lien claim in Utah

2014Lane Myers Constr., LLC v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2012 UT App 269, ¶¶ 16-17 , 287 P.3d 479 .

2014Lane Myers Constr., LLC v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2012 UT App 269, ¶¶ 16-17 , 287 P.3d 479 .

2025Dumar argues that New Star funneled its payments this way because “the rest of the [d]evelopment was subject to [Broadmark]’s [d]eed of [t]rust, which would be senior to any lien notice of New Star’s.” Dumar asserts that by applying its payments this way, New Star intentionally increased the amount it could recover in a lien against the units in Building C, which were not subject to Broadmark’s superior lien. ¶65 As a first step, the party claiming an excessive lien must show that “the lien contained a ‘greater demand than the sum’ actually owed.” 76 If the lien did claim more than was owed, t

2025Dumar argues that New Star funneled its payments this way because “the rest of the [d]evelopment was subject to [Broadmark]’s [d]eed of [t]rust, which would be senior to any lien notice of New Star’s.” Dumar asserts that by applying its payments this way, New Star intentionally increased the amount it could recover in a lien against the units in Building C, which were not subject to Broadmark’s superior lien. ¶65 As a first step, the party claiming an excessive lien must show that “the lien contained a ‘greater demand than the sum’ actually owed.” 76 If the lien did claim more than was owed, t

2017In 2 Ton, we stated that “where the statute fails, courts cannot create rights” and “[a] lien created solely by statute depends on the terms of the statute.”46 ¶ 62 This conclusion is supported by the fact that the legislature has elsewhere delineated what is ultimately recoverable in a _____________________________________________________________ AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 , 291 43 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). 44 2015 UT 29, ¶ 43 , 345 P.3d 675 . 45 Id. ¶ 32 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted). 46 Id. ¶ 21 (citations omi

2017In 2 Ton, we stated that “where the statute fails, courts cannot create rights” and “[a] lien created solely by statute depends on the terms of the statute.”46 ¶ 62 This conclusion is supported by the fact that the legislature has elsewhere delineated what is ultimately recoverable in a _____________________________________________________________ AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 , 291 43 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). 44 2015 UT 29, ¶ 43 , 345 P.3d 675 . 45 Id. ¶ 32 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted). 46 Id. ¶ 21 (citations omi

2017In 2 Ton, we stated that “where the statute fails, courts cannot create rights” and “[a] lien created solely by statute depends on the terms of the statute.”46 ¶ 62 This conclusion is supported by the fact that the legislature has elsewhere delineated what is ultimately recoverable in a _____________________________________________________________ AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 , 291 43 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). 44 2015 UT 29, ¶ 43 , 345 P.3d 675 . 45 Id. ¶ 32 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted). 46 Id. ¶ 21 (citations omi

2017In 2 Ton, we stated that “where the statute fails, courts cannot create rights” and “[a] lien created solely by statute depends on the terms of the statute.”46 ¶ 62 This conclusion is supported by the fact that the legislature has elsewhere delineated what is ultimately recoverable in a _____________________________________________________________ AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 , 291 43 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). 44 2015 UT 29, ¶ 43 , 345 P.3d 675 . 45 Id. ¶ 32 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted). 46 Id. ¶ 21 (citations omi

2017In particular, he seems to argue that his claims had merit because “ft]here has yet to be an appellate decision construing application of [section 38-2-7] to a person having actual notice of the lien claim, and if priority is determined, to what extent is that priority.” He also asserts that with respect to his claim for rent, 6 “[n]o priority exists to defeat the lien claim for that personal property.” ¶ 32 “To determine whether a claim is without merit, we look to whether it was frivolous or of little weight or importance having no’ basis in law or fact.” Migliore v. Livingston Fin., LLC, 20

2017In particular, he seems to argue that his claims had merit because “ft]here has yet to be an appellate decision construing application of [section 38-2-7] to a person having actual notice of the lien claim, and if priority is determined, to what extent is that priority.” He also asserts that with respect to his claim for rent, 6 “[n]o priority exists to defeat the lien claim for that personal property.” ¶ 32 “To determine whether a claim is without merit, we look to whether it was frivolous or of little weight or importance having no’ basis in law or fact.” Migliore v. Livingston Fin., LLC, 20

2017In 2 Ton, we stated that “where the statute fails, courts cannot create rights” and “[a] lien created solely by statute depends on the terms of the statute.”46 ¶ 62 This conclusion is supported by the fact that the legislature has elsewhere delineated what is ultimately recoverable in a _____________________________________________________________ AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 , 291 43 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). 44 2015 UT 29, ¶ 43 , 345 P.3d 675 . 45 Id. ¶ 32 (second, third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted). 46 Id. ¶ 21 (citations omi

