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11 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Garner v. Poveygreen2 sentences2014Pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121: “In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party . . . .” An award of fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 may be awarded by the district court in its discretion “when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468 , 259 P.3d 608, 614 (2011) (quoting C 6 In its oral discussion of CitiMortgage’s request for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121, the district court referred to 2014Pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121: “In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party----” An award of fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 may be awarded by the district court in its discretion “when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259 . | 2 | 2 |
Harris v. Wildcat Corporationgreen2 sentences2013The Bank responds that even if a valid pre-loan commitment existed, “any such agreement was subsequently extinguished and substituted by the written $2.2 million agreement.” This Court has held that “novation is a species of accord and satisfaction,” and one that “results when an accord and satisfaction is reached by substitution of a new agreement or performance in place of the performance or compromise of the original obligation.” Harris v. Wildcat Corp., 97 Idaho 884, 886 , 556 P.2d 67, 69 (1976). 2013The Bank responds that even if a valid pre-loan commitment existed, “any such agreement was subsequently extinguished and substituted by the written $2.2 million agreement.” This Court has held that “novation is a species of accord and satisfaction,” and one that “results when an accord and satisfaction is reached by substitution of a new agreement or performance in place of the performance or compromise of the original obligation.” Harris v. Wildcat Corp., 97 Idaho 884, 886 , 556 P.2d 67, 69 (1976). | 2 | 2 |
Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Wisselgreen2 sentences2024The trial court eventually granted summary judgment to the bank on its claim for possession of the 2 We use the word “putative” because in certain respects the plaintiffs in that case, Farm Credit Bank of Spokane and the Ketterlings, never referred to themselves in their appeal as “non-prevailing parties.” To the contrary, it appears they referred to themselves as “prevailing parties.” Farm Credit Bank, 122 Idaho at 570 , 836 P. 2d at 516 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“F[arm] C[redit] B[ank] and the Ketterlings argue only that they were entitled to costs and attorne 2024The trial court eventually granted summary judgment to the bank on its claim for possession of the 2 We use the word “putative” because in certain respects the plaintiffs in that case, Farm Credit Bank of Spokane and the Ketterlings, never referred to themselves in their appeal as “non-prevailing parties.” To the contrary, it appears they referred to themselves as “prevailing parties.” Farm Credit Bank, 122 Idaho at 570 , 836 P. 2d at 516 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“F[arm] C[redit] B[ank] and the Ketterlings argue only that they were entitled to costs and attorne | 1 | 1 |
Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalitiongreen2 sentences1994Ill THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL WERE NOT RENDERED MOOT BY STEVENSON’S CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY Because mootness brings into question whether this Court is presented with a justiciable controversy on appeal, see Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho 31, 36 , 855 P.2d 868, 873 (1993), we will first address the Bank’s motion to dismiss the appeal. 1994Ill THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL WERE NOT RENDERED MOOT BY STEVENSON’S CONVEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY Because mootness brings into question whether this Court is presented with a justiciable controversy on appeal, see Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho 31, 36 , 855 P.2d 868, 873 (1993), we will first address the Bank’s motion to dismiss the appeal. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Idaho Independent Bank v. Marty D. Frantz
green
1 sentence2019Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Denison State Bank v. Madeira
green
2 sentences1992Each was competently represented by a qualified representative who was fully capable of protecting the interests of their parties. 12 To hold the bank to the standard of a fiduciary in this financing transaction, thus requiring it to act primarily for the benefit of the borrower rather than itself, “would put an intolerable obligation upon banking institutions and convert ordinary day-to-day business transactions into fiduciary relationships where none were intended or anticipated.” Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d at 1243 . 1992Each was competently represented by a qualified representative who was fully capable of protecting the interests of their parties. [12] To hold the bank to the standard of a fiduciary in this financing transaction, thus requiring it to act primarily for the benefit of the borrower rather than itself, "would put an intolerable obligation upon banking institutions and convert ordinary day-to-day business transactions into fiduciary relationships where none were intended or anticipated." Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d at 1243 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First National Bank
green
2 sentences1930On the latter point we invite attention to the ease of Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First National Bank, 184 Mass. 49 , 67 N. E. 670 , where, among other things, the Court, in disposing of a similar question, said: ‘It is true that the proper records were to be made upon the books; but the payment is effected by the acts and not by the record, and was valid, even without records. 1930On the latter point we invite attention to the ease of Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First National Bank, 184 Mass. 49 , 67 N. E. 670 , where, among other things, the Court, in disposing of a similar question, said: ‘It is true that the proper records were to be made upon the books; but the payment is effected by the acts and not by the record, and was valid, even without records. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
First National Bank of Pocatello v. C. Bunting & Co.
neutral
2 sentences1922Bunting & Co., 7 Ida. 27 , 59 Pac. 929, 1106 , it was held that public moneys deposited in a bank in violation of law are trust funds and do not become the property or assets of such bank, and remain trust funds, with the title in the true owner after the appointment of a receiver of the insolvent bank, and that a county whose funds have been unlawfully deposited in a bank is not estopped from claiming such funds. 1922Bunting & Co., 7 Ida. 27 , 59 Pac. 929, 1106 , it was held that public moneys deposited in a bank in violation of law are trust funds and do not become the property or assets of such bank, and remain trust funds, with the title in the true owner after the appointment of a receiver of the insolvent bank, and that a county whose funds have been unlawfully deposited in a bank is not estopped from claiming such funds. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Lowe v. Jones
green
1 sentence1921(See, also, Lowe v. Jones, 192 Mass. 94 , 116 Am. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
State v. Bruce
neutral
2 sentences1921The court in the case of Bellevue State Bank v. Coffin, supra, distinguished the case of State v. Bruce, 17 Ida. 1 , 102 Pac. 831 , and limited its application to the ease of a deposit of public funds in a bank in violation of a statute. 1921The court in the case of Bellevue State Bank v. Coffin, supra, distinguished the case of State v. Bruce, 17 Ida. 1 , 102 Pac. 831 , and limited its application to the ease of a deposit of public funds in a bank in violation of a statute. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.