lien claim in Nevada

1985In Ray Heating Products v. Miller, supra, we held that a lien claim was not insufficient for failure to state the “terms, time given and conditions of the contract,” explaining that “if there are no special terms, time or conditions given, none can be stated, and in the absence of any such specifications, or proofs to the contrary, the law would presume that none existed, and that the materials were to be paid for on delivery.” 74 Nev. at 126 , 324 P.2d at 238 .

1985In Ray Heating Products v. Miller, supra, we held that a lien claim was not insufficient for failure to state the “terms, time given and conditions of the contract,” explaining that “if there are no special terms, time or conditions given, none can be stated, and in the absence of any such specifications, or proofs to the contrary, the law would presume that none existed, and that the materials were to be paid for on delivery.” 74 Nev. at 126 , 324 P.2d at 238 .

1970Relying on the authority of Porteous Decorative Co. Inc. v. Fee, 29 Nev. 375 , 91 P. 135 (1907), Close makes a multi-pronged attack upon the lien claim, contending it did not comply with NRS 108.060. 4 Porteous was impliedly overruled in Milner v. Shuey, 57 Nev. 159 , 60 P.2d 604 (1936), and in Ray Heating Prods.

1970Relying on the authority of Porteous Decorative Co. Inc. v. Fee, 29 Nev. 375 , 91 P. 135 (1907), Close makes a multi-pronged attack upon the lien claim, contending it did not comply with NRS 108.060. 4 Porteous was impliedly overruled in Milner v. Shuey, 57 Nev. 159 , 60 P.2d 604 (1936), and in Ray Heating Prods.

2007Ct. 2004) (concluding that the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply when the timeliness of serving notice is at issue, and thus, the trial court properly struck a mechanics’ lien claim since notice of the claim was not served until one month after the statutory time period allowed for service); American Standard Homes Corp. v. Reinecke, 425 S.E.2d 515, 518 (Va. 1993) (indicating that, unless a lien is perfected within the time outlined by statute, it is lost); Marsh-McLennan Bldg., Inc. v. Clapp, 980 P.2d 311 , 313 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that an unlawful detainer st

2007Ct. 2004) (concluding that the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply when the timeliness of serving notice is at issue, and thus, the trial court properly struck a mechanics’ lien claim since notice of the claim was not served until one month after the statutory time period allowed for service); American Standard Homes Corp. v. Reinecke, 425 S.E.2d 515, 518 (Va. 1993) (indicating that, unless a lien is perfected within the time outlined by statute, it is lost); Marsh-McLennan Bldg., Inc. v. Clapp, 980 P.2d 311 , 313 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that an unlawful detainer st

2007Ct. 2004) (concluding that the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply when the timeliness of serving notice is at issue, and thus, the trial court properly struck a mechanics’ lien claim since notice of the claim was not served until one month after the statutory time period allowed for service); American Standard Homes Corp. v. Reinecke, 425 S.E.2d 515, 518 (Va. 1993) (indicating that, unless a lien is perfected within the time outlined by statute, it is lost); Marsh-McLennan Bldg., Inc. v. Clapp, 980 P.2d 311 , 313 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that an unlawful detainer st

2003Const. v. Vaughn, 631 P.2d 688, 690 (Mont. 1981)). 7 See NRS 108.239(5) (requiring the district court to hear and determine mechanic’s lien claims in a summary way). 8 55 Nev. 134 , 28 P.2d 499 (1934). 9 100 Nev. 185 , 678 P.2d 679 (1984). 10 55 Nev. at 140 , 28 P.2d at 499 . 11 Id. at 142-43 , 28 P.2d at 500 . 12 100 Nev. at 186-87 , 678 P.2d at 680 . 13 Id. at 189-90 , 678 P.2d at 682 . 14 Id. at 190 , 678 P.2d at 682 . 15 Commercial’s argument that, by failing to allow a mechanic’s lien claim for delay-related damages, the district court would permit Amedeo to be unjustly enriched is withou

2003Const. v. Vaughn, 631 P.2d 688, 690 (Mont. 1981)). 7 See NRS 108.239(5) (requiring the district court to hear and determine mechanic’s lien claims in a summary way). 8 55 Nev. 134 , 28 P.2d 499 (1934). 9 100 Nev. 185 , 678 P.2d 679 (1984). 10 55 Nev. at 140 , 28 P.2d at 499 . 11 Id. at 142-43 , 28 P.2d at 500 . 12 100 Nev. at 186-87 , 678 P.2d at 680 . 13 Id. at 189-90 , 678 P.2d at 682 . 14 Id. at 190 , 678 P.2d at 682 . 15 Commercial’s argument that, by failing to allow a mechanic’s lien claim for delay-related damages, the district court would permit Amedeo to be unjustly enriched is withou

