lien claim in Georgia

2012Cuvillier appeals, and, for the reasons explained below, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. 1 OCGA § 15-19-14 (b) provides, in pertinent part, that, “[u]pon actions, judgments, and decrees for money, attorneys at law shall have a lien superior to all liens except tax liens; and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy such an action, judgment, or decree until the lien or claim of the attorney for his [or her] fees is fully satisfied.” OCGA § 15-19-14 “is in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Gilbert v. Montl

2012Cuvillier appeals, and, for the reasons explained below, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. 1 OCGA § 15-19-14 (b) provides, in pertinent part, that, “[u]pon actions, judgments, and decrees for money, attorneys at law shall have a lien superior to all liens except tax liens; and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy such an action, judgment, or decree until the lien or claim of the attorney for his [or her] fees is fully satisfied.” OCGA § 15-19-14 “is in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Gilbert v. Montl

2012Woodward v. Lawson, 225 Ga. 261, 262 (2) ( 167 SE2d 660 ) (1969); Hill v. Centennial/Ashton Properties Corp., 254 Ga. App. 176, 178 (2) (561 4 Black’s defines a “charging” lien as “An attorney’s lien on a claim that the attorney has helped the client perfect, as through a judgment or settlement.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), lien. 6 SE2d 853 ) (2002).

2012Woodward v. Lawson, 225 Ga. 261, 262 (2) ( 167 SE2d 660 ) (1969); Hill v. Centennial/Ashton Properties Corp., 254 Ga. App. 176, 178 (2) (561 4 Black’s defines a “charging” lien as “An attorney’s lien on a claim that the attorney has helped the client perfect, as through a judgment or settlement.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), lien. 6 SE2d 853 ) (2002).

2012Woodward v. Lawson, 225 Ga. 261, 262 (2) ( 167 SE2d 660 ) (1969); Hill v. Centennial/Ashton Properties Corp., 254 Ga. App. 176, 178 (2) ( 561 SE2d 853 ) (2002).

2012Woodward v. Lawson, 225 Ga. 261, 262 (2) ( 167 SE2d 660 ) (1969); Hill v. Centennial/Ashton Properties Corp., 254 Ga. App. 176, 178 (2) (561 4 Black’s defines a “charging” lien as “An attorney’s lien on a claim that the attorney has helped the client perfect, as through a judgment or settlement.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), lien. 6 SE2d 853 ) (2002).

2025See Dorsey v. Edge, 75 Ga. App. 388, 392 (2) ( 43 SE2d 425 ) (1947) (“A client may . . . dismiss the suit . . . and his action in doing so is . . . the exercise of his right.”) A charging lien comes into play once there is a settlement or a judgment. “[N]o person shall be at liberty to satisfy such an action, judgment, or decree until the lien or claim of the attorney for his fees is fully satisfied.” OCGA § 15-19-14 (b).

2025See Dorsey v. Edge, 75 Ga. App. 388, 392 (2) ( 43 SE2d 425 ) (1947) (“A client may . . . dismiss the suit . . . and his action in doing so is . . . the exercise of his right.”) A charging lien comes into play once there is a settlement or a judgment. “[N]o person shall be at liberty to satisfy such an action, judgment, or decree until the lien or claim of the attorney for his fees is fully satisfied.” OCGA § 15-19-14 (b).

2025This means that a lien under OCGA § 15-19-14 (b) “may not be divested by any settlement . . . ,” Howe & Assoc., 280 Ga. at 804 (citation and punctuation omitted), and the lien’s 4 existence “prevents a plaintiff from filing an effective dismissal of the complaint sufficient to defeat that lien[.]” Howe & Assoc. v. Daniels, 274 Ga. App. 312, 315 (1) ( 618 SE2d 42 ) (2005) (emphasis supplied).

2025This means that a lien under OCGA § 15-19-14 (b) “may not be divested by any settlement . . . ,” Howe & Assoc., 280 Ga. at 804 (citation and punctuation omitted), and the lien’s 4 existence “prevents a plaintiff from filing an effective dismissal of the complaint sufficient to defeat that lien[.]” Howe & Assoc. v. Daniels, 274 Ga. App. 312, 315 (1) ( 618 SE2d 42 ) (2005) (emphasis supplied).

2025This means that a lien under OCGA § 15-19-14 (b) “may not be divested by any settlement . . . ,” Howe & Assoc., 280 Ga. at 804 (citation and punctuation omitted), and the lien’s 4 existence “prevents a plaintiff from filing an effective dismissal of the complaint sufficient to defeat that lien[.]” Howe & Assoc. v. Daniels, 274 Ga. App. 312, 315 (1) ( 618 SE2d 42 ) (2005) (emphasis supplied).

