42 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1917–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Conn, Sherrod & Co. v. Tri-Electric Supply Co.green2 sentences2009See Conn, Sherrod & Co., 535 S.W.2d at 34 ; see also Goldman, 341 S.W.2d at 158 . 2009See Conn, Sherrod & Co., 535 S.W.2d at 34 ; see also Goldman, 341 S.W.2d at 158 . | 3 | 3 |
Goldman v. Torresgreen2 sentences2009See Conn, Sherrod & Co., 535 S.W.2d at 34 ; see also Goldman, 341 S.W.2d at 158 . 2009See Conn, Sherrod & Co., 535 S.W.2d at 34 ; see also Goldman, 341 S.W.2d at 158 . | 3 | 3 |
Donna T. Moore, David B. Moore and Provident Funding Associates, LP D/B/A Provident Home Loans v. Brenham Ready Mix, Inc.green2 sentences2022Accordingly, we rejected the materialman’s argument that written notice was not required when the owner had actual knowledge of the claim, explaining that “[w]ritten notice is certain and definite information upon which the owner must act.” Id.; see also Moore v. Brenham Ready Mix, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 109 , 114–16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (holding that actual notice of a lien claim did not qualify as substantial compliance 27 with the mechanic’s lien statute’s requirement of “timely written notice”). 2022Accordingly, we rejected the materialman’s argument that written notice was not required when the owner had actual knowledge of the claim, explaining that “[w]ritten notice is certain and definite information upon which the owner must act.” Id.; see also Moore v. Brenham Ready Mix, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 109 , 114–16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (holding that actual notice of a lien claim did not qualify as substantial compliance 27 with the mechanic’s lien statute’s requirement of “timely written notice”). | 2 | 2 |
Jose Luis Cardenas D/B/A J&S Body Shop v. Betty Wilson & Jeffery Wilsongreen2 sentences2020See Cardenas, 428 S.W.3d at 133 (“Under the fraudulent lien statute, the trial court does not rule on the validity of the underlying claim creating the lien or rule on any substantive evidentiary claim.”). 2015Cf. Cardenas, 428 S.W.3d at 133 (“Under the fraudulent lien statute, the trial court does not rule on the validity of the underlying claim creating the lien or rule on any substantive evidentiary claim.”); Samshi Homes, 321 S.W.3d at 667 -68 & n. 5 (explaining that scope of fraudulent lien statute does not include “substantive eviden-tiary claims”). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Purported Liens or Claims Against Samshi Homes, L.L.C.green2 sentences2015Cf. Cardenas, 428 S.W.3d at 133 (“Under the fraudulent lien statute, the trial court does not rule on the validity of the underlying claim creating the lien or rule on any substantive evidentiary claim.”); Samshi Homes, 321 S.W.3d at 667 -68 & n. 5 (explaining that scope of fraudulent lien statute does not include “substantive eviden-tiary claims”). 2014See id. at 667-68 . | 1 | 2 |
Valdez v. Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co.green2 sentences2003See Valdez , 842 S.W.2d at 276 ; Inman , 485 S.W.2d at 374 ; Wood , 420 S.W.2d at 428 . 1994Id. | 1 | 2 |
Murray v. Cadle Co.green1 sentence2022Patterson & Associates, P.C. v. Holub, the court assumed that the success of a bona fide purchaser defense depended on whether the underlying lien was valid, but it offered no authority to support this assumption. 264 S.W.3d 180, 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); see also Murray v. Cadle Co., 257 S.W.3d 291, 301 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (implying that the validity of a lien factors into whether there is constructive notice of the lien); Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Gary E. Patterson & Associates, P.C. v. Holubgreen1 sentence2022Patterson & Associates, P.C. v. Holub, the court assumed that the success of a bona fide purchaser defense depended on whether the underlying lien was valid, but it offered no authority to support this assumption. 264 S.W.3d 180, 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); see also Murray v. Cadle Co., 257 S.W.3d 291, 301 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (implying that the validity of a lien factors into whether there is constructive notice of the lien); Gen. | 1 | 1 |
HOLY CROSS CHURCH OF GOD IN CHRIST v. Wolfgreen1 sentence2021Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001). | 1 | 1 |