2017It asserts that the district court erred in 1) quashing the writ of execution and halting the sheriff’s sale; 2) concluding that FNMA is not bound by the partial _____________________________________________________________ 3 Under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1) (2008), the “successful party” in an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien “shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys’ fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.” 6 Cite as: 2017 UT 28 Opinion of the Court summary judgment rendered against Mr. Bell in the first phase of this case; 3) concluding th

2017This court has recently explained that “the bare existence of a basis in law for a potential claim is not sufficient to make a claim meritorious.” Bresee v. Barton, 2016 UT App 220, ¶ 49 , 387 P.3d 536 .

2017This court has recently explained that “the bare existence of a basis in law for a potential claim is not sufficient to make a claim meritorious.” Bresee v. Barton, 2016 UT App 220, ¶ 49 , 387 P.3d 536 .

2012Utah Code Ann. § (b) (emphasis added); 7 Olsen, 2011 UT App 181, ¶ 15 , 270 P.3d 538 ("[Slection 38-1-89 sets out conditions under which the holder of a mechanic's lien may now, notwithstanding section 38-1-29, agree to subordinate or waive the priority of that lien.").

2012Utah Code Ann. § (b) (emphasis added); 7 Olsen, 2011 UT App 181, ¶ 15 , 270 P.3d 538 ("[Slection 38-1-89 sets out conditions under which the holder of a mechanic's lien may now, notwithstanding section 38-1-29, agree to subordinate or waive the priority of that lien.").

1988This Court held that there was no affirmative duty to release the lien and that “at the common law, no action for damages would lie because of a refusal to release a mortgage or discharge a lien or claim against property.” Id. at 374 , 204 P.2d at 829 .

1988This Court held that there was no affirmative duty to release the lien and that “at the common law, no action for damages would lie because of a refusal to release a mortgage or discharge a lien or claim against property.” Id. at 374 , 204 P.2d at 829 .

1949At the common law, no action for damages would lie because of a refusal to release a mortgage or discharge a lien or claim against property, Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 201 P. 352 , 202 P. 1107 ; Hasquet v. Big West Oil Co., 9 Cir., 29 F. 2d 78 ; Morrill v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 94 Wash, 258, 162 P. 360 , on rehearing 163 P. 733 .

1949At the common law, no action for damages would lie because of a refusal to release a mortgage or discharge a lien or claim against property, Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 201 P. 352 , 202 P. 1107 ; Hasquet v. Big West Oil Co., 9 Cir., 29 F. 2d 78 ; Morrill v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 94 Wash, 258, 162 P. 360 , on rehearing 163 P. 733 .

1949At the common law, no action for damages would lie because of a refusal to release a mortgage or discharge a lien or claim against property, Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 201 P. 352 , 202 P. 1107 ; Hasquet v. Big West Oil Co., 9 Cir., 29 F. 2d 78 ; Morrill v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 94 Wash, 258, 162 P. 360 , on rehearing 163 P. 733 .

1949At the common law, no action for damages would lie because of a refusal to release a mortgage or discharge a lien or claim against property, Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 201 P. 352 , 202 P. 1107 ; Hasquet v. Big West Oil Co., 9 Cir., 29 F. 2d 78 ; Morrill v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 94 Wash, 258, 162 P. 360 , on rehearing 163 P. 733 .

1909Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 424 , 69 N. W. 819 .) Lastly, it is claimed that, if the property was exempt from the assessment, then the city’s attempt to assess it, and its assertion of a lien in violation of law, would 4 constitute no cloud on the title, and hence the action 'brought by plaintiff to bay© the charge and assessment against the land decreed void, and the city debarred and enjoined from asserting any claim or lien against the land, Avould not lie.

1909Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 424 , 69 N. W. 819 .) Lastly, it is claimed that, if the property was exempt from the assessment, then the city’s attempt to assess it, and its assertion of a lien in violation of law, would 4 constitute no cloud on the title, and hence the action 'brought by plaintiff to bay© the charge and assessment against the land decreed void, and the city debarred and enjoined from asserting any claim or lien against the land, Avould not lie.

1885A mortgage is made by the person having the property or title, to another for security: Herford v, Davis, 102 U. S., 235 , cited by defendant’s counsel, was a sale of certain cars to a railway company in Missouri.