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17 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mitchell v. Flandrogreen2 sentences2009Certainly, it is well settled law in Idaho that substantial completion is a construction milestone, which properly commences the time deadline to record a mechanics lien against a private works project.” (Citation omitted.) In making that argument, Surety quotes from Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 231 , 506 P.2d 455, 458 (1972), which held, “It is established that ‘trivial’ work done or materials furnished after the contract has been substantially completed will not extend the time in which a lien claim can be filed under I.C. 45-507.” In Mitchell , the contractor’s testimony also showed t 2009Certainly, it is well settled law in Idaho that substantial completion is a construction milestone, which properly commences the time deadline to record a mechanics lien against a private works project.” (Citation omitted.) In making that argument, Surety quotes from Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 231 , 506 P.2d 455, 458 (1972), which held, “It is established that ‘trivial’ work done or materials furnished after the contract has been substantially completed will not extend the time in which a lien claim can be filed under I.C. 45-507.” In Mitchell , the contractor’s testimony also showed t | 2 | 2 |
Gem State Lumber Co. v. Wittygreen2 sentences2004The district court in this ease found that “Idaho courts have consistently held that the time for filing a lien claim begins to run from the substantial completion of the contract.” The district court also found that “items of a trivial character will not extend the time for claiming a lien.” In support of its findings, the district court cited to Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38 , 539 P.2d 590 (1975) and Gem State Lumber Co. v. Witty, 37 Idaho 489 , 217 P. 1027 (1923). 2004The district court in this ease found that “Idaho courts have consistently held that the time for filing a lien claim begins to run from the substantial completion of the contract.” The district court also found that “items of a trivial character will not extend the time for claiming a lien.” In support of its findings, the district court cited to Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38 , 539 P.2d 590 (1975) and Gem State Lumber Co. v. Witty, 37 Idaho 489 , 217 P. 1027 (1923). | 1 | 3 |
Phillips v. Salmon River Mining & Development Co.green2 sentences2011Co., the owner of a mine composed of three placer mining claims, challenged the validity of a lien claim when the lien claimant described the property to be liened as the Salem Bar Mine, without identifying the individual mining claims making up the larger mine. 9 Idaho 149 , 72 P. 886, 886 (1903). 2011Co., the owner of a mine composed of three placer mining claims, challenged the validity of a lien claim when the lien claimant described the property to be liened as the Salem Bar Mine, without identifying the individual mining claims making up the larger mine. 9 Idaho 149 , 72 P. 886, 886 (1903). | 1 | 1 |
Chief Industries, Inc. v. Schwendimangreen2 sentences2011See Chief Industries, 99 Idaho at 687 , 587 P.2d at 828 . 2011See Chief Industries, 99 Idaho at 687 , 587 P.2d at 828 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stonebrook Constraction, LLC v. Chase Home Finance, LLC
green
2 sentences2024Id. at 4 The law provided that any person who engaged in the practice of architecture or offered to practice without a license was guilty of a misdemeanor. 2024Id. at 4 The law provided that any person who engaged in the practice of architecture or offered to practice without a license was guilty of a misdemeanor. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson / Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024Later in the hearing on the motion for directed verdict, Genho’s attorney asked the court to reconsider its decision on the lien claim under this Court’s holding in ParkWest Homes LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603 , 238 P.3d 203 (2010). 2024Later in the hearing on the motion for directed verdict, Genho’s attorney asked the court to reconsider its decision on the lien claim under this Court’s holding in ParkWest Homes LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603 , 238 P.3d 203 (2010). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Pierson v. Sewell
green
2 sentences2004The district court in this ease found that “Idaho courts have consistently held that the time for filing a lien claim begins to run from the substantial completion of the contract.” The district court also found that “items of a trivial character will not extend the time for claiming a lien.” In support of its findings, the district court cited to Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38 , 539 P.2d 590 (1975) and Gem State Lumber Co. v. Witty, 37 Idaho 489 , 217 P. 1027 (1923). 2004The district court in this ease found that “Idaho courts have consistently held that the time for filing a lien claim begins to run from the substantial completion of the contract.” The district court also found that “items of a trivial character will not extend the time for claiming a lien.” In support of its findings, the district court cited to Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38 , 539 P.2d 590 (1975) and Gem State Lumber Co. v. Witty, 37 Idaho 489 , 217 P. 1027 (1923). | 2 | 2004–2009 |