City of Keller v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2019See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819 . 7 We agree with Founders that the recitation in Founders’ petition of the amount of Schear Hampton’s lien claim is of no moment and is not a judicial admission that Founders owed Schear Hampton the amount of its lien claim. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 779147green1 sentence2019See Beeler v. Jewell (In re Stanton), 303 F.3d 939 , 942–43 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that lender’s advance of funds pursuant to future advance clause did not “create” new lien each time an advance was made). | 1 | 1 |
Daughters of Charity Health Services of Waco v. Linnstaedtergreen1 sentence2017See Daughters of Charity Health Servs. v. Linnstaedter, 226 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. 2007) (observing that lien against property “is necessarily a claim against its owner”); McAllen Hosps., L.P. v. Gomez, No. 13-12-00421-CV, 2013 WL 784688 -, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 28, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that hospital lien is claim against patient). | 1 | 1 |
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See id. | 1 | 1 |
David Powers Homes, Inc. v. M. L. Rendleman Company, Inc. D/B/A Fiberglass Insulatorsgreen1 sentence2015See David Powers Homes, Inc., 355 S.W.3d at 337 . | 1 | 1 |
Marsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.green1 sentence2015See Marsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 888 F. Supp. 2d 805, 812-14 (W.D. | 1 | 1 |
Southwest Properties, L.P. v. Lite-Dec of Texas, Inc.green1 sentence2013Southwest Properties, 989 S.W.2d at 69, 72 . | 1 | 1 |
Britton v. Texas Department of Criminal Justicegreen1 sentence2013These issues also fail to address the Owner’s alternative basis for summary judgment against the Supplier’s lien claim for the July materials, i.e., the untimely notice. 6 ―Generally speaking, an appellant must attack all independent bases or grounds that fully support a complained-of ruling or judgment.‖ Britton v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Biffle v. Morton Rubber Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2009See Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 53.052(c) (“Failure of the county clerk to properly record or index a filed affidavit does not invalidate the lien.”); Biffle v. Morton Rubber Indus., Inc., 785 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex.1990) (per curiam) (“Since [appellant] satisfied his duty to file timely the cost bond, he should not be penalized for an error once the instrument was in the custody and control of the clerk.”). 2009See Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 53.052(c) ("Failure of the county clerk to properly record or index a filed affidavit does not invalidate the lien."); Biffle v. Morton Rubber Indus., Inc., 785 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) ("Since [appellant] satisfied his duty to file timely the cost bond, he *767 should not be penalized for an error once the instrument was in the custody and control of the clerk."). | 1 | 1 |
Stolz v. Honeycuttgreen1 sentence2005Epstein and Fidelity argue that the first part of the statute controls, citing the case of Stolz v. Honeycutt, See Stolz v. Honeycutt, 42 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (“An action on the bond must be filed no later than one year after the date on which notice of the bond is served.”). | 1 | 1 |
Pacesetter Pools, Inc. v. Pierce Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2004Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex. 2002); Pacesetter Pools, Inc. v. Pierce Homes, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, “If the lien claim arises from a debt incurred by a subcontractor, the claimant must give to the original contractor written notice of the unpaid balance. 2004The claimant must give the notice not later than the 15th day of the second month following each month in which all or part of the claimant’s labor was performed or material delivered . . . .” Id. § 53.056(b) (West 2002). 3 Although Wesco’s lien claim included unpaid balances for materials delivered in March and April, it is clear from the statute that no valid lien could attach for those balances, as their deadlines for notice, May 15 and June 15, respectively, had long since passed. | 1 | 1 |
Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authoritygreen1 sentence2004Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex. 2002); Pacesetter Pools, Inc. v. Pierce Homes, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, “If the lien claim arises from a debt incurred by a subcontractor, the claimant must give to the original contractor written notice of the unpaid balance. | 1 | 1 |
Contract Sales Co. v. Skaggsgreen1 sentence2003See Contract Sales Co. v. Skaggs , 612 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
