adversary hearing in Maryland

1995As the Supreme Court explained in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55-56 , 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1468-1469 , 43 L.Ed.2d 712, 728-729 (1975), “[t]he mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing.

1995As the Supreme Court explained in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55-56 , 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1468-1469 , 43 L.Ed.2d 712, 728-729 (1975), “[t]he mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing.

2016Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.” Id. 343-44 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ; see also Bartram v. State, 280 Md. 616, 627 , 374 A.2d 1144 (1977) (citations omitted) (“ ‘The grand jury is an accusing body, and not a judicial tribunal.’ ”) The grand jury’s authority “to require the production of evidence” is “[indispensable to the exercise of its power.” Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 571 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (citations omitted).

2016Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.” Id. 343-44 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ; see also Bartram v. State, 280 Md. 616, 627 , 374 A.2d 1144 (1977) (citations omitted) (“ ‘The grand jury is an accusing body, and not a judicial tribunal.’ ”) The grand jury’s authority “to require the production of evidence” is “[indispensable to the exercise of its power.” Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 571 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (citations omitted).

2021Prior to Williams, in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 482-83 (1980), the Supreme Court addressed whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled a prisoner who had been convicted and incarcerated in Nebraska certain due process protections, including notice, an adversary hearing, and provision of counsel, before the prisoner was involuntarily transferred to a State psychiatric hospital for treatment.

2021The trial court ruled that such a transfer “must be accompanied by adequate notice, an adversary hearing before an independent decisionmaker, a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision, and the availability of appointed counsel for indigent prisoners.” Id. (citation omitted).

2016Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.” Id. 343-44 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ; see also Bartram v. State, 280 Md. 616, 627 , 374 A.2d 1144 (1977) (citations omitted) (“ ‘The grand jury is an accusing body, and not a judicial tribunal.’ ”) The grand jury’s authority “to require the production of evidence” is “[indispensable to the exercise of its power.” Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 571 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (citations omitted).

2016Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.” Id. 343-44 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ; see also Bartram v. State, 280 Md. 616, 627 , 374 A.2d 1144 (1977) (citations omitted) (“ ‘The grand jury is an accusing body, and not a judicial tribunal.’ ”) The grand jury’s authority “to require the production of evidence” is “[indispensable to the exercise of its power.” Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 571 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (citations omitted).

2016Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.” Id. 343-44 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ; see also Bartram v. State, 280 Md. 616, 627 , 374 A.2d 1144 (1977) (citations omitted) (“ ‘The grand jury is an accusing body, and not a judicial tribunal.’ ”) The grand jury’s authority “to require the production of evidence” is “[indispensable to the exercise of its power.” Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 571 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (citations omitted).

2016Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.” Id. 343-44 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ; see also Bartram v. State, 280 Md. 616, 627 , 374 A.2d 1144 (1977) (citations omitted) (“ ‘The grand jury is an accusing body, and not a judicial tribunal.’ ”) The grand jury’s authority “to require the production of evidence” is “[indispensable to the exercise of its power.” Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 571 , 96 S.Ct. 1768 (citations omitted).

2011In Re Deontay J., 408 Md. 152, 167 , 968 A.2d 1067, 1075 (2009).

2011In Re Deontay J., 408 Md. 152, 167 , 968 A.2d 1067, 1075 (2009).

2007See also LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 300-301 , 849 A.2d 451, 458-59 (2004); Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441 , 654 A.2d 449 (1995); Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771, 776 , 511 A.2d 501, 504 (1986); State Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548, 554 , 383 A.2d 51, 55 (1977).

2007See also LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 300-301 , 849 A.2d 451, 458-59 (2004); Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441 , 654 A.2d 449 (1995); Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771, 776 , 511 A.2d 501, 504 (1986); State Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548, 554 , 383 A.2d 51, 55 (1977).

2007See also LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 300-301 , 849 A.2d 451, 458-59 (2004); Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441 , 654 A.2d 449 (1995); Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771, 776 , 511 A.2d 501, 504 (1986); State Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548, 554 , 383 A.2d 51, 55 (1977).

2007See also LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 300-301 , 849 A.2d 451, 458-59 (2004); Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441 , 654 A.2d 449 (1995); Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771, 776 , 511 A.2d 501, 504 (1986); State Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548, 554 , 383 A.2d 51, 55 (1977).

2007See also LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 300-301 , 849 A.2d 451, 458-59 (2004); Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441 , 654 A.2d 449 (1995); Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771, 776 , 511 A.2d 501, 504 (1986); State Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548, 554 , 383 A.2d 51, 55 (1977).

2007See also LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 300-301 , 849 A.2d 451, 458-59 (2004); Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441 , 654 A.2d 449 (1995); Lerner v. Lerner, 306 Md. 771, 776 , 511 A.2d 501, 504 (1986); State Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v. Baltimore County, 281 Md. 548, 554 , 383 A.2d 51, 55 (1977).

2007A temporary restraining order may be granted only if it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or other statement under oath that immediate, substantial, and irreparable harm will result to the person seeking the order before a full adversary hearing can be held on the propriety of a preliminary or final injunction.” *340 Moreover, this Court has enumerated four factors which must be considered by trial courts in deciding whether a TRO should issue: “(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) the ‘balance of convenience’ determined by whether greater

2007A temporary restraining order may be granted only if it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or other statement under oath that immediate, substantial, and irreparable harm will result to the person seeking the order before a full adversary hearing can be held on the propriety of a preliminary or final injunction.” *340 Moreover, this Court has enumerated four factors which must be considered by trial courts in deciding whether a TRO should issue: “(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) the ‘balance of convenience’ determined by whether greater

2006There is no reason to take the additional step of asserting control over the *428 property without first affording notice and an adversary hearing.” Id. at 515-16, 709 A.2d 142 .

2006Dep't of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 404-05 , 474 A.2d 191, 197 (1984).

2006Dep't of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 404-05 , 474 A.2d 191, 197 (1984).

1998Known & Numbered as 429 S. Main Street, 52 F.3d 1416, 1420 (6th Cir.1995); U.S. v. 408 Peyton Rd., S.W., Atlanta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1106 , 1110 n. 5 (11th Cir.1997).

1983Chief Judge Seitz in his concurring opinion said he believed "the government’s disclosure, if the district court is satisfied as to its sufficiency, cannot be made the subject of an adversary hearing by the witness” which, he said, "would lead to the type of mini-hearing which the Supreme Court condemned in Dionisio. ” Id. at 94.

1983Chief Judge Seitz in his concurring opinion said he believed "the government's disclosure, if the district court is satisfied as to its sufficiency, cannot be made the subject of an adversary hearing by the witness" which, he said, "would lead to the type of mini-hearing which the Supreme Court condemned in Dionisio." Id. at 94.

1980In State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 734 , 298 A.2d 867, 879 (1973), the Court of Appeals analyzed the constitutional background of summary direct contempt proceedings.

1980In State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 734 , 298 A.2d 867, 879 (1973), the Court of Appeals analyzed the constitutional background of summary direct contempt proceedings.