First General Services v. Perkins
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 486 . 2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Frazee v. Frazee
green
2 sentences1989The lien asserted by Cole is what is known as an “attorney’s charging lien.” See Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463 , 660 P.2d 928 (1983). 1989The lien asserted by Cole is what is known as an “attorney’s charging lien.” See Frazee v. Frazee, 104 Idaho 463 , 660 P.2d 928 (1983). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison
green
2 sentences1985The district court’s judgment was affirmed in Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison, 93 Idaho 652 , 471 P.2d 39 (1970). 1985The district court’s judgment was affirmed in Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison, 93 Idaho 652 , 471 P.2d 39 (1970). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Gee v. Crabtree
green
2 sentences1981In our view, the attorney's charging lien may not only be asserted, but may be enforced, in the civil action which gave rise to the lien claim, or, in the alternative, in an independent action." 560 P.2d at 836 . 1981In our view, the attorney’s charging lien may not only be asserted, but may be enforced, in the civil action which gave rise to the lien claim, or, in the alternative, in an independent action.” 560 P.2d at 836 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Finnell v. Finnell
green
2 sentences1975We adopt the following language of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Finnell v. Finnell, 156 Cal. 589 , 105 P. 740 (1909), in which the California court, which construed a vendor’s lien statute substantially identical to Idaho’s, stated: “The right of a vendor to enforce his lien continues, unless waived, so long as an action can be commenced for the purchase money . . . .” 105 P. at 744 . 1975We adopt the following language of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Finnell v. Finnell, 156 Cal. 589 , 105 P. 740 (1909), in which the California court, which construed a vendor’s lien statute substantially identical to Idaho’s, stated: “The right of a vendor to enforce his lien continues, unless waived, so long as an action can be commenced for the purchase money . . . .” 105 P. at 744 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Lus v. Pecararo
neutral
2 sentences1974Linch v. Perrine, 51 Idaho 152 , 4 P.2d 353 (1931); Lus v. Pecararo, 41 Idaho 425 , 238 P. 1021 (1925); Brunecz v. DiLeo, 263 Md. 481 , 283 A.2d 606 (1971); Kuntz v. Partridge, 65 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1954); Duncan Box & Lbr. 1974Linch v. Perrine, 51 Idaho 152 , 4 P.2d 353 (1931); Lus v. Pecararo, 41 Idaho 425 , 238 P. 1021 (1925); Brunecz v. DiLeo, 263 Md. 481 , 283 A.2d 606 (1971); Kuntz v. Partridge, 65 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1954); Duncan Box & Lbr. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Linch v. Perrine
neutral
2 sentences1974Linch v. Perrine, 51 Idaho 152 , 4 P.2d 353 (1931); Lus v. Pecararo, 41 Idaho 425 , 238 P. 1021 (1925); Brunecz v. DiLeo, 263 Md. 481 , 283 A.2d 606 (1971); Kuntz v. Partridge, 65 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1954); Duncan Box & Lbr. 1974Linch v. Perrine, 51 Idaho 152 , 4 P.2d 353 (1931); Lus v. Pecararo, 41 Idaho 425 , 238 P. 1021 (1925); Brunecz v. DiLeo, 263 Md. 481 , 283 A.2d 606 (1971); Kuntz v. Partridge, 65 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1954); Duncan Box & Lbr. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Kuntz v. Partridge
green
1 sentence1974Linch v. Perrine, 51 Idaho 152 , 4 P.2d 353 (1931); Lus v. Pecararo, 41 Idaho 425 , 238 P. 1021 (1925); Brunecz v. DiLeo, 263 Md. 481 , 283 A.2d 606 (1971); Kuntz v. Partridge, 65 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1954); Duncan Box & Lbr. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Brunecz v. DiLeo
green
2 sentences1974Linch v. Perrine, 51 Idaho 152 , 4 P.2d 353 (1931); Lus v. Pecararo, 41 Idaho 425 , 238 P. 1021 (1925); Brunecz v. DiLeo, 263 Md. 481 , 283 A.2d 606 (1971); Kuntz v. Partridge, 65 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1954); Duncan Box & Lbr. 1974Linch v. Perrine, 51 Idaho 152 , 4 P.2d 353 (1931); Lus v. Pecararo, 41 Idaho 425 , 238 P. 1021 (1925); Brunecz v. DiLeo, 263 Md. 481 , 283 A.2d 606 (1971); Kuntz v. Partridge, 65 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1954); Duncan Box & Lbr. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Gem State Lumber Co. v. Union Grain & Elevator Co.
