lien claim in New York

2014As the Court of Appeals noted in Altshuler Shaham Provident Funds, Ltd. v GML Tower, LLC ( 21 NY3d 352, 364-365 [2013], rearg denied 21 NY3d 1047 [2013]), “the reason for public filing is to allow any interested contractors, subcontractors and material suppliers to discover the level of financing available for construction so that they might guide their actions accordingly” (see Nanuet Natl.

2014As the Court of Appeals noted in Altshuler Shaham Provident Funds, Ltd. v GML Tower, LLC ( 21 NY3d 352, 364-365 [2013], rearg denied 21 NY3d 1047 [2013]), “the reason for public filing is to allow any interested contractors, subcontractors and material suppliers to discover the level of financing available for construction so that they might guide their actions accordingly” (see Nanuet Natl.

2013The law is clear that “a claim may . . . supersede an attorney’s lien if the claim is both prior in time and a charge against the specific fund upon which the attorney’s lien attaches, not merely general indebtedness asserted against the client” (LMWT Realty Corp., 85 NY2d at 468 ).

2013The law is clear that “a claim may . . . supersede an attorney’s lien if the claim is both prior in time and a charge against the specific fund upon which the attorney’s lien attaches, not merely general indebtedness asserted against the client” (LMWT Realty Corp., 85 NY2d at 468 ).

2024Co. v Realty Intl., 96 Misc 2d 1028, 1029 )." Crossland Sav., FSB v. Sutton E.

2000Co. v Realty Intl., 96 Misc 2d 1028, 1029 ).

2014This is an action in contract, to which plaintiffs appended a number of superfluous tort claims including conversion (see Saint Patrick’s Home for Aged & Infirm v Laticrete Intl., 267 AD2d 166 [1st Dept 1999]; McMahan & Co. v Bass, 250 AD2d 460, 462 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied, lv dismissed 92 NY2d 1013 [1998]), and in response to which defendants interposed an artisan’s lien defense and a counterclaim for the balance due under an invoice memorializing the parties’ agreement.

2014This is an action in contract, to which plaintiffs appended a number of superfluous tort claims including conversion (see Saint Patrick’s Home for Aged & Infirm v Laticrete Intl., 267 AD2d 166 [1st Dept 1999]; McMahan & Co. v Bass, 250 AD2d 460, 462 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied, lv dismissed 92 NY2d 1013 [1998]), and in response to which defendants interposed an artisan’s lien defense and a counterclaim for the balance due under an invoice memorializing the parties’ agreement.

2014This is an action in contract, to which plaintiffs appended a number of superfluous tort claims including conversion (see Saint Patrick’s Home for Aged & Infirm v Laticrete Intl., 267 AD2d 166 [1st Dept 1999]; McMahan & Co. v Bass, 250 AD2d 460, 462 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied, lv dismissed 92 NY2d 1013 [1998]), and in response to which defendants interposed an artisan’s lien defense and a counterclaim for the balance due under an invoice memorializing the parties’ agreement.

2014This is an action in contract, to which plaintiffs appended a number of superfluous tort claims including conversion (see Saint Patrick’s Home for Aged & Infirm v Laticrete Intl., 267 AD2d 166 [1st Dept 1999]; McMahan & Co. v Bass, 250 AD2d 460, 462 [1st Dept 1998], lv denied, lv dismissed 92 NY2d 1013 [1998]), and in response to which defendants interposed an artisan’s lien defense and a counterclaim for the balance due under an invoice memorializing the parties’ agreement.

2012Here, in several letters written to claimant’s counsel prior to settlement of the third-party claim, the administrator expressly reserved “all of our rights and that of our client under [Workers’ Compensation Law § 29].” However, the subsequent settlement agreement, to which the employer was a party, stipulated that all claims would be settled for the amount of $155,000 “plus waiver of [workers’ [c]omp lien.” Inasmuch as the lien waiver set forth in the settlement made no discernment be tween the type of lien — present or future — to be waived pursuant Workers’ Compensation Law § 29, we cannot

2012Here, in several letters written to claimant’s counsel prior to settlement of the third-party claim, the administrator expressly reserved “all of our rights and that of our client under [Workers’ Compensation Law § 29].” However, the subsequent settlement agreement, to which the employer was a party, stipulated that all claims would be settled for the amount of $155,000 “plus waiver of [workers’ [c]omp lien.” Inasmuch as the lien waiver set forth in the settlement made no discernment be tween the type of lien — present or future — to be waived pursuant Workers’ Compensation Law § 29, we cannot

1970Corp. (supra) also cited in the minority opinion, is not a holding supporting the proposition that any portion of the Melbros claim is not lienable; that case deals with personal services, and only that portion of such services as was directed to aiding or assisting the procurement of subcontracts or subcontractors was excluded from the lien claim; also excluded were lost profits, arising from failure of an owner to complete the construction of a building, partially begun, because of financial inability.

