24 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1913–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gee v. Crabtreegreen2 sentences2017See C.R.C.P. 64(a) (defining judgment as a “decree and order to or from which an appeal lies”); Gee v. Crabtree, 192 Colo. 550 , 560 P.2d 835, 836 (1977) (treating a dissolution decree as a judgment for purposes of section 12-5-119, and holding that an attorney may enforce his charging lien in either the dissolution action that gave rise to the lien claim or an independent action). 2017See C.R.C.P. 64(a) (defining judgment as a “decree and order to or from which an appeal lies”); Gee v. Crabtree, 192 Colo. 550 , 560 P.2d 835, 836 (1977) (treating a dissolution decree as a judgment for purposes of section 12-5-119, and holding that an attorney may enforce his charging lien in either the dissolution action that gave rise to the lien claim or an independent action). | 2 | 5 |
People v. Colliegreen2 sentences2008Id.; see People v. Collie, 682 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Colo.App.1988) (noting that the purpose of the Trust Fund Statute "is to protect homeowners, laborers, and materialmen from dishonest or profligate contractors") (emphasis added), First Commercial Corp., 572 F.Supp. at 1484 (noting that the statute creates a separate form of protection because any other interpretation would render either lien claims or trust fund claims superfluous).. 2007Id.; see People v. Collie, 682 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Colo. App.1983) (noting that the purpose of the Trust Fund Statute "is to protect homeowners, laborers, and materialmen from dishonest or profligate contractors ") (emphasis added); First Commercial Corp., 572 F.Supp. at 1434 (noting that the statute creates a separate form of protection because any other interpretation would render either lien claims or trust fund claims superfluous). | 2 | 2 |
Buerger Investment Co. v. B. F. Salzer Lumber Co.green2 sentences2005There has been too much of that sort of construction of the Mechanic's Lien Law, and it ought to go no farther." Buerger, 77 Colo. at 407 , 237 P. at 165 . [3] Condominium ownership is recognized and governed by statute in Colorado. 2005There has been too much of that sort of construction of the Mechanic's Lien Law, and it ought to go no farther." Buerger, 77 Colo. at 407 , 237 P. at 165 . [3] Condominium ownership is recognized and governed by statute in Colorado. | 1 | 2 |
Mangone v. U-Haul International, Inc.green1 sentence2025Unpreserved Contentions ¶ 13 At the outset, we agree with JP Antlers that to the extent Bobby Hill Designs relies on the first method for establishing a mechanic’s lien claim — section 38-22-101(1) — it failed to preserve this argument. ¶ 14 While we don’t require talismanic language to preserve an issue, In re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 21 , we generally won’t address for the first time on appeal issues that weren’t raised before the district court, Mangone v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 7 P.3d 189, 191 (Colo. App. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Seitz v. Seitzgreen1 sentence2025See also Seitz v. Seitz, 516 P.2d 654, 655 (Colo. App. 1973) (recognizing that the district court must determine whether an attorney’s lien is valid and whether fees are owed to counsel). ¶8 Wife contends that the district court erred by entering judgment against her because the law firm never provided any evidence in support of the amount of attorney fees and costs that it claimed, and because Basler allegedly violated his professional duties. | 1 | 1 |
Jefferson County Board of Equalization v. Gerganoffgreen1 sentence2018See Gerganoff, 241 P.3d at 935 . | 1 | 1 |
Jacobsen v. Olivergreen1 sentence2010See, e.g., Jacobsen, 555 F.Supp.2d at 84 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Benítezgreen1 sentence2007See Williams v. Uncompahgre Canal Co., 13 Colo. 469 , 22 P. 806 (1889). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Uncompahgre Canal Co.green1 sentence2007See Williams v. Uncompahgre Canal Co., 13 Colo. 469 , 22 P. 806 (1889). | 1 | 1 |