2024In Benning Construction Co. v. Dykes Paving & Construction Co., our Supreme Court ruled that a material supplier (Dykes Paving) could not assert a lien claim against the general contractor (Benning Construction Company) because there was a break in the chain of contracts between the general contractor and the supplier.14 In that case, Benning had subcontracted with Scarboro Paving Company to perform the paving, curb, and gutter work associated with an office and warehouse project; 14 263 Ga. 16, 18-19 ( 426 SE2d 564 ) (1993). 7 Scarboro then subcontracted with Lanier Paving Company to install

2024In Benning Construction Co. v. Dykes Paving & Construction Co., our Supreme Court ruled that a material supplier (Dykes Paving) could not assert a lien claim against the general contractor (Benning Construction Company) because there was a break in the chain of contracts between the general contractor and the supplier.14 In that case, Benning had subcontracted with Scarboro Paving Company to perform the paving, curb, and gutter work associated with an office and warehouse project; 14 263 Ga. 16, 18-19 ( 426 SE2d 564 ) (1993). 7 Scarboro then subcontracted with Lanier Paving Company to install

2022A judicial proceeding is “[a]ny court proceeding; any proceeding initiated to procure an order or decree, whether in law or in equity.” Judicial Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Harkins v. CA 14th Investors, 247 Ga. App. 549, 550 ( 544 SE2d 744 ) (2001) (“[D]ictionaries may supply the plain and ordinary meaning of a word.”).

2022A judicial proceeding is “[a]ny court proceeding; any proceeding initiated to procure an order or decree, whether in law or in equity.” Judicial Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Harkins v. CA 14th Investors, 247 Ga. App. 549, 550 ( 544 SE2d 744 ) (2001) (“[D]ictionaries may supply the plain and ordinary meaning of a word.”).

2022See Burns v. State, 313 Ga. 368, 372 (3) ( 870 SE2d 360 ) (2022) (explaining that a “procedural law is that law which prescribes the methods of enforcement of rights, duties, and obligations,” whereas a substantive law creates obligations and grants substantive rights) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Henderson v. Dept. of Transp., 267 Ga. 90 (2) ( 475 SE2d 614 ) (1996) (service and notice requirements under the Tort Claims Act are procedural); see generally OCGA § 44-14-366.

2022See Burns v. State, 313 Ga. 368, 372 (3) ( 870 SE2d 360 ) (2022) (explaining that a “procedural law is that law which prescribes the methods of enforcement of rights, duties, and obligations,” whereas a substantive law creates obligations and grants substantive rights) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Henderson v. Dept. of Transp., 267 Ga. 90 (2) ( 475 SE2d 614 ) (1996) (service and notice requirements under the Tort Claims Act are procedural); see generally OCGA § 44-14-366.

2022See Burns v. State, 313 Ga. 368, 372 (3) ( 870 SE2d 360 ) (2022) (explaining that a “procedural law is that law which prescribes the methods of enforcement of rights, duties, and obligations,” whereas a substantive law creates obligations and grants substantive rights) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Henderson v. Dept. of Transp., 267 Ga. 90 (2) ( 475 SE2d 614 ) (1996) (service and notice requirements under the Tort Claims Act are procedural); see generally OCGA § 44-14-366.

2015“An attorney’s lien on a claim for money, i.e., a charging lien, is the equitable right of the attorney to recover his fees and costs due him for his services, and may be satisfied out of the judgment *329 obtained by his professional services.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) McRae, 316 Ga. App. at 528 .

2015See id.

2012Cuvillier appeals, and, for the reasons explained below, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. 1 OCGA § 15-19-14 (b) provides, in pertinent part, that, “[u]pon actions, judgments, and decrees for money, attorneys at law shall have a lien superior to all liens except tax liens; and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy such an action, judgment, or decree until the lien or claim of the attorney for his [or her] fees is fully 1 “Because this appeal involves a question of law, we review both the record and the decision of the court below de novo.” (Citation omitted.) Outlaw v

2012Cuvillier appeals, and, for the reasons explained below, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. 1 OCGA § 15-19-14 (b) provides, in pertinent part, that, “[u]pon actions, judgments, and decrees for money, attorneys at law shall have a lien superior to all liens except tax liens; and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy such an action, judgment, or decree until the lien or claim of the attorney for his [or her] fees is fully 1 “Because this appeal involves a question of law, we review both the record and the decision of the court below de novo.” (Citation omitted.) Outlaw v

2011Materials v. Franklin Builders Properties, 298 Ga. App. 120, 122-123 ( 679 SE2d 356 ) (2009) (same where lien failed to state the date the claim was due).

