adversary hearing in Michigan

2018First, "[t]he right to counsel attaches ... only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the accused by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." People v. Buie (On Remand) , 298 Mich.App. 50 , 61, 825 N.W.2d 361 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). " 'A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated.

2018First, "[t]he right to counsel attaches ... only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the accused by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." People v. Buie (On Remand) , 298 Mich.App. 50 , 61, 825 N.W.2d 361 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). " 'A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated.

2018First, “[t]he right to counsel attaches . . . only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the accused by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” People v Buie (On Remand), 298 Mich App 50, 61 ; 825 NW2d 361 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “ ‘A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated[;] [r]ather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted again

2018First, “[t]he right to counsel attaches . . . only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the accused by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” People v Buie (On Remand), 298 Mich App 50, 61 ; 825 NW2d 361 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “ ‘A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated[;] [r]ather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted again

2018First, “[t]he right to counsel attaches . . . only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the accused by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” People v Buie (On Remand), 298 Mich App 50, 61 ; 825 NW2d 361 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “ ‘A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated[;] [r]ather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted again

2018First, “[t]he right to counsel attaches . . . only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the accused by way of a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” People v Buie (On Remand), 298 Mich App 50, 61 ; 825 NW2d 361 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “ ‘A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated[;] [r]ather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted again

2015The institution in McNeil raised two grounds to support its indefinite commitment of the defendant: “that a commitment for observation need not be surrounded by the procedural safeguards (such as an adversary hearing) that are appropriate for a final determination of defective delinquency,” id. at 249 , and that the defendant’s commitment was akin to a civil contempt because his obstreperous behavior prevented examination, id. at 250 .

2015The institution in McNeil raised two grounds to support its indefinite commitment of the defendant: “that a commitment for observation need not be surrounded by the procedural safeguards (such as an adversary hearing) that are appropriate for a final determination of defective delinquency,” id. at 249 , and that the defendant’s commitment was akin to a civil contempt because his obstreperous behavior prevented examination, id. at 250 .

2018Hence, defendant’s argument is misguided because the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause have yet to come to fruition at the time of the one-person grand jury.2 Third, defendant’s argument that the one-person grand jury procedure is, as a matter of policy, improper, is neither an issue this Court (or any court) can decide, nor is it otherwise compelling because the Legislature acted within its province when it created an “alternative charging procedure.” People v Farquharson, 274 Mich App 268, 273-274 ; 731 NW2d 797 (2007).

2018Hence, defendant’s argument is misguided because the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause have yet to come to fruition at the time of the one-person grand jury.2 Third, defendant’s argument that the one-person grand jury procedure is, as a matter of policy, improper, is neither an issue this Court (or any court) can decide, nor is it otherwise compelling because the Legislature acted within its province when it created an “alternative charging procedure.” People v Farquharson, 274 Mich App 268, 273-274 ; 731 NW2d 797 (2007).

1990Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103 ; 95 S Ct 854 ; 43 L Ed 2d 54 (1975).

1990Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103 ; 95 S Ct 854 ; 43 L Ed 2d 54 (1975).

1988Ceteways, supra. Thus, defendant has not established error.

1977In People v McFadden, 73 Mich App 232 ; 251 NW2d 297 (1977), we deduced from the absence of a procedural framework in MCLA 335.348; MSA 18.1070(48) a legislative intent not to provide an adversary hearing regarding the prior offense, and observed that the second offender status could be challenged at sentencing.

1977In People v McFadden, 73 Mich App 232 ; 251 NW2d 297 (1977), we deduced from the absence of a procedural framework in MCLA 335.348; MSA 18.1070(48) a legislative intent not to provide an adversary hearing regarding the prior offense, and observed that the second offender status could be challenged at sentencing.

1975Nevertheless, the US Supreme Court vacated the judgment and ordered a remand for further consideration in light of Arnett v Kennedy, supra. Civil Service Commission v Snead, 416 US 977 ; 94 S Ct 2376 ; 40 L Ed 2d 755 (1974). *689 Essentially, the only provision present in the Snead statute which is absent in the instant case is the medical certification.

1975Nevertheless, the US Supreme Court vacated the judgment and ordered a remand for further consideration in light of Arnett v Kennedy, supra. Civil Service Commission v Snead, 416 US 977 ; 94 S Ct 2376 ; 40 L Ed 2d 755 (1974). *689 Essentially, the only provision present in the Snead statute which is absent in the instant case is the medical certification.