First Commercial Corp. v. First National Bancorporation, Inc.green2 sentences2007Id.; see People v. Collie, 682 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Colo.App.1983) (noting that the purpose of the Trust Fund Statute “is to protect home-otvners, laborers, and materialmen from dishonest or profligate contractors ”) (emphasis added); First Commercial Corp., 572 F.Supp. at 1434 (noting that the statute creates a separate form of protection because any other interpretation would render either lien claims or trust fund claims superfluous). 2007Id.; see People v. Collie, 682 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Colo. App.1983) (noting that the purpose of the Trust Fund Statute "is to protect homeowners, laborers, and materialmen from dishonest or profligate contractors ") (emphasis added); First Commercial Corp., 572 F.Supp. at 1434 (noting that the statute creates a separate form of protection because any other interpretation would render either lien claims or trust fund claims superfluous). | 1 | 1 |
Schneider v. J.W. Metz Lumber Co.green2 sentences2005Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329, 332 (Colo.1986) (“Colorado courts have long held that the mechanics’ lien statute [is in] derogation of the common law [and] is to be strictly construed in determining who is entitled to a lien.”); Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. F.D.I.C., 928 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Colo.App.1996) (“The mechanics’ lien statute is to be strictly construed with respect to those acts necessary to perfect the lien and liberally construed with respect to the benefits accorded a properly perfected lien.”), rev’d on other grounds, 2 Because a mechanics’ lien is a creature of statute, see ITC, 79 2005Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329, 332 (Colo.1986) ("Colorado courts have long held that the mechanics' lien statute [is in] derogation of the common law [and] is to be strictly construed in determining who is entitled to a lien."); Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. F.D.I.C., 928 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Colo.App.1996) ("The mechanics' lien statute is to be strictly construed with respect to those acts necessary to perfect the lien and liberally construed with respect to the benefits accorded a properly perfected lien."), rev'd on other grounds. [2] Because a mechanics' lien is a creature of statute, see ITC, | 1 | 1 |
Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.green2 sentences2005Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329, 332 (Colo.1986) (“Colorado courts have long held that the mechanics’ lien statute [is in] derogation of the common law [and] is to be strictly construed in determining who is entitled to a lien.”); Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. F.D.I.C., 928 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Colo.App.1996) (“The mechanics’ lien statute is to be strictly construed with respect to those acts necessary to perfect the lien and liberally construed with respect to the benefits accorded a properly perfected lien.”), rev’d on other grounds, 2 Because a mechanics’ lien is a creature of statute, see ITC, 79 2005Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329, 332 (Colo.1986) ("Colorado courts have long held that the mechanics' lien statute [is in] derogation of the common law [and] is to be strictly construed in determining who is entitled to a lien."); Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. F.D.I.C., 928 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Colo.App.1996) ("The mechanics' lien statute is to be strictly construed with respect to those acts necessary to perfect the lien and liberally construed with respect to the benefits accorded a properly perfected lien."), rev'd on other grounds. [2] Because a mechanics' lien is a creature of statute, see ITC, | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Sayresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Great Western Sugar Co. v. Jackson Lake Reservoir & Irrigation Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Nelsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Orcasitas v. Registrar of Property
neutral
