search incident to arrest exception (Tennessee) · Go Syfert
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search incident to arrest exception in Tennessee

5 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Riley v. Cal. United Statesgreen
scotus · 2014 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Id. at 401-03.

11
Arizona v. Gantgreen
scotus · 2009 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014“In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence.” Id. (citations omitted).

2014Under the doctrine of search incident to arrest, the police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s lawful arrest “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search” or when “it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard green
scotus · 2016
2 sentences

2020After noting that the Court had already determined that the exigent circumstances exception could apply in drunk driving cases, subject to a “careful case- by-case assessment of exigency,” id. at 2174 (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152 ), the Court considered whether the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement might also be applied in drunk driving cases by examining the facts presented in the three cases before it, in each of which “the drivers were searched or told that they were required to submit to a search after being placed under arrest for drunk driving.” Birchfie

2020After noting that the Court had already determined that the exigent circumstances exception could apply in drunk driving cases, subject to a “careful case- by-case assessment of exigency,” id. at 2174 (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152 ), the Court considered whether the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement might also be applied in drunk driving cases by examining the facts presented in the three cases before it, in each of which “the drivers were searched or told that they were required to submit to a search after being placed under arrest for drunk driving.” Birchfie

32016–2020
Mitchell v. Wisconsin green
scotus · 2019
1 sentence

2020If statutory implied consent laws, as their name suggests, actually provided constitutionally valid consent to search, then the Court would not have needed to evaluate the natural dissipation of alcohol as it relates to the exigent circumstances exception, see McNeely, 569 U.S. at 153-54 , to resort to the search incident to arrest exception for the administration of warrantless breath tests, see Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184 , or to have carved out an “almost always” category of exigent circumstances for the administration of warrantless blood tests on unconscious DUI suspects, see Mitchell,

12020–2020
Missouri v. McNeely green
scotus · 2013
2 sentences

2020After noting that the Court had already determined that the exigent circumstances exception could apply in drunk driving cases, subject to a “careful case- by-case assessment of exigency,” id. at 2174 (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152 ), the Court considered whether the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement might also be applied in drunk driving cases by examining the facts presented in the three cases before it, in each of which “the drivers were searched or told that they were required to submit to a search after being placed under arrest for drunk driving.” Birchfie

2020If statutory implied consent laws, as their name suggests, actually provided constitutionally valid consent to search, then the Court would not have needed to evaluate the natural dissipation of alcohol as it relates to the exigent circumstances exception, see McNeely, 569 U.S. at 153-54 , to resort to the search incident to arrest exception for the administration of warrantless breath tests, see Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184 , or to have carved out an “almost always” category of exigent circumstances for the administration of warrantless blood tests on unconscious DUI suspects, see Mitchell,

12020–2020

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-213 (3) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401 (3) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-406 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

WA 102 (1983–2025) PA 102 (1963–2026) TX 75 (1980–2026) CA 52 (1969–2026) MN 48 (1985–2025) IN 41 (1983–2024) OH 39 (1997–2025) NJ 38 (1988–2026) GA 33 (1997–2025) IA 32 (1980–2026) MD 32 (1974–2024) IL 31 (1974–2023) ID 25 (1991–2026) OR 25 (1984–2026) KS 25 (1984–2025) WI 23 (1989–2026) MI 19 (2000–2026) NY 19 (1981–2024) VA 18 (2001–2026) FL 18 (1982–2026) NM 17 (1982–2023) KY 14 (2004–2025) MA 14 (2005–2025) DC 13 (1979–2025) AZ 12 (2002–2020) CO 12 (1984–2026) ND 11 (1981–2021) LA 9 (1997–2021) MO 9 (2002–2024) CT 8 (1992–2021) NC 7 (2010–2023) WY 7 (1987–2024) AK 7 (1979–2006) AL 7 (1984–2018) NE 6 (1990–2019) ME 6 (1973–2019) TN 5 (2014–2020) HI 5 (1988–2019) VT 4 (1982–2018) MS 4 (2007–2025) NH 4 (1990–2024) AR 3 (1982–2011) UT 3 (1997–2025) SC 3 (2010–2021) SD 3 (2014–2018) RI 2 (2002–2010)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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