lien claim in Maryland

1955Church v. Heise, 44 Md. 453, 472 , Judge Alvey, reversing the decree appealed from, held that interest should be allowed from the time of filing the lien claim for record, although not charged or claimed in the account.

1917In the German Lutheran Church v. Heise, 44 Md. 453 , no interest was charged or claimed in the account, and it was held that the interest was allowable only from the date of filing the lien; and in Hensel v. Johnson, 94 Md. 737 , it is said: “Inasmuch as the lien became a claim of record, enforceable without stay or condition, interest should be allowed from the time of filing the lien claim for record.” In this case the lien as filed claimed interest only from November 9th, 1910, and if the claim is allowed at all, no interest could be awarded for a longer time than claimed, in addition, to w

1998Maryland Brick Co. v. Spilman, 76 Md. 337 , 25 A. 297 , 17 L.

1998Maryland Brick Co. v. Spilman, 76 Md. 337 , 25 A. 297 , 17 L.

1983The court considered that the Colorado mechanics’ lien statute contained "an express and exhaustive enumeration of those classes of persons entitled to claim a mechanic’s lien,” and that "[c]onspicuously absent from [that] list [was] the express grant of a lien claim to trustees for unpaid contributions to employee trusts.” Id. at 480 , 549 P.2d at 411 .

1983The court considered that the Colorado mechanics’ lien statute contained "an express and exhaustive enumeration of those classes of persons entitled to claim a mechanic’s lien,” and that "[c]onspicuously absent from [that] list [was] the express grant of a lien claim to trustees for unpaid contributions to employee trusts.” Id. at 480 , 549 P.2d at 411 .

1956From that time, therefore, interest will be allowed on whatever may be ascertained to be the amount due.” It was also stated in Hensel v. Johnson, 94 Md. 729, 737 , 51 A. 575 , that interest should have been allowed on a mechanic’s lien from the time of filing the lien claim for record.

1956From that time, therefore, interest will be allowed on whatever may be ascertained to be the amount due.” It was also stated in Hensel v. Johnson, 94 Md. 729, 737 , 51 A. 575 , that interest should have been allowed on a mechanic’s lien from the time of filing the lien claim for record.

2021Id.

2007Id. at 30 , 353 A.2d at 231 ; see also Accrocco v. Fort Wash. Lumber, 255 Md. 682, 684 , 259 A.2d 60, 61 (1969). 24 .

2007Id. at 30 , 353 A.2d at 231 ; see also Accrocco v. Fort Wash. Lumber, 255 Md. 682, 684 , 259 A.2d 60, 61 (1969). 24 .

2006Noting that the chancellor had dismissed the lien claim because of “[insufficiency of description of the property,” the Court of Appeals stated that that reason “is not in our opinion valid.” Id. at 663 , 130 A. 53 .

2006Noting that the chancellor had dismissed the lien claim because of “[insufficiency of description of the property,” the Court of Appeals stated that that reason “is not in our opinion valid.” Id. at 663 , 130 A. 53 .

2006We described the standard for appellate review of a grant of a motion to dismiss a mechanic’s lien claim as follows in Gravett v. Covenant Life Church, 154 Md.App. 640, 645 , 841 A.2d 342 (2004): “The proper standard for reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss is whether the trial court was legally correct.

2006We described the standard for appellate review of a grant of a motion to dismiss a mechanic’s lien claim as follows in Gravett v. Covenant Life Church, 154 Md.App. 640, 645 , 841 A.2d 342 (2004): “The proper standard for reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss is whether the trial court was legally correct.

2005Scott & Wimbrow, Inc. v. Wisterco Investments, Inc., 36 Md.App. 274, 275 , 373 A.2d 965 (1977); see also Wolf, supra, 119 Md.App. at 366 , 705 A.2d 40 (observing that the mechanic’s lien proceeding is in rem).

2005Scott & Wimbrow, Inc. v. Wisterco Investments, Inc., 36 Md.App. 274, 275 , 373 A.2d 965 (1977); see also Wolf, supra, 119 Md.App. at 366 , 705 A.2d 40 (observing that the mechanic’s lien proceeding is in rem).

2000In Gannon & Son, Inc. v. Emerson, 291 Md. 443 , 435 A.2d 449 (1981), a defendant in a mechanics’ lien claim based on a home improvement contract claimed that the contract was unenforceable because (1) it was oral, in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol., 1981 Cum.Supp.), Art. 56 § 265(b), and (2) it was in violation of section 261(a)(15), which made it illegal for a contractor to receive part of the purchase price “prior to the signing of a home-improvement contract.” Id. at 445, 435 A.2d 449 .

2000In Gannon & Son, Inc. v. Emerson, 291 Md. 443 , 435 A.2d 449 (1981), a defendant in a mechanics’ lien claim based on a home improvement contract claimed that the contract was unenforceable because (1) it was oral, in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol., 1981 Cum.Supp.), Art. 56 § 265(b), and (2) it was in violation of section 261(a)(15), which made it illegal for a contractor to receive part of the purchase price “prior to the signing of a home-improvement contract.” Id. at 445, 435 A.2d 449 .

1999Winton Co. v. Meister, 133 Md. 318 , 105 A. 301 (1918), involved the lien claim of an automobile repair mechanic at a time when no statute expressly recognized the lien.

1999Winton Co. v. Meister, 133 Md. 318 , 105 A. 301 (1918), involved the lien claim of an automobile repair mechanic at a time when no statute expressly recognized the lien.

