lien claim in Missouri

1956The manner of service becomes immaterial where it clearly appears that the owner actually received the written notice of lien (or a copy thereof) not less than ten days prior to filing of the lien claim [Meyer v. Christian, 64 Mo.App. 203, 205 ; Fruin-Bambrick Const. Co. v. Jones, 60 Mo.App. 1, 4 ; Miller v. Hoffman, 26 Mo.App. 199, 202-203 ], but there is-no suggestion fin the case at bar. that either defendant Butter-worth or Wachter, the. equitable owner, at any time received ⅛ copy of the notice of lien...

1912“Mis takes in the notice of a lien claim, given by a subcontractor to the owner, will not vitiate the notice, unless it appears that the owner was misled thereby to his prejudice.” [Construction Co. v. Jones, supra.] But it is insisted that the judgment can be upheld for another reason, viz., that Richards & Con-over and Hodge were not subcontractors.

1979Rall Bros. v. McCrary, 45 Mo.App. 365 ; DeWitt v. Smith, 63 Mo. 263 .” 367 S.W.2d at 828 .

1963Rail Bros. v. McCrary, 45 Mo.App. 365 ; DeWitt v. Smith, 63 Mo. 263 .

1979Rall Bros. v. McCrary, 45 Mo.App. 365 ; DeWitt v. Smith, 63 Mo. 263 .” 367 S.W.2d at 828 .

1963Rail Bros. v. McCrary, 45 Mo.App. 365 ; DeWitt v. Smith, 63 Mo. 263 .

1970As pointed out in the Mayne [Mayne v. Jacob Meihel Real Estate Co., 237 Mo.App. 952 , 180 S.W.2d 809 ] and Driscoll [Driscoll v. Konze, Mo.Sup., 322 S.W.2d 824 ] cases, the plaintiff may not by such device extend the period of limitation on the cause of action.

1969They all manifest the same unwillingness to permit the period of limitation to be prolonged by the failure of the plaintiff to make diligent use of the means provided by law for obtaining jurisdiction of the defendant.” *584 In Continental the court at pages 138— 139, of 375 S.W.2d further stated: “ * * * If prompt determination of the lien claim is to he achieved, and such is the obvious purpose of the short limitation period, there can be no reason to accord to the party bringing the suit a period of time for obtaining process which exceeds the time within which he is required to sue. * * *”

1956The lien claim is'-not itself a pleading and, broadly stated, “(a) 11 that is required therein is a substantial compliance with the statute [Settion-429.080] declaring what that claim Shall contain.” Mitchell Planing-Mill Co. v. Allison, 138 Mo. 50, 57 , 40 S.W. 118, 121 , The'language-' of the statutory requirement that the lien claim include “a-true description Of the property, or so near as to identify the same” [Section -429.Ó80] suggests that “possible imperfections” in ■ the description were anticipated by the! lawmakers [Oster v. Rabeneau, 46 Mo. 595, 598 ], perhaps because it was ccfn’

1956The lien claim is'-not itself a pleading and, broadly stated, “(a) 11 that is required therein is a substantial compliance with the statute [Settion-429.080] declaring what that claim Shall contain.” Mitchell Planing-Mill Co. v. Allison, 138 Mo. 50, 57 , 40 S.W. 118, 121 , The'language-' of the statutory requirement that the lien claim include “a-true description Of the property, or so near as to identify the same” [Section -429.Ó80] suggests that “possible imperfections” in ■ the description were anticipated by the! lawmakers [Oster v. Rabeneau, 46 Mo. 595, 598 ], perhaps because it was ccfn’

1917Had this plaintiff set out in his lien account the items and specifications of the lumber and mill work substantially as contained in the estimates submitted to it by plaintiff with the lump price of the articles in each such estimate, the lien claim would be sufficient. [Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Construction Co., 187 Mo. App. 584, 589 , 174 S. W. 161 ; Grace v. Nesbit, 109 Mo. 9, 17 , 18 S. W. 1138 .] So in Planing Mill Co. v. Allison, 338 Mo. 50, 58 , 40 S. W. 118 , the court ruled: “If the contract of the sub-con tracto- was to supply for the building a certain group of articles, for a cer

1897But that case must be considered greatly limited, if not in effect overruled, by Hilliker v. Francisco (1877) 65 Mo. 598 , in which the statement of a single charge of $7,790, based on the contract of a subcontractor (who furnished stone, together with the labor of setting the same) was held valid, as a lien claim against the landowner.

2019In 8000 Maryland, Huntleigh Financial Services, Inc. (“HFS”) began experiencing financial difficulties due to lease obligations it was no longer able to afford. 292 S.W.3d at 444 .

2012Id. at 671 .

2000Id. at 543 .

1992Southern Cross Lumber, 761 S.W.2d at 271 .

1987Lamke v. Lynn, supra, at 288 .

1984Kaufman, supra. The theory applied to justify a lien is implied agency.

1984Bryant, supra. However, our courts have recognized potential hardships to creditors and in a case where the evidence reveals joint participation by a wife, the interest of the wife will be subject to a lien claim.

1982From an inspection of Lawson v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co., 178 Mo.App. 124 , 164 S.W. 138 (1914), it appears that the defendants heeded the advice of this Court and placed the funds to satisfy the plaintiff’s claim in custodia legis pending resolution of the attorneys’ lien claim.

1982From an inspection of Lawson v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co., 178 Mo.App. 124 , 164 S.W. 138 (1914), it appears that the defendants heeded the advice of this Court and placed the funds to satisfy the plaintiff’s claim in custodia legis pending resolution of the attorneys’ lien claim.

1980Id.

1979In the there cited cases, and those relied upon by respondent, John Griffiths & Son Co. v. United States, 72 F.2d 466 (C.A. 7th 1934), there was a contingent fee contract (obviously an attorneys’ lien matter) wherein the court retained jurisdiction to hear evidence upon all claims and demands of appellants, accountants-attorneys; Estee Candy Co. v. United States, 343 F.Supp. 1362 (Cust.Ct., 1972), also involving discharged counsel under a contingent fee contract, the court merely preserving to counsel the payment of fees when payment from the United States should be received, reserving jurisdi

1979Rall Bros. v. McCrary, 45 Mo.App. 365 ; DeWitt v. Smith, 63 Mo. 263 .” 367 S.W.2d at 828 .

1979In the there cited cases, and those relied upon by respondent, John Griffiths & Son Co. v. United States, 72 F.2d 466 (C.A. 7th 1934), there was a contingent fee contract (obviously an attorneys’ lien matter) wherein the court retained jurisdiction to hear evidence upon all claims and demands of appellants, accountants-attorneys; Estee Candy Co. v. United States, 343 F.Supp. 1362 (Cust.Ct., 1972), also involving discharged counsel under a contingent fee contract, the court merely preserving to counsel the payment of fees when payment from the United States should be received, reserving jurisdi