2003Const. v. Vaughn, 631 P.2d 688, 690 (Mont. 1981)). 7 See NRS 108.239(5) (requiring the district court to hear and determine mechanic’s lien claims in a summary way). 8 55 Nev. 134 , 28 P.2d 499 (1934). 9 100 Nev. 185 , 678 P.2d 679 (1984). 10 55 Nev. at 140 , 28 P.2d at 499 . 11 Id. at 142-43 , 28 P.2d at 500 . 12 100 Nev. at 186-87 , 678 P.2d at 680 . 13 Id. at 189-90 , 678 P.2d at 682 . 14 Id. at 190 , 678 P.2d at 682 . 15 Commercial’s argument that, by failing to allow a mechanic’s lien claim for delay-related damages, the district court would permit Amedeo to be unjustly enriched is withou

2003Const. v. Vaughn, 631 P.2d 688, 690 (Mont. 1981)). 7 See NRS 108.239(5) (requiring the district court to hear and determine mechanic’s lien claims in a summary way). 8 55 Nev. 134 , 28 P.2d 499 (1934). 9 100 Nev. 185 , 678 P.2d 679 (1984). 10 55 Nev. at 140 , 28 P.2d at 499 . 11 Id. at 142-43 , 28 P.2d at 500 . 12 100 Nev. at 186-87 , 678 P.2d at 680 . 13 Id. at 189-90 , 678 P.2d at 682 . 14 Id. at 190 , 678 P.2d at 682 . 15 Commercial’s argument that, by failing to allow a mechanic’s lien claim for delay-related damages, the district court would permit Amedeo to be unjustly enriched is withou

2002(Emphasis added; citations omitted.) Burlington Northern v. Department of Revenue, 934 F.2d 1064 , 1069 (9th Cir. 1991); Adriana Intern.

1990In Hayes v. Pigg, 515 P.2d 924 (Or. 1973), the Oregon court held: If the non-lienable charge is extremely small as compared to *713 the total item in which it is included, and if it is inserted without malicious intent, the rule of de minimum non curat lex should apply.

1970Relying on the authority of Porteous Decorative Co. Inc. v. Fee, 29 Nev. 375 , 91 P. 135 (1907), Close makes a multi-pronged attack upon the lien claim, contending it did not comply with NRS 108.060. 4 Porteous was impliedly overruled in Milner v. Shuey, 57 Nev. 159 , 60 P.2d 604 (1936), and in Ray Heating Prods.

1958Said claimant has duly performed all terms of said contract on its part to be performed, has furnished said labor and materials upon said contract. * * * That the market value of said services due to claimant is the sum of $1487.86, none of which has been paid.” (1) Respondents’ first contention is that this language did not comply with the requirement for a statement of the claimant’s “demand after deducting all just credits and offsets.” The same attack was made against a similar allegation in Milner et al. v. Shuey, 57 Nev. 159 , 60 P.2d 604 , 69 P.2d 771 , but the allegation consisting of

1958Said claimant has duly performed all terms of said contract on its part to be performed, has furnished said labor and materials upon said contract. * * * That the market value of said services due to claimant is the sum of $1487.86, none of which has been paid.” (1) Respondents’ first contention is that this language did not comply with the requirement for a statement of the claimant’s “demand after deducting all just credits and offsets.” The same attack was made against a similar allegation in Milner et al. v. Shuey, 57 Nev. 159 , 60 P.2d 604 , 69 P.2d 771 , but the allegation consisting of

1958Said claimant has duly performed all terms of said contract on its part to be performed, has furnished said labor and materials upon said contract. * * * That the market value of said services due to claimant is the sum of $1487.86, none of which has been paid.” (1) Respondents’ first contention is that this language did not comply with the requirement for a statement of the claimant’s “demand after deducting all just credits and offsets.” The same attack was made against a similar allegation in Milner et al. v. Shuey, 57 Nev. 159 , 60 P.2d 604 , 69 P.2d 771 , but the allegation consisting of

1949Hooper v. Flood, 1880, 54 Cal. 218 , properly held: Demurrer for misjoinder should have been sustained as to defendant Flood alleged in the complaint and nominated in the lien claim to have been the agent of Irvine, the owner; that the word “cash” does not state terms, time given and conditions of contract, no longer required by 1187, Code of Civil Procedure, Baird v. Ocequeda, 8 Cal.2d 700 , 67 P.2d 1055 ; that statement of intervener “that materials were furnished for Irvine and Lien was claimed on his interest in the land and buildings,” was not a statement of owner or reputed owner.