1953Corp., 252 N. Y. 336, 342 .) This conclusion, we believe, is in accordance with the intent of the Legislature as reflected not only in sections 12-a and 23 of the Lien Law but by the successive amendments to that statute which have extended its protection to additional classes of persons, enlarged its scope as to materials lien-able and strengthened its provisions for the enforcement of mechanic’s liens.

2025Therefore, any reliance on Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v Ahlborn ( 547 US 268 [2006]) is misplaced.

2025Therefore, any reliance on Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v Ahlborn ( 547 US 268 [2006]) is misplaced.

2025Moreover, it is common practice for a lien waiver to be issued before final payment is made, ensuring that the release only takes effect when payment clears ( see Lopez v 157-161 E. 28th St., LLC , 209 AD3d 495 [2022]; Spectrum Painting Contrs., Inc. v Kreisler Borg Florman Gen.

2025Moreover, it is common practice for a lien waiver to be issued before final payment is made, ensuring that the release only takes effect when payment clears ( see Lopez v 157-161 E. 28th St., LLC , 209 AD3d 495 [2022]; Spectrum Painting Contrs., Inc. v Kreisler Borg Florman Gen.

2022Bd. , 107 AD3d 544 , 545-546 [1st Dept 2013]).

2019The IAS court properly found that Nissan's reliance on the lien waiver did not "conclusively establish" its defense that the lien was willfully exaggerated ( 150 Broadway , 14 AD3d at 5 ).

2019The IAS court properly found that Nissan's reliance on the lien waiver did not "conclusively establish" its defense that the lien was willfully exaggerated ( 150 Broadway , 14 AD3d at 5 ).

2019It is uncontested that the lien waiver at issue was not accompanied by the payment that plaintiff had expected to receive ( Katz v Anchor Constr. , 247 AD2d 339 [1st Dept 1998]).

2019It is uncontested that the lien waiver at issue was not accompanied by the payment that plaintiff had expected to receive ( Katz v Anchor Constr. , 247 AD2d 339 [1st Dept 1998]).

2018Finally, it is well settled that contentions that are raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before us ( see Becker-Manning, Inc. v Common Council of City of Utica , 114 AD3d 1143, 1144 [4th Dept 2014]; Stubbs v Capellini , 108 AD3d 1057, 1059 [4th Dept 2013]; Turner v Canale , 15 AD3d 960, 961 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 702 [2005]).

2011Moreover, even assuming that the lien waiver is ambiguous and the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained from the four corners of the document, as concluded by the motion court, such determination, in and of itself, compels dismissal of the third-party complaint (see Ruhland v Cowper Co., 72 AD2d 907 [1979], affd 52 NY2d 756 [1980]).

2011Moreover, even assuming that the lien waiver is ambiguous and the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained from the four corners of the document, as concluded by the motion court, such determination, in and of itself, compels dismissal of the third-party complaint (see Ruhland v Cowper Co., 72 AD2d 907 [1979], affd 52 NY2d 756 [1980]).

2011Moreover, even assuming that the lien waiver is ambiguous and the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained from the four corners of the document, as concluded by the motion court, such determination, in and of itself, compels dismissal of the third-party complaint (see Ruhland v Cowper Co., 72 AD2d 907 [1979], affd 52 NY2d 756 [1980]).

2011Moreover, even assuming that the lien waiver is ambiguous and the intent of the parties cannot be ascertained from the four corners of the document, as concluded by the motion court, such determination, in and of itself, compels dismissal of the third-party complaint (see Ruhland v Cowper Co., 72 AD2d 907 [1979], affd 52 NY2d 756 [1980]).

2003In Sweet, the court relied on that legal distinction to uphold a mechanics’ lien arising from an individual’s contract to “furnish all common labor and carpenter labor” necessary to the construction of a building, and to reject the same party’s lien claim based on an earlier agreement to “assume [] and agree [ ] to pay all of the wages” due to the contractor’s workers (174 Cal at 795-796, 164 P at 790-791 ).