1998In York Roofing, Inc. v. Adcock, 333 Md. 158 , 634 A.2d 39 (1993), the arguments advanced by the petitioners/subcontractors were similar to those urged upon us by Wolf.

1998In York Roofing, Inc. v. Adcock, 333 Md. 158 , 634 A.2d 39 (1993), the arguments advanced by the petitioners/subcontractors were similar to those urged upon us by Wolf.

1996In apparent anticipation of arguments by Carney, IA also contended that Carney was not a bona fide purchaser for a number of reasons, including lis pendens. *709 In his four page brief to the Court of Special Appeals, Carney rested exclusively on extinguishment of the mechanic’s lien by the ratification of the foreclosure sale, citing § 7-105(a) and Southern Maryland Oil, Inc. v. Kaminetz, 260 Md. 443 , 272 A.2d 641 (1971).

1996In apparent anticipation of arguments by Carney, IA also contended that Carney was not a bona fide purchaser for a number of reasons, including lis pendens. *709 In his four page brief to the Court of Special Appeals, Carney rested exclusively on extinguishment of the mechanic’s lien by the ratification of the foreclosure sale, citing § 7-105(a) and Southern Maryland Oil, Inc. v. Kaminetz, 260 Md. 443 , 272 A.2d 641 (1971).

1995Although the “prosecution of a mechanic’s lien claim does not affect the right of the claimant to maintain an in personam action against the property owner,” NSC Contractors v. Borders, 317 Md. 394 , 398 n. 3, 564 A.2d 408 (1989), if the foreclosure sale were to be vacated, appellants’ only remedy would lie in the enforcement of mechanics’ liens on the property under Maryland Code (1974, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.), § 9-101, et seq., of the Real Property Article, not in a claim for unjust enrichment.

1995Although the “prosecution of a mechanic’s lien claim does not affect the right of the claimant to maintain an in personam action against the property owner,” NSC Contractors v. Borders, 317 Md. 394 , 398 n. 3, 564 A.2d 408 (1989), if the foreclosure sale were to be vacated, appellants’ only remedy would lie in the enforcement of mechanics’ liens on the property under Maryland Code (1974, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.), § 9-101, et seq., of the Real Property Article, not in a claim for unjust enrichment.

1991Appellants insist that McDonough incorrectly cites Hashem v. Taheri, 82 Md.App. 269 , 571 A.2d 837 (1990), for the proposition that the fiduciary duty claim was properly decided by the trial judge and not the jury.

1991Appellants insist that McDonough incorrectly cites Hashem v. Taheri, 82 Md.App. 269 , 571 A.2d 837 (1990), for the proposition that the fiduciary duty claim was properly decided by the trial judge and not the jury.

1981Emerson relies on Harry Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 258 Md. 290 , 265 A.2d 759 (1970) which held unenforceable a mechanic’s lien claim by a home improvement contractor who was unlicensed.

1981Emerson relies on Harry Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 258 Md. 290 , 265 A.2d 759 (1970) which held unenforceable a mechanic’s lien claim by a home improvement contractor who was unlicensed.

1977The rule provides in pertinent part: “Pleadings in an action filed under this Subtitle may be amended pursuant to Rule 320 except that after the expiration of the period within which notice of the lien claim must be given, or the petition to establish the lien must be filed if notice is not required, no amendment shall be permitted which will... (2) materially alter the description of the land.” 3 Although the cases denying leave to amend by substituting different properties for those described in the lien, e.g., Brunecz v. DiLeo, 263 Md. 481 and Gault v. Wittman, 34 Md. 35 , might be distingu

1977Lmt’d v. Fabricated Steel Products, Inc., supra, while a judgment on the debt is in personam and subjects all of the properties of the judgment debtor to its claim.

1977The rule provides in pertinent part: “Pleadings in an action filed under this Subtitle may be amended pursuant to Rule 320 except that after the expiration of the period within which notice of the lien claim must be given, or the petition to establish the lien must be filed if notice is not required, no amendment shall be permitted which will... (2) materially alter the description of the land.” 3 Although the cases denying leave to amend by substituting different properties for those described in the lien, e.g., Brunecz v. DiLeo, 263 Md. 481 and Gault v. Wittman, 34 Md. 35 , might be distingu

1975The Maryland Brick Company of Baltimore City v. Dunkerly, 85 Md. 199 (1899); see also Watts v. Whittington, 48 Md. 353 (1878).

1969This issue was before us in District Heights Apartments, Section D-E, Inc. v. No-land Company Inc., 202 Md. 43 , 95 A. 2d 90 (1953), and we there held that: “Maryland has adopted the rule that where a materialman delivers materials to the site of construction of a number of buildings comprised in a single project, it is not essential to the validity of a mechanic’s lien claim that he must *128 show in which buildings the specific materials were used or even that the materials were actually used on the project if they were purchased for and delivered to the site of the work * * * It is reasoned

1969This issue was before us in District Heights Apartments, Section D-E, Inc. v. No-land Company Inc., 202 Md. 43 , 95 A. 2d 90 (1953), and we there held that: “Maryland has adopted the rule that where a materialman delivers materials to the site of construction of a number of buildings comprised in a single project, it is not essential to the validity of a mechanic’s lien claim that he must *128 show in which buildings the specific materials were used or even that the materials were actually used on the project if they were purchased for and delivered to the site of the work * * * It is reasoned