lien claim in Oklahoma

1933In Key v. Hill, 93 Okla. 64 , 219 P. 308 , it was held that where laborer, mechanic, or materialman filed his claim within time in the office of the court clerk, and such lien claim gives the name of the owner, the name of the claimant, describes the property sought to be charged, fixes the amount of the claim and gives the date the last material was furnished, and the claim is signed by the claimant, it is not fatally defective and a nullity even though no itemized statement is attached thereto, and that upon the trial the court should permit the lien claim to be amended in furtherance of jus

1933In Key v. Hill, 93 Okla. 64 , 219 P. 308 , it was held that where laborer, mechanic, or materialman filed his claim within time in the office of the court clerk, and such lien claim gives the name of the owner, the name of the claimant, describes the property sought to be charged, fixes the amount of the claim and gives the date the last material was furnished, and the claim is signed by the claimant, it is not fatally defective and a nullity even though no itemized statement is attached thereto, and that upon the trial the court should permit the lien claim to be amended in furtherance of jus

1984Key v. Hill, 93 Okl. 64 , 219 P. 308 (1923); Sutherland Lumber Co. v. Gale, 136 Okl. 233 , 277 P. 242 (1929); Wass v. Vickery, 137 Okl. 552 , 278 P. 336 (1929).

1938Key v. Hill, 93 Okla. 64 , 219 P. 308 ; Wass v. Vickery, 137 Okla. 52 , 278 P. 336 ; Sutherland Lumber Co. v. Gale, 136 Okla. 233 , 277 P. 242 ; Newman v. Kirk, 164 Okla. 147 , 23 P.2d 163 .

1984Key v. Hill, 93 Okl. 64 , 219 P. 308 (1923); Sutherland Lumber Co. v. Gale, 136 Okl. 233 , 277 P. 242 (1929); Wass v. Vickery, 137 Okl. 552 , 278 P. 336 (1929).

1984Key v. Hill, 93 Okl. 64 , 219 P. 308 (1923); Sutherland Lumber Co. v. Gale, 136 Okl. 233 , 277 P. 242 (1929); Wass v. Vickery, 137 Okl. 552 , 278 P. 336 (1929).

1980As was said in Beebe v. Redward, 35 Wash. 615 , 77 P. 1052 , 1055: `It is at most only a tentative charge against the property it purports to bind, and is liable to be defeated * * * by showing that the indebtedness, or some considerable part thereof, is not owing.'" The lien claimant gets nothing before judgment.

1980As was said in Beebe v. Redward, 35 Wash. 615 , 77 P. 1052 , 1055: `It is at most only a tentative charge against the property it purports to bind, and is liable to be defeated * * * by showing that the indebtedness, or some considerable part thereof, is not owing.'" The lien claimant gets nothing before judgment.

1966On the matter of the attor ney’s fee, the court held in the third paragraph of its syllabus that: “Title 42 O.S.1961, Sec. 176, provides, ‘In an action brought to enforce any lien the party for whom judgment is rendered shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.’ Thereunder no attorney’s fee may be allowed the attorney for the defendant unless the final judgment be against the lien claim.” The cases of Oklahoma Farm Mortgage Co. v. Cesar, 178 Okl. 451 , 62 P.2d 1269 , and Pierson v. American National Bank of S

1966On the matter of the attor ney’s fee, the court held in the third paragraph of its syllabus that: “Title 42 O.S.1961, Sec. 176, provides, ‘In an action brought to enforce any lien the party for whom judgment is rendered shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.’ Thereunder no attorney’s fee may be allowed the attorney for the defendant unless the final judgment be against the lien claim.” The cases of Oklahoma Farm Mortgage Co. v. Cesar, 178 Okl. 451 , 62 P.2d 1269 , and Pierson v. American National Bank of S

2021Its argument appears to be as follows: 1) pursuant to § 143, H2K can only have a lien to the "same extent" as Techsas and Techsas waived its lien in its subcontract with WSP, therefore, H2K cannot have any greater right to file a lien than Techsas; 2) it has long been established in Oklahoma that a subcontractor is charged with notice of the "original contract" and therefore, H2K had constructive notice of the lien waiver clause in the Techsas Contract (a subcontract); and 3) the lien waiver provision flows down to H2K and it is bound by it. ¶10 In support of their argument, the defendants c

2018Farmers cites for this doctrine the 10th Circuit case of Burchfield v. Bevans , 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1957). 4 The Burchfield case, however, was decided more than ten years before 42 O.S. § 43 was first enacted, and does not appear to address a hospital lien at all.

2018Farmers cites for this doctrine the 10th Circuit case of Burchfield v. Bevans , 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1957). 4 The Burchfield case, however, was decided more than ten years before 42 O.S. § 43 was first enacted, and does not appear to address a hospital lien at all.

2011Cf. Smith v. Westgate Oil Co., 1936 OK 94, ¶ 0 , 53 P.2d 1090 (Syllabus 3) (In an action by an attorney against his clients' adversary to recover an attorney fee due him from his client ... it is essential that the attorney preserve and perfect a lien on his clients' cause of action by indorsing a lien claim on his pleading or serving notice on his clients' adversary setting forth the nature of his lien and the extent thereof, prior to a settlement of his clients' cause of action or claim.").

2011Cf. Smith v. Westgate Oil Co., 1936 OK 94, ¶ 0 , 53 P.2d 1090 (Syllabus 3) (In an action by an attorney against his clients' adversary to recover an attorney fee due him from his client ... it is essential that the attorney preserve and perfect a lien on his clients' cause of action by indorsing a lien claim on his pleading or serving notice on his clients' adversary setting forth the nature of his lien and the extent thereof, prior to a settlement of his clients' cause of action or claim.").

2010Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 292 , 126 S.Ct. 1752 . [8] The Ahlborn Court expressly refrained from deciding whether a state could adopt special rules or procedures pertaining to allocation of tort settlement proceeds for the purpose of preventing Medicaid recipients from seeking to manipulate their damage allocations in order to limit or prevent states from asserting a claim for reimbursement.

2010Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 292 , 126 S.Ct. 1752 . [8] The Ahlborn Court expressly refrained from deciding whether a state could adopt special rules or procedures pertaining to allocation of tort settlement proceeds for the purpose of preventing Medicaid recipients from seeking to manipulate their damage allocations in order to limit or prevent states from asserting a claim for reimbursement.

2010Air Evac is entitled to enforce its lien against the settlement proceeds, and the trial court correctly *630 found that Air Evac is entitled to a portion of those proceeds. 16 On appeal, Parkland cites Johnson v. Stoval, 1914 OK 650 , 144 P. 1057 , suggesting that Air Evac did not respond or appear at the hearing because it was no longer asserting any interest in the proceeds.

2010Air Evac is entitled to enforce its lien against the settlement proceeds, and the trial court correctly *630 found that Air Evac is entitled to a portion of those proceeds. 16 On appeal, Parkland cites Johnson v. Stoval, 1914 OK 650 , 144 P. 1057 , suggesting that Air Evac did not respond or appear at the hearing because it was no longer asserting any interest in the proceeds.

2003"A lawyer can assert a [statutory] ... charging lien [pursuant to 5 O.S. § 6] only when he (or she) has commenced an action on behalf of a client or filed an answer containing a counterclaim, and endorsed on the pleading a notice of a lien claim{,] [and the] charging lien ... attach[es] to the ultimate verdict, report, decision, finding or judgment that is entered in a client's action or counterclaim." Cummings, 1993 OK 127, ¶ 12 , 863 P.2d at 1169 . ¶8 On the other hand, the common law retaining lien is but "a lawyer's claim to retain a client's papers, money or property in his (or her) posse

2003"A lawyer can assert a [statutory] ... charging lien [pursuant to 5 O.S. § 6] only when he (or she) has commenced an action on behalf of a client or filed an answer containing a counterclaim, and endorsed on the pleading a notice of a lien claim{,] [and the] charging lien ... attach[es] to the ultimate verdict, report, decision, finding or judgment that is entered in a client's action or counterclaim." Cummings, 1993 OK 127, ¶ 12 , 863 P.2d at 1169 . ¶8 On the other hand, the common law retaining lien is but "a lawyer's claim to retain a client's papers, money or property in his (or her) posse

2002In Swan-Sigler, Inc. v. Black, 1966 OK 90 , 414 P.2d 300 , syl. 2 the Court held: [N]o attorney’s fee may be allowed the attorney for the defendant unless the final judgment be against the lien claim.

2002In Swan-Sigler, Inc. v. Black, 1966 OK 90 , 414 P.2d 300 , syl. 2 the Court held: [N]o attorney’s fee may be allowed the attorney for the defendant unless the final judgment be against the lien claim.

2002Nevertheless, we have promulgated opinions instructive on the issue. {11 The primary issues presented in Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79 , 989 P.2d 448 involved the right of clients to proceed in a malpractice action against attorneys and a law firm for allegedly substandard performance in rendering trial and appellate service in defending against a subcontractor's lien claim.

2002Nevertheless, we have promulgated opinions instructive on the issue. {11 The primary issues presented in Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79 , 989 P.2d 448 involved the right of clients to proceed in a malpractice action against attorneys and a law firm for allegedly substandard performance in rendering trial and appellate service in defending against a subcontractor's lien claim.

1984This distinguishes the case at bar from Smith v. Thompson, Okl., 402 P.2d 882 (1965) in which the Court held that where liens were filed and recorded which had defective ac-knowledgements they did not operate to serve as constructive notice of the lien.

1980We said in Hartford Accident and Indemnity v. Orr, Okl., 321 P.2d 373, 376-377 , (1958): “The filing of a lien claim is not ordinarily deemed the equivalent of the fact of the indebtedness which it concerns.

1980We said in Hartford Accident and Indemnity v. Orr, Okl., 321 P.2d 373, 376-377 , (1958) : "The filing of a lien claim is not ordinarily deemed the equivalent of the fact of the indebtedness which it concerns.

1956In denying an attorney’s fee the Federal Court stated [ 32 F.2d 742 ] : “In foreclosure cases, it is common knowledge that there are usually numerous defendants, brought in with the principal one, in order to clear the title of outstanding equities, liens, and claims.

1953It is true that Consolidated Cut Stone Co. v. Seidenbach, 181 Okl. 578 , 75 P.2d 442, 444 , holds: “Where the'owner of a building has discharged a lien filed against his property by depositing with the court clerk the amount of the lien claim and exe *515 cuting a bond conditioned to pay attorney’s fee, court costs, and interest, as provided by section 10980, O.S.1931, 42 Okl.St.Ann. § 147, such owner is liable for attorney’s fee, court costs, and interest only in the event the claimant filing such lien recovers judgment on his claim in the amount for which such claim is filed.” We do not agre

1953It is true that Consolidated Cut Stone Co. v. Seidenbach, 181 Okl. 578 , 75 P.2d 442, 444 , holds: “Where the'owner of a building has discharged a lien filed against his property by depositing with the court clerk the amount of the lien claim and exe *515 cuting a bond conditioned to pay attorney’s fee, court costs, and interest, as provided by section 10980, O.S.1931, 42 Okl.St.Ann. § 147, such owner is liable for attorney’s fee, court costs, and interest only in the event the claimant filing such lien recovers judgment on his claim in the amount for which such claim is filed.” We do not agre

1938Key v. Hill, 93 Okla. 64 , 219 P. 308 ; Wass v. Vickery, 137 Okla. 52 , 278 P. 336 ; Sutherland Lumber Co. v. Gale, 136 Okla. 233 , 277 P. 242 ; Newman v. Kirk, 164 Okla. 147 , 23 P.2d 163 .

1938Key v. Hill, 93 Okla. 64 , 219 P. 308 ; Wass v. Vickery, 137 Okla. 52 , 278 P. 336 ; Sutherland Lumber Co. v. Gale, 136 Okla. 233 , 277 P. 242 ; Newman v. Kirk, 164 Okla. 147 , 23 P.2d 163 .

1935In Johnson v. Johnston, supra, the lien claim was endorsed on the petition, but aside from the differences be *514 tween tlie cases cited and those cases and the one under consideration, we hold to the view held by Mr. Justice Brewer in Herman v. Miller, supra, that is, that the right to set off one judgment against another is not absolute, but that the equitable rights of the parties should be considered, and that when the rights of third parties intervene, as they do in this case, the court should hold the rights of such third parties as superior.

1934“Held, that the lien claim is valid, even as against the surety; that the mere fact that the moneys used by the contractor in making the payment to the creditor were received by the contractor as part payment of the schoolhouse contract gave the surety no right at law o-r in equity to insist that such moneys be used solely or primarily in paying debts arising out of that schoolhouse job.” Other cases to the same general effect are Radichel v. Federal Surety Co. (Minn.) 212 N. W. 171 ; Meyer v. Cooper (Tenn.) 7 S. W. (2d) 38 ; National Surety Co. v. Southern Lumber & Supply Co. (Ark.) 24 S. W.

1934“Held, that the lien claim is valid, even as against the surety; that the mere fact that the moneys used by the contractor in making the payment to the creditor were received by the contractor as part payment of the schoolhouse contract gave the surety no right at law o-r in equity to insist that such moneys be used solely or primarily in paying debts arising out of that schoolhouse job.” Other cases to the same general effect are Radichel v. Federal Surety Co. (Minn.) 212 N. W. 171 ; Meyer v. Cooper (Tenn.) 7 S. W. (2d) 38 ; National Surety Co. v. Southern Lumber & Supply Co. (Ark.) 24 S. W.