Bank motion in Pennsylvania

2024UCC § 9-625 , Official Comment 4; see also Coxall, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79 . - 17 - J-A19029-23 For these reasons, the Bank’s challenge to standing fails.

2024UCC § 9-625 , Official Comment 4; see also Coxall, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79 . - 17 - J-A19029-23 For these reasons, the Bank’s challenge to standing fails.

2020(Id. at 3.) Further, the trial court found Homeowner failed to demonstrate “extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record or some other evidence of extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court.” Id. at 2-3 (numbers omitted), citing Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology, SC, 108 A.3d 913, 918-919 (Pa.Super. 2015).

2020(Id. at 3.) Further, the trial court found Homeowner failed to demonstrate “extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record or some other evidence of extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court.” Id. at 2-3 (numbers omitted), citing Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology, SC, 108 A.3d 913, 918-919 (Pa.Super. 2015).

2019Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 515 A.2d 980, 983 (Pa.Super. 1986) (“In order to properly raise a genuine issue of fact, [the appellant] had the burden to present ‘facts’ by counter-affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories.”).

2019Stein, supra at 981 .

2025Our Supreme Court has stated that a trial court “always has - 15 - J-A24044-24 the authority to reconsider its own judgment” and is “in the best position to decide if additional testimony, briefs or argument are necessary to the court in reassessing its original order.” Moore v. Moore, 634 A.2d 163, 167 (Pa. 1993); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (providing that a court “may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry” if no appeal has been filed).

2025See Bensinger, 98 A.3d at 676-77 .

2020See U.S. Bank’s brief at 16-17 (citing Deutsche Bank Nat’l Co. v. Butler, 868 A.2d 574, 577 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

2020Utils., Inc., 207 A.3d 355, 367 (Pa.Super. 2019).

2020In Pennsylvania, “parties must be given reasonable time to complete discovery before a trial court entertains any motion for summary judgment[.]” Reeves v. Middletown Athletic Assoc., 866 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

2016See CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Barbezat, ___ A.3d. ___, ___, 2016 PA Super 7, *3 (Pa. Super. 2016) (filed January 7, 2016) (“Where an assignment is effective, the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and assumes all of his rights.”) (citing Smith v. Cumberland Group, Ltd., 687 A.2d 1167, 1172 (Pa. Super. 1997)). 3 In his brief filed in opposition to U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment, Appellant asserted that his mortgage was part of the Lehman Brothers, Inc. trust, as evidenced by “Exhibit E” attached thereto.

2016See CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Barbezat, ___ A.3d. ___, ___, 2016 PA Super 7, *3 (Pa. Super. 2016) (filed January 7, 2016) (“Where an assignment is effective, the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and assumes all of his rights.”) (citing Smith v. Cumberland Group, Ltd., 687 A.2d 1167, 1172 (Pa. Super. 1997)). 3 In his brief filed in opposition to U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment, Appellant asserted that his mortgage was part of the Lehman Brothers, Inc. trust, as evidenced by “Exhibit E” attached thereto.

2015See Estate of Pew, supra. When Appellees filed their motion for summary judgment, they broadly challenged Bank’s claim that Appellees owed a duty to Bank under any theory asserted.

2015“Over the Bank’s objection, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Chapter 13 plan.” Id.

2015The case proceeded to review before the High Court on the question of “whether a debtor can include a mortgage lien in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy reorganization plan once the personal obligation secured by the mortgaged property has been discharged in a Chapter 7 proceeding.” Id. at 80, 81 .

2013See Johnson v. Martofel, 797 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa.Super.2002) (”[t]he appellate courts of this Commonwealth will not decide moot or abstract questions except in rare instances....

2011Bank cites what it calls a “general rule” that “economic losses may not be recovered in tort (negligence) absent physical injury or property damage.” Bank’s brief at pg. 27, citing Spivack v. Berks Ridge Corporation, 586 A.2d 402, 405 (Pa. Super. 1991).

2006University Medical Center, 973 F.2d 1065 , 1081 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir.1984)).

1987See Evans v. Thomas, 304 Pa.Super. 338, 346-348 , 450 A.2d 710, 714-15 (1982) (errors in hypothetical question posed to expert adequately cured on cross-examination); Whistler Sportswear, Inc. v. Rullo, supra. As to the Bank’s objection to Dr. Reavy testifying as to the cause of Bolus’ financial loss, we do not find the question of the cause of the decline of a business to be one concerning a matter of such common knowledge as to preclude expert testimony.

1987See Evans v. Thomas, 304 Pa.Super. 338, 346-348 , 450 A.2d 710, 714-15 (1982) (errors in hypothetical question posed to expert adequately cured on cross-examination); Whistler Sportswear, Inc. v. Rullo, supra. As to the Bank’s objection to Dr. Reavy testifying as to the cause of Bolus’ financial loss, we do not find the question of the cause of the decline of a business to be one concerning a matter of such common knowledge as to preclude expert testimony.

1987Klyman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 331 Pa.Super. 172 , 480 A.2d 299 *268 (1984); Mapp v. Dube, 330 Pa.Super. 284 , 479 A.2d 553 (1984).

1987Klyman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 331 Pa.Super. 172 , 480 A.2d 299 *268 (1984); Mapp v. Dube, 330 Pa.Super. 284 , 479 A.2d 553 (1984).

1987Expert testimony is appropriate on any subject that is “so distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman.” McCormick on Evidence at 33 (3d ed. 1984) (footnote omitted); Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 35 , 485 A.2d 408, 415 (1984).

1987Expert testimony is appropriate on any subject that is “so distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman.” McCormick on Evidence at 33 (3d ed. 1984) (footnote omitted); Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 35 , 485 A.2d 408, 415 (1984).

1987Given this fact, and the fact that the jury ultimately awarded Bolus only approximately one-half of the total amount of damages Dr. Reavy had calculated Bolus had suffered, any error in Dr. Reavy’s calculation was clearly harmless. 3 Harman v. Chambers, 358 Pa. 516, 522 , 57 A.2d 842, 845 (1948) (error is harmless where jury awards reasonable amount of damages despite trial court’s error in failing to limit or restrict measure of damages).

1987Given this fact, and the fact that the jury ultimately awarded Bolus only approximately one-half of the total amount of damages Dr. Reavy had calculated Bolus had suffered, any error in Dr. Reavy’s calculation was clearly harmless. 3 Harman v. Chambers, 358 Pa. 516, 522 , 57 A.2d 842, 845 (1948) (error is harmless where jury awards reasonable amount of damages despite trial court’s error in failing to limit or restrict measure of damages).

1985However, the parties in this case stand in substantially different positions to each other, as did the parties in Polsky, supra. The court in that case noted our decision in Phillips Home Furnishings, Inc. v. Continental Bank, 231 Pa.Superior Ct. 174, 181-2, 331 A.2d 840, 843-4 (1974), rev’d on other grounds, 467 Pa. 43 , 354 A.2d 542 (1976) in which an exculpatory clause asserted by a bank as a defense against allegations of negligence was held invalid.