2 sentences1913Prior to the act of 1889 the sub-contractor was required to give notice of an intention to claim a lien with no exception as to amount of the contract, the contract was not required to be in writing or to be filed, and he could not maintain a lien unless at the date of his notice of lien or of his intention to file the same, “there was something due or to become due from the owner to the. contractor.” — Jensen v. Brown, 2 Colo., 694 (Law of 1872); McIntyre v. Barnes, 4 Colo., 285 (Law of 1872); Epley v. Sherrer, 5 Colo., 536 (Law of 1876); Tabor v. Armstrong, 9 Colo., 285 , 12 Pac., 157 (Gener 1913Prior to the act of 1889 the sub-contractor was required to give notice of an intention to claim a lien with no exception as to amount of the contract, the contract was not required to be in writing or to be filed, and he could not maintain a lien unless at the date of his notice of lien or of his intention to file the same, “there was something due or to become due from the owner to the. contractor.” — Jensen v. Brown, 2 Colo., 694 (Law of 1872); McIntyre v. Barnes, 4 Colo., 285 (Law of 1872); Epley v. Sherrer, 5 Colo., 536 (Law of 1876); Tabor v. Armstrong, 9 Colo., 285 , 12 Pac., 157 (Gener | 2 | 1913–1913 |
Jensen v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences1913Prior to the act of 1889 the sub-contractor was required to give notice of an intention to claim a lien with no exception as to amount of the contract, the contract was not required to be in writing or to be filed, and he could not maintain a lien unless at the date of his notice of lien or of his intention to file the same, “there was something due or to become due from the owner to the. contractor.” — Jensen v. Brown, 2 Colo., 694 (Law of 1872); McIntyre v. Barnes, 4 Colo., 285 (Law of 1872); Epley v. Sherrer, 5 Colo., 536 (Law of 1876); Tabor v. Armstrong, 9 Colo., 285 , 12 Pac., 157 (Gener 1913Prior to the act of 1889 the sub-contractor was required to give notice of an intention to claim a lien with no exception as to amount of the contract, the contract was not required to be in writing or to be filed, and he could not maintain a lien unless at the date of his notice of lien or of his intention to file the same, “there was something due or to become due from the owner to the. contractor.” — Jensen v. Brown, 2 Colo., 694 (Law of 1872); McIntyre v. Barnes, 4 Colo., 285 (Law of 1872); Epley v. Sherrer, 5 Colo., 536 (Law of 1876); Tabor v. Armstrong, 9 Colo., 285 , 12 Pac., 157 (Gener | 2 | 1913–1913 |
Tabor v. Armstrong
neutral
2 sentences1913Prior to the act of 1889 the sub-contractor was required to give notice of an intention to claim a lien with no exception as to amount of the contract, the contract was not required to be in writing or to be filed, and he could not maintain a lien unless at the date of his notice of lien or of his intention to file the same, “there was something due or to become due from the owner to the. contractor.” — Jensen v. Brown, 2 Colo., 694 (Law of 1872); McIntyre v. Barnes, 4 Colo., 285 (Law of 1872); Epley v. Sherrer, 5 Colo., 536 (Law of 1876); Tabor v. Armstrong, 9 Colo., 285 , 12 Pac., 157 (Gener 1913Prior to the act of 1889 the sub-contractor was required to give notice of an intention to claim a lien with no exception as to amount of the contract, the contract was not required to be in writing or to be filed, and he could not maintain a lien unless at the date of his notice of lien or of his intention to file the same, “there was something due or to become due from the owner to the. contractor.” — Jensen v. Brown, 2 Colo., 694 (Law of 1872); McIntyre v. Barnes, 4 Colo., 285 (Law of 1872); Epley v. Sherrer, 5 Colo., 536 (Law of 1876); Tabor v. Armstrong, 9 Colo., 285 , 12 Pac., 157 (Gener | 2 | 1913–1913 |
McIntire v. Barnes
neutral
2 sentences1913Prior to the act of 1889 the sub-contractor was required to give notice of an intention to claim a lien with no exception as to amount of the contract, the contract was not required to be in writing or to be filed, and he could not maintain a lien unless at the date of his notice of lien or of his intention to file the same, “there was something due or to become due from the owner to the. contractor.” — Jensen v. Brown, 2 Colo., 694 (Law of 1872); McIntyre v. Barnes, 4 Colo., 285 (Law of 1872); Epley v. Sherrer, 5 Colo., 536 (Law of 1876); Tabor v. Armstrong, 9 Colo., 285 , 12 Pac., 157 (Gener 1913Prior to the act of 1889 the sub-contractor was required to give notice of an intention to claim a lien with no exception as to amount of the contract, the contract was not required to be in writing or to be filed, and he could not maintain a lien unless at the date of his notice of lien or of his intention to file the same, “there was something due or to become due from the owner to the. contractor.” — Jensen v. Brown, 2 Colo., 694 (Law of 1872); McIntyre v. Barnes, 4 Colo., 285 (Law of 1872); Epley v. Sherrer, 5 Colo., 536 (Law of 1876); Tabor v. Armstrong, 9 Colo., 285 , 12 Pac., 157 (Gener | 2 | 1913–1913 |