1949Hooper v. Flood, 1880, 54 Cal. 218 , properly held: Demurrer for misjoinder should have been sustained as to defendant Flood alleged in the complaint and nominated in the lien claim to have been the agent of Irvine, the owner; that the word “cash” does not state terms, time given and conditions of contract, no longer required by 1187, Code of Civil Procedure, Baird v. Ocequeda, 8 Cal.2d 700 , 67 P.2d 1055 ; that statement of intervener “that materials were furnished for Irvine and Lien was claimed on his interest in the land and buildings,” was not a statement of owner or reputed owner.

1949Hooper v. Flood, 1880, 54 Cal. 218 , properly held: Demurrer for misjoinder should have been sustained as to defendant Flood alleged in the complaint and nominated in the lien claim to have been the agent of Irvine, the owner; that the word “cash” does not state terms, time given and conditions of contract, no longer required by 1187, Code of Civil Procedure, Baird v. Ocequeda, 8 Cal.2d 700 , 67 P.2d 1055 ; that statement of intervener “that materials were furnished for Irvine and Lien was claimed on his interest in the land and buildings,” was not a statement of owner or reputed owner.

1949In Norton v. Bedell Engineering Co., 1928, 88 Cal.App. 777 , 264 P. 311 , where neither complaint nor lien claim stated, as required by 1187, C.C.P., kind of materials furnished or work done, objection to evidence was sustained without leave to amend despite 1203, C.C.P., “where complaint stated none of the material matters in the lien claim and did not attach or contain a copy of lien claim.” The court *368 there said it could not be ascertained from the complaint as to contents of lien notice, whether compensation was sought for lumber, hardware, paint, plaster or brick nor whether work perf

1949In Norton v. Bedell Engineering Co., 1928, 88 Cal.App. 777 , 264 P. 311 , where neither complaint nor lien claim stated, as required by 1187, C.C.P., kind of materials furnished or work done, objection to evidence was sustained without leave to amend despite 1203, C.C.P., “where complaint stated none of the material matters in the lien claim and did not attach or contain a copy of lien claim.” The court *368 there said it could not be ascertained from the complaint as to contents of lien notice, whether compensation was sought for lumber, hardware, paint, plaster or brick nor whether work perf

1949In Hogan v. Bigler, 1908, 8 Cal.App. 71 , 96 P. 97 , strictly interpreting the statute as so many earlier cases did under statutes similar to our own, the court held that required statement, among other things, “the name of the person to whom he furnished the materials,” was not met where lien stated and complaint alleged that lumber was sold to Crawford and evidence without conflict shows sale to one Hambleton, and the lower court so found.

1949In Hogan v. Bigler, 1908, 8 Cal.App. 71 , 96 P. 97 , strictly interpreting the statute as so many earlier cases did under statutes similar to our own, the court held that required statement, among other things, “the name of the person to whom he furnished the materials,” was not met where lien stated and complaint alleged that lumber was sold to Crawford and evidence without conflict shows sale to one Hambleton, and the lower court so found.

1936The question is governed by our ruling in George et al. v. Wentworth, 56 Nev. 380 , 53 P.2d 1193 , wherein we held that this provision was intended to impose an additional requirement upon an owner in order to exempt his property from the effect of a lien claim.

1936The question is governed by our ruling in George et al. v. Wentworth, 56 Nev. 380 , 53 P.2d 1193 , wherein we held that this provision was intended to impose an additional requirement upon an owner in order to exempt his property from the effect of a lien claim.

1936This provision relative to amending a lien claim was first incorporated in our lien act in 1911 (Stats. 1911, chap. 160), but notwithstanding this fact, this court, in the case of Riverside Fixture Co. v. Quigley, 35 Nev. 17 , 126 P. 545 , in which the rights of claimant evidently accrued prior to the 1911 amendment, held that where the rights of third parties had not intervened, an amendment would be allowed.

1935J. p. 230; McClain v. Hutton, 131 Cal. 132 , 61 P. 273 , 63 P. 182 , 622; N. C.

1935J. p. 230; McClain v. Hutton, 131 Cal. 132 , 61 P. 273 , 63 P. 182 , 622; N. C.