1970United States district court decisions recognizing that a prior adversary hearing is required even where the film is seized at the same time that the defendant is arrested include Sokolic v. Ryan, supra ; Fontaine v. Dial, supra ; Cambist Films, Inc., v. Illinois, supra ; Abrams and Parisi, Inc., v. Canale, supra ; Bongiovanni v. Hogan, supra . [11] Similarly, see Entertainment Ventures, Inc., v. Brewer, supra, p 809 . [12] Tyrone, Inc., v. Wilkinson, supra, p 640; Astro Cinema Corp., Inc., v. Mackell, supra, p 294; Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, supra, p 411; United States v. Alexander, su

1970United States district court decisions recognizing that a prior adversary hearing is required even where the film is seized at the same time that the defendant is arrested include Sokolic v. Ryan, supra ; Fontaine v. Dial, supra ; Cambist Films, Inc., v. Illinois, supra ; Abrams and Parisi, Inc., v. Canale, supra ; Bongiovanni v. Hogan, supra . [11] Similarly, see Entertainment Ventures, Inc., v. Brewer, supra, p 809 . [12] Tyrone, Inc., v. Wilkinson, supra, p 640; Astro Cinema Corp., Inc., v. Mackell, supra, p 294; Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, supra, p 411; United States v. Alexander, su

1970United States district court decisions recognizing that a prior adversary hearing is required even where the film is seized at the same time that the defendant is arrested include Sokolic v. Ryan, supra ; Fontaine v. Dial, supra ; Cambist Films, Inc., v. Illinois, supra ; Abrams and Parisi, Inc., v. Canale, supra ; Bongiovanni v. Hogan, supra . [11] Similarly, see Entertainment Ventures, Inc., v. Brewer, supra, p 809 . [12] Tyrone, Inc., v. Wilkinson, supra, p 640; Astro Cinema Corp., Inc., v. Mackell, supra, p 294; Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, supra, p 411; United States v. Alexander, su

1970United States district court decisions recognizing that a prior adversary hearing is required even where the film is seized at the same time that the defendant is arrested include Sokolic v. Ryan, supra ; Fontaine v. Dial, supra ; Cambist Films, Inc., v. Illinois, supra ; Abrams and Parisi, Inc., v. Canale, supra ; Bongiovanni v. Hogan, supra . [11] Similarly, see Entertainment Ventures, Inc., v. Brewer, supra, p 809 . [12] Tyrone, Inc., v. Wilkinson, supra, p 640; Astro Cinema Corp., Inc., v. Mackell, supra, p 294; Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, supra, p 411; United States v. Alexander, su

1970It has always been recognized that ‘the more important the rights at stake the more important must be the procedural safeguards surrounding those rights.’ (Speiser v. Randall [1958], 357 US 513, 520, 521 [ 78 S Ct 1332, 1339 , 2 L Ed 2d 1460 ]).” Flack v. Municipal Court (1967), 66 Cal 2d 981 (59 Cal Rptr 872, 879, 880; 429 P2d 192, 199 .) 11 In several cases the judicial officer who issued the search warrant saw the film before he issued it; this was held not to satisfy the requirement that there he an adversary hearing. 12 In any event, in this case the magistrate did not see the film, only

1970It has always been recognized that `the more important the rights at stake the more important must be the procedural safeguards surrounding those rights.' ( Speiser v. Randall [1958], 357 US 513, 520, 521 [ 78 S Ct 1332, 1339 , 2 L Ed 2d 1460 ])." Flack v. Municipal Court (1967), 66 Cal 2d 981 (59 Cal Rptr 872, 879, 880; 429 P2d 192, 199 .) [11] In several cases the judicial officer who issued the search warrant saw the film before he issued it; this was held not to satisfy the requirement that there be an adversary hearing. [12] In any event, in this case the magistrate did not see the film,

1969We do not think the ease of Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia (1968), 392 US 636 ( 88 S Ct 2103 , 20 L Ed 2d 1313 ), cited by defendant, wherein the Court seems to require some sort of an adversary hearing on questions of obscenity before a search warrant may be issued, is controlling in this case.

1969We do not think the ease of Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia (1968), 392 US 636 ( 88 S Ct 2103 , 20 L Ed 2d 1313 ), cited by defendant, wherein the Court seems to require some sort of an adversary hearing on questions of obscenity before a search warrant may be issued, is controlling in this case.