Bank motion in Texas

2015See Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d at 508 . 14 Money Had and Received ADT alleged that the Bank wrongfully withdrew $30,000.00 from ADT’s account and it would be unconscionable for the Bank to retain it.

2015See Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d at 508 . 14 Money Had and Received ADT alleged that the Bank wrongfully withdrew $30,000.00 from ADT’s account and it would be unconscionable for the Bank to retain it.

2015See City of Houston, 589 S.W.2d at 678-79 .

1982A literal application of City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979), supports the Bank’s argument.

2018See First Bank, 472 S.W.3d at 16–20.

2017The court of appeals held that the trial court "did not err in overruling First Bank’s objection that no third-party-beneficiary issue should be submitted to the jury because ... construction of the unambiguous Letters is a matter of law for the court.," 472 S.W.3d at 28 (emphasis added).

2015See Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653 , 655–56 (Tex.2001) (recognizing appellate court may not reverse summary judgment on a particular claim when appellant fails to challenge summary judgment on that claim). 8 The Bank representative made these averments with respect to Bank One, N.A. and Banc One Texas Leasing Corp., although Banc One Texas Leasing Corp. had already merged with Banc One Acceptance Corp. However, the Bank entities presented proof in their supplemental motion for summary judgment that Banc One Acceptance Corp. became the lessor and owner of the vehicle by virtue of its merg

2007See Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655-56 (Tex. 2001) (recognizing appellate court may not reverse summary judgment on a particular claim when appellant fails to challenge summary judgment on that claim). [8] The Bank representative made these averments with respect to Bank One, N.A. and Banc One Texas Leasing Corp., although Banc One Texas Leasing Corp. had already merged with Banc One Acceptance Corp. However, the Bank entities presented proof in their supplemental motion for summary judgment that Banc One Acceptance Corp. became the lessor and owner of the vehicle by virtue of its me

2012See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009).

2012See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009).

2012See id.

2012See id.

2012See Cleveland v. Taylor, No. 01-11-00227-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 5159, at *30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 28, 2012, no pet. h.).

2012See Cleveland v. Taylor , No. 01-11-00227-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 5159, at *30 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] June 28, 2012, no pet. h.).

2012See CU Lloyd’s of Tex. v. Feldman, 977 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).

2012See CU Lloyd’s of Tex. v. Feldman, 977 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex.1998) (per curiam).

2012See id.

2012See id.

2011Land Bank Ass’n, 77 S.W.3d 364, 366 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (portion of promissory note addressing default contemplated there could be an owner or holder other than the bank and no clause in note prohibited assignment).

2011Land Bank Ass’n, 77 S.W.3d 364, 366 (Tex. App.—Sam Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (portion of promissory note addressing default contemplated there could be an owner or holder other than the bank and no clause in note 3 The only restriction contained in the deed provided that the Crowells could not sell, transfer, or encumber all or any part of the property without the lender’s prior written consent. -5- 04-10-00534-CV prohibited assignment).

2007See Fojtik , 775 S.W.2d at 633 .

2007See Fojtik, 775 S.W.2d at 633 .

1995See Lewis, 199 S.W.2d at 148-49 ; Tabor, 283 S.W. at 780 ; Ben E.

1995See Lewis , 199 S.W.2d at 148-49 ; Tabor , 283 S.W. at 780 ; Ben E.

1987In Ackerman v. Vordenbaum, 403 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.1966) that court held: The safer rule is one restricting the Tobin-Garcia [Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58 , 316 S.W.2d 396 (1955)] doctrine to its factual situation and that disclosed in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry.

1980In Ackermann v. Vordenbaum, 403 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.1966) that court held: “The safer rule is one restricting the To-bin-Garcia doctrine to its factual situation and that disclosed in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry.

2024In Holmes v. Dallas International Bank, 718 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.), we quoted civil procedure rule 166A(c)’s requirement that “[i]ssues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered as grounds for reversal,” and explained “it is no longer the duty of the trial court or appellate court to sift the summary-judgment record to see if there are fact issues that could be raised by the opposing party, but were not.” Id.

2024In Holmes v. Dallas International Bank, 718 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.), we quoted civil procedure rule 166A(c)’s requirement that “[i]ssues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered as grounds for reversal,” and explained “it is no longer the duty of the trial court or appellate court to sift the summary-judgment record to see if there are fact issues that could be raised by the opposing party, but were not.” Id