state's "interest in preventing crime and protecting its citizens against the defendant's pre-trial liberty interest." (State's Memorandum, p. 2.) The Court in U.S. v. Salerno , supra, 481 U.S. 755 , held that "[t]he [Bail Reform] Act [also referred to as 18 U.S.C. § 3142 et seq.] authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an advers

1999Thus, where, as in this case, an aggrieved party is afforded a subsequent opportunity' for judicial review, "[a]n administrative decision that calls primarily for fact-finding, especially where that fact-finding requires technical or professional expertise, may appropriately depend upon inspection, examination, or testing, rather than upon an adversary hearing." Id., 119 .

1995We now turn to the defendant’s claim that neither the recent decision in Sassone v. Lepore, supra, 226 Conn. 773 , nor the recently amended version of § 52-278d are dispositive of his claim that in tort actions, plaintiffs must, as a matter of law, post security bonds.

1995In its memorandum of decision, the trial court in this case, relying on Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 987 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1993), held that “a full adversary hearing on the issue of probable cause provides sufficient protection from erroneous deprivation of property and that the further protection of a bond is not constitutionally required.” At issue in Shaumyan was a prejudgment remedy granting an attachment on a residence in a breach of contract case where a homeowner refused to pay for the installation of new windows.

1995Id., 123 .

1993The standard of proof as to a prejudgment attachment of property, applicable to tort cases as well as to other cases, Calfee v. Usman, 224 Conn. 29 , 37 (1992), is probable cause that the plaintiff will, at the trial on the merits, sustain the validity of his or her claim.

1992Bonds have been a similarly common feature of other prejudgment remedy procedures that we have considered, whether or not these procedures also included a hearing.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Connecticut v. Doehr, supra, 2117 . 2 Accordingly, I would find the prejudgment remedy statutes, §§ 52-278a through 52-278n, insofar as they allow a plaintiff to attach a defendant’s property without posting a bond or other security, unconstitutional 3 as violating the due process clause of the United States constitution. 4 The majority opinion points out that, under the federal constitution, th

1992Bonds have been a similarly common feature of other prejudgment remedy procedures that we have considered, whether or not these procedures also included a hearing.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Connecticut v. Doehr, supra, 2117 . 2 Accordingly, I would find the prejudgment remedy statutes, §§ 52-278a through 52-278n, insofar as they allow a plaintiff to attach a defendant’s property without posting a bond or other security, unconstitutional 3 as violating the due process clause of the United States constitution. 4 The majority opinion points out that, under the federal constitution, th

1992Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 , 95 S. Ct. 854 , 43 L.

1992Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 , 95 S. Ct. 854 , 43 L.

1979See Davis, Administrative Law Text (3d Ed. 1972) §7.10; cf. Parham v. J.L. and J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 612 , 99 S. Ct. 2493 , 61 L.

1979See Davis, Administrative Law Text (3d Ed. 1972) §7.10; cf. Parham v. J.L. and J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 612 , 99 S. Ct. 2493 , 61 L.