| Ackerson v. Farm & Home Savings & Loan Ass'n of Missourigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Haden Co., Inc. v. Mixers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| General Air Conditioning Company v. Third Ward Church of Christgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hubert Lumber Co. v. Kinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
First National Bank in Graham v. Sledge
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 287 . 1988(Emphasis added.) We conclude that a derivative claimant’s failure to include the statutory warning now provided by section 53.056(d) 11 does not invalidate his lien, 12 though it does bring about a reduction of the amount of his lien claim against the owner and his property, measured by the aggregate sum of the payments thereafter made by the owner to the original contractor. 13 Cf. First National Bank in Graham v. Sledge, 653 S.W.2d 283 (Tex.1983). | 4 | 1988–2004 |
In re Lipsky
green
1 sentence2024According to Emerald, the Firm, including Massey, advised Emerald that liens related to the Golden Pass Project “could be perfected within 45 days after Emerald’s work on the project was completed and to revisit the issue then, when and/or if Emerald was not paid.” But, under the applicable version of the Texas Property Code, if a lien claim arises from a debt incurred by a subcontractor, the claimant must give written notice of the unpaid balance to the original contractor “not later than the 15th day of the second month following each month in which all or part of the claimant’s labor was pe | 1 | 2024–2024 |
in Re a Purported Lien or Claim Against Hai Quang La and Theresa Thorn Nguyen
green
1 sentence2022Likewise, in Hai Quang La, we rejected an attempt to dispose of a restrictive covenant through Chapter 51 procedure, reasoning that the restrictive covenant did not purport to create a lien and was thus beyond the statute’s scope. 415 S.W.3d at 566–67. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
U.S. Renal Care, Inc. v. Jaafar
green
1 sentence2015This case presents a similar issue to that addressed in U.S. Renal Care v. Jaafar, 345 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Robert D. Coleman v. Reed W. Prospere
green
1 sentence2015Coleman v. Prospere, No. 05-13-00068-CV, 2014 WL 4672456 (Tex, App. - Dallas, 2014) (majority rejects multifarious briefing argument and reverses a no-evidence summary judgment).1 As further noted in the original motion, the Court's existing judgment recognizes that appellant is the beneficiary of legal authority for a prima facie defense of privilege,2 and has produced prima facie evidence supporting a justification based on the power to prosecute liens and reversionary interests in the subject property,3 and the right to self- representation to resolve a dispute with a former attorney.4 The | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wesco Distribution, Inc. v. Westport Group, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015Notice to the general contractor “is the only notice that the original contractor personally receives” and is “for the benefit of the original contractor.” Wesco Distrib., 150 S.W.3d at 560 ; Stone Fort Nat’l Bank v. Elliott Elec. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Heggen v. Pemelton
green
1 sentence2014Citing Heggen, 836 S.W.2d at 148 , Hinton argues that a lien imposed on a separate property homestead to secure a reimbursement interest is not permitted under the Texas Constitution. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Wood v. Barnes
green
1 sentence2003See Valdez , 842 S.W.2d at 276 ; Inman , 485 S.W.2d at 374 ; Wood , 420 S.W.2d at 428 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Inman v. Clark green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Scarth v. First Bank & Trust Co. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Clingingsmith v. Cook neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Home Savings Ass'n v. Southern Union Gas Co. neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Pool v. Wedemeyer & Schulte neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Trinity Universal Insurance Company v. Palmer green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Duke v. Garrett neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Trane Co. green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Rooney v. Porch neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Producers' Oil Co. v. State green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Waples-Platter Co. v. Mitchell neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Jones v. El Paso Bitulithic Co. neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Threadgill v. Bickerstaff green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| F. J. Harrison & Co. v. Boring green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Cook v. Smith green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.