green
2 sentences1958This Court, in Gem State Lumber Co. v. Union Grain & Elevator Co., 47 Idaho 747 , 278 P. 775, 776 , upon invoking the rule of liberal construction of the lien law, held that failure to state the name of the record owner of the property in the claim of lien, was not fatal since it appeared that such owner “was in no manner misled by the mistake, but had been apprised of the lien claim.” Herein it is not indicated whether Mrs. MacFarland is, or was at the time of the trial, a record owner of the property, together with her husband. 1958This Court, in Gem State Lumber Co. v. Union Grain & Elevator Co., 47 Idaho 747 , 278 P. 775, 776 , upon invoking the rule of liberal construction of the lien law, held that failure to state the name of the record owner of the property in the claim of lien, was not fatal since it appeared that such owner “was in no manner misled by the mistake, but had been apprised of the lien claim.” Herein it is not indicated whether Mrs. MacFarland is, or was at the time of the trial, a record owner of the property, together with her husband. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Blake v. Crystalline Lime Co.
green
2 sentences1934It is said in Blake v. Crystalline Lime Co., 37 Ida. 637, 641 , 221 Pac. 1100 , 1101: “The very foundation of a lien claim under our statute is the performance of labor upon or the furnishing of materials for the construction or improvement of the property upon which the lien is claimed. 1934It is said in Blake v. Crystalline Lime Co., 37 Ida. 637, 641 , 221 Pac. 1100 , 1101: “The very foundation of a lien claim under our statute is the performance of labor upon or the furnishing of materials for the construction or improvement of the property upon which the lien is claimed. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Franklin v. Walker
neutral
2 sentences1925(Franklin v. Walker, 171 Ill. 405 , 49 N. E. 556 ; Jones v. Wolfe (Tenn. Ch. 1925(Franklin v. Walker, 171 Ill. 405 , 49 N. E. 556 ; Jones v. Wolfe (Tenn. Ch. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Gilbert v. Bakes
neutral
2 sentences1925(Gilbert v. Bakes, 106 Ind. 558 , 7 N. E. 257 .) The acceptance of a forged mortgage does not waive an implied vendor’s lien. (39 Cyc. 1840.) The law will not imply a waiver of a vendor’s lien when the waiver, if implied, was induced by fraud of the vendee. 1925(Gilbert v. Bakes, 106 Ind. 558 , 7 N. E. 257 .) The acceptance of a forged mortgage does not waive an implied vendor’s lien. (39 Cyc. 1840.) The law will not imply a waiver of a vendor’s lien when the waiver, if implied, was induced by fraud of the vendee. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Taylor v. Debritz
neutral
2 sentences1915Ency. of Law, p. 755, which reads: “If the owner of land, or a party having interest therein, in good faith applies to the proper officer for the purpose of paying the tax thereon, and payment is prevented by the mistake or fault of such officer, .... the attempt to pay is considered, in most jurisdictions as the legal equivalent of payment in so far as -to discharge the lien and bar a sale for nonpayment.” Thus in Breisch v. Coxe, 81 Pa. St. 336, 346, the court in dealing with an attempt to pay taxes, observed: “It is an almost universal rule, which substitutes a tender for performance, when 1915Ency. of Law, p. 755, which reads: “If the owner of land, or a party having interest therein, in good faith applies to the proper officer for the purpose of paying the tax thereon, and payment is prevented by the mistake or fault of such officer, .... the attempt to pay is considered, in most jurisdictions as the legal equivalent of payment in so far as -to discharge the lien and bar a sale for nonpayment.” Thus in Breisch v. Coxe, 81 Pa. St. 336, 346, the court in dealing with an attempt to pay taxes, observed: “It is an almost universal rule, which substitutes a tender for performance, when | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.