2011Materials v. Franklin Builders Properties, 298 Ga. App. 120, 122-123 ( 679 SE2d 356 ) (2009) (same where lien failed to state the date the claim was due).

2002Hines v. Good Housekeeping Shop, 161 Ga. App. 318, 319 (3) ( 291 SE2d 238 ) (1982).

2002Hines v. Good Housekeeping Shop, 161 Ga. App. 318, 319 (3) ( 291 SE2d 238 ) (1982).

1998Attorneys at law shall have the same right and power over the actions, judgments, and decrees to enforce their liens as their clients had or may have for the amount due thereon to them. [2] AFLAC v. Williams, 264 Ga. 351, 353 , 444 S.E.2d 314 (1994), quoting Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 553 , 444 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 , 428 N.E.2d 387, 389 (1981). [3] See Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-17 ("A lawyer should not charge more than a reasonable fee.... [A]n excessive charge abuses the professional relationship between the lawyer and client."); see also id.

1998Attorneys at law shall have the same right and power over the actions, judgments, and decrees to enforce their liens as their clients had or may have for the amount due thereon to them. [2] AFLAC v. Williams, 264 Ga. 351, 353 , 444 S.E.2d 314 (1994), quoting Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 553 , 444 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 , 428 N.E.2d 387, 389 (1981). [3] See Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-17 ("A lawyer should not charge more than a reasonable fee.... [A]n excessive charge abuses the professional relationship between the lawyer and client."); see also id.

1997In fact, the lien waiver which Hensons was required to sign listed Deibert as the “owners agent.” Hensons’ vice president testified that the “affidavit of release of liens . . . told me that Mr. Deibert was acting as an owner’s agent rather than acting as a contractor himself, and that I was the contractor.” Compare Turnipseed v. Jaje, 267 Ga. 320, 323 (2) (a) ( 477 SE2d 101 ) (1996).

1997In fact, the lien waiver which Hensons was required to sign listed Deibert as the “owners agent.” Hensons’ vice president testified that the “affidavit of release of liens . . . told me that Mr. Deibert was acting as an owner’s agent rather than acting as a contractor himself, and that I was the contractor.” Compare Turnipseed v. Jaje, 267 Ga. 320, 323 (2) (a) ( 477 SE2d 101 ) (1996).

1992Hospital Auth. of Augusta v. Boyd, 96 Ga. App. 705, 708 (1) ( 101 SE2d 207 ) (1957).

1992Hospital Auth. of Augusta v. Boyd, 96 Ga. App. 705, 708 (1) ( 101 SE2d 207 ) (1957).

1992See Nix v. Luke, 96 Ga. App. 123, 127 (3) ( 99 SE2d 446 ) (1957).

1992See Nix v. Luke, 96 Ga. App. 123, 127 (3) ( 99 SE2d 446 ) (1957).

1987Co. v. Tri-City Concrete, 161 Ga. App. 174, 175 (1) ( 288 SE2d 125 ) (1982), cited by Coe, this Court permitted amendments to a lien claim but the twelve-month limit was not involved.

1987Co. v. Tri-City Concrete, 161 Ga. App. 174, 175 (1) ( 288 SE2d 125 ) (1982), cited by Coe, this Court permitted amendments to a lien claim but the twelve-month limit was not involved.

1978As the Court of Appeals noted in Brewer v. Chapman, 94 Ga. App. 92, 94 ( 93 SE2d 814 ) (1956), quoting American Coal Burner Co. v. Merritt, 129 F2d 314, 315 (1942), "It has been held in a number of cases that where a lien claim is asserted in bankruptcy proceedings under state statutes which provide that the lien is not preserved unless positive action to enforce it has been commenced in the state court within a definite period, it is not necessary for the claimant to file action in the state court if the lien is asserted in the bankruptcy court within the statutory time. . .

1978As the Court of Appeals noted in Brewer v. Chapman, 94 Ga. App. 92, 94 ( 93 SE2d 814 ) (1956), quoting American Coal Burner Co. v. Merritt, 129 F2d 314, 315 (1942), "It has been held in a number of cases that where a lien claim is asserted in bankruptcy proceedings under state statutes which provide that the lien is not preserved unless positive action to enforce it has been commenced in the state court within a definite period, it is not necessary for the claimant to file action in the state court if the lien is asserted in the bankruptcy court within the statutory time. . .