Epley v. Scherer
neutral
2 sentences1913Prior to the act of 1889 the sub-contractor was required to give notice of an intention to claim a lien with no exception as to amount of the contract, the contract was not required to be in writing or to be filed, and he could not maintain a lien unless at the date of his notice of lien or of his intention to file the same, “there was something due or to become due from the owner to the. contractor.” — Jensen v. Brown, 2 Colo., 694 (Law of 1872); McIntyre v. Barnes, 4 Colo., 285 (Law of 1872); Epley v. Sherrer, 5 Colo., 536 (Law of 1876); Tabor v. Armstrong, 9 Colo., 285 , 12 Pac., 157 (Gener 1913Prior to the act of 1889 the sub-contractor was required to give notice of an intention to claim a lien with no exception as to amount of the contract, the contract was not required to be in writing or to be filed, and he could not maintain a lien unless at the date of his notice of lien or of his intention to file the same, “there was something due or to become due from the owner to the. contractor.” — Jensen v. Brown, 2 Colo., 694 (Law of 1872); McIntyre v. Barnes, 4 Colo., 285 (Law of 1872); Epley v. Sherrer, 5 Colo., 536 (Law of 1876); Tabor v. Armstrong, 9 Colo., 285 , 12 Pac., 157 (Gener | 2 | 1913–1913 |
In Re the Marriage of Mitchell
green
1 sentence2025A lien may be enforced and reduced to a judgment in a “proper civil action,” § 13-93-114, which “has been held to include . . . filing a motion to reduce the lien to judgment in the civil action that gave rise to the lien claim,” Mitchell, 55 P.3d at 185 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In re Estate of Owens
green
1 sentence2025Unpreserved Contentions ¶ 13 At the outset, we agree with JP Antlers that to the extent Bobby Hill Designs relies on the first method for establishing a mechanic’s lien claim — section 38-22-101(1) — it failed to preserve this argument. ¶ 14 While we don’t require talismanic language to preserve an issue, In re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 21 , we generally won’t address for the first time on appeal issues that weren’t raised before the district court, Mangone v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 7 P.3d 189, 191 (Colo. App. 1999). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. Regan
green
1 sentence2008The trial court disagreed, relying upon In re Regan, 151 P.3d 1281 (Colo.2007), to find that "as benefi-claries, property owners are able to enforce the Trust Fund Statute against the contractor separate from the lien claim laws." On appeal, Pullen argues that the court's reliance on Regan is misplaced and the court's ruling erroneously allows homeowners the right to sue when such right under the statute should only be given to subcontractors, laborers, and material suppliers. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Discount Home Center, Inc. v. Turner (In Re Turner)
green
2 sentences2007The court in In re Turner held that even when a lien creditor fails to perfect a lien, the contractor-trustee may not breach his own fiduciary duty to hold trust funds so that no liens need be created at all. 134 B.R. at 656-57 . 2007The court in In re Turner held that even when a lien creditor fails to perfect a lien, the contractor-trustee may not breach his own fiduciary duty to hold trust funds so that no liens need be created at all. 134 B.R. at 656-57 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Damrell v. Creagar
green
2 sentences2007Damrell v. Creagar, 42 Colo.App. 281 , 599 P.2d 262 (1979). 2007Damrell v. Creagar, 42 Colo.App. 281 , 599 P.2d 262 (1979). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Woodcrest Homes, Inc. v. First National Bank of Pueblo (In re Woodcrest Homes, Inc.)
neutral
1 sentence2005In re Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 11 B.R. 342 (Bankr.D.Colo.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 15 B.R. 886 (D.Colo.1981). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Woodcrest Homes, Inc. v. First National Bank of Pueblo (In Re Woodcrest Homes, Inc.)
green
1 sentence2005In re Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 11 B.R. 342 (Bankr.D.Colo.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 15 B.R. 886 (D.Colo.1981). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Independent Trust Corp. v. Stan Miller, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329, 332 (Colo.1986) (“Colorado courts have long held that the mechanics’ lien statute [is in] derogation of the common law [and] is to be strictly construed in determining who is entitled to a lien.”); Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. F.D.I.C., 928 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Colo.App.1996) (“The mechanics’ lien statute is to be strictly construed with respect to those acts necessary to perfect the lien and liberally construed with respect to the benefits accorded a properly perfected lien.”), rev’d on other grounds, 2 Because a mechanics’ lien is a creature of statute, see ITC, 79 2005Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329, 332 (Colo.1986) ("Colorado courts have long held that the mechanics' lien statute [is in] derogation of the common law [and] is to be strictly construed in determining who is entitled to a lien."); Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. F.D.I.C., 928 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Colo.App.1996) ("The mechanics' lien statute is to be strictly construed with respect to those acts necessary to perfect the lien and liberally construed with respect to the benefits accorded a properly perfected lien."), rev'd on other grounds. [2] Because a mechanics' lien is a creature of statute, see ITC, | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Adler v. Fenton
green
2 sentences2003Adler v. Fenton, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 407 , 16 L.Ed. 696 (1860); see also Pullen v. Headberg, supra. However, modern fraudulent transfer law, like CUFTA, has dispensed with the lien requirement, focusing instead on the debtor’s intent to frustrate the creditor once its claim is made known. 2003Adler v. Fenton, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 407 , 16 L.Ed. 696 (1860); see also Pullen v. Headberg, supra. However, modern fraudulent transfer law, like CUFTA, has dispensed with the lien requirement, focusing instead on the debtor’s intent to frustrate the creditor once its claim is made known. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Aleman v. Annable
green
2 sentences1990Aleman v. Annable, 110 Colo. 61 , 129 P.2d 987 (1942); Nichols v. Orr, 63 Colo. 333 , 166 P. 561 (1917); Cottonwood Hill, Inc. v. Ansay, 782 P.2d 1207 (Colo. App.1989). 1990Aleman v. Annable, 110 Colo. 61 , 129 P.2d 987 (1942); Nichols v. Orr, 63 Colo. 333 , 166 P. 561 (1917); Cottonwood Hill, Inc. v. Ansay, 782 P.2d 1207 (Colo. App.1989). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Collins v. Thuringer
green
2 sentences1990In Collins v. Thuringer, 92 Colo. 433 , 21 P.2d 709 (1933), our supreme court determined that one who garnished a judgment debtor to secure funds owed to him by a judgment creditor did not have priority over the lien of the attorney for the judgment creditor. 1990In Collins v. Thuringer, 92 Colo. 433 , 21 P.2d 709 (1933), our supreme court determined that one who garnished a judgment debtor to secure funds owed to him by a judgment creditor did not have priority over the lien of the attorney for the judgment creditor. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Cottonwood Hill, Inc. v. Ansay green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Nichols v. Orr green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Stan Miller, Inc. v. Breckenridge Resort Associates, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| BOARD OF CTY. COM'RS, ETC. v. Berkeley Village green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. First Virginia Mortgage & Real Estate Investment Trust
green
2 sentences1990West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. First Virginia Mortgage and Real Estate Investment Trust, 221 Va. 134 , 267 S.E.2d 149 (1980) and PIC Construction Co. v. First Union National Bank of North Carolina, 218 Va. 915 , 241 S.E.2d 804 (1978) dealt with the partial release of a mechanics’ lien claim and the subsequent attempt by the claimant to enforce the lien against the remainder of the property. 1990West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. First Virginia Mortgage and Real Estate Investment Trust, 221 Va. 134 , 267 S.E.2d 149 (1980) and PIC Construction Co. v. First Union National Bank of North Carolina, 218 Va. 915 , 241 S.E.2d 804 (1978) dealt with the partial release of a mechanics’ lien claim and the subsequent attempt by the claimant to enforce the lien against the remainder of the property. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
PIC Construction Co. v. First Union National Bank of North Carolina
green
2 sentences1990West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. First Virginia Mortgage and Real Estate Investment Trust, 221 Va. 134 , 267 S.E.2d 149 (1980) and PIC Construction Co. v. First Union National Bank of North Carolina, 218 Va. 915 , 241 S.E.2d 804 (1978) dealt with the partial release of a mechanics’ lien claim and the subsequent attempt by the claimant to enforce the lien against the remainder of the property. 1990West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. First Virginia Mortgage and Real Estate Investment Trust, 221 Va. 134 , 267 S.E.2d 149 (1980) and PIC Construction Co. v. First Union National Bank of North Carolina, 218 Va. 915 , 241 S.E.2d 804 (1978) dealt with the partial release of a mechanics’ lien claim and the subsequent attempt by the claimant to enforce the lien against the remainder of the property. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| The Superior Oil Company v. The City of Port Arthur green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| United States, Small Business Administration v. Freeland (In Re Chaseley's Foods, Inc.) green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hutchison v. Bank of North Carolina green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Terranova v. Avco Financial Services of Barre, Inc. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Davidson v. Board of County Commissioners green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Clarke v. Day neutral | 1 | 1916–1916 |
| In re Stowell neutral | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.