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5 Tennessee opinions name it 4 courts 2017–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Michelle RYE Et Al. v. WOMEN’S CARE CENTER OF MEMPHIS, MPLLC Et Al.green2 sentences2022Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (2021); see also Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). 2017The burden then shifted to Mitchell to set forth specific facts showing a genuine disputed issue of material fact, “which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of [Mitchell].” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265 . | 1 | 2 |
Troy Mitchell v. Fayetteville Public Utilitiesgreen2 sentences2018First, it argues Employee’s injury was due to her own willful misconduct in failing to follow the safety instructions of her supervisor, and that the “Larson Test,” adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Fayetteville Public Utilities, 368 S.W.3d 442 (Tenn. 2012) to address the affirmative defenses in section 50-6-110(a)(1) and (4), “usurped the power of the legislature in remedying what the Mitchell court and Larson seemingly argue is a deficient and imprecise statutory provision.” 3 Employer contends the four-part “Larson test” as interpreted by Mitchell, “conflates two statuto 2018First, it argues Employee’s injury was due to her own willful misconduct in failing to follow the safety instructions of her supervisor, and that the “Larson Test,” adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Fayetteville Public Utilities, 368 S.W.3d 442 (Tenn. 2012) to address the affirmative defenses in section 50-6-110(a)(1) and (4), “usurped the power of the legislature in remedying what the Mitchell court and Larson seemingly argue is a deficient and imprecise statutory provision.” 3 Employer contends the four-part “Larson test” as interpreted by Mitchell, “conflates two statuto | 1 | 2 |
State v. Soudergreen1 sentence2025State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 607-08 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (affirming the trial court’s denial of probation despite the trial court’s statements that the defendant’s silence in response to a prosecutor’s question whether he had molested children was “not putting his best foot forward” because the trial court did not draw adverse inferences about the crime from the defendant’s silence and instead used the defendant’s silence as part of its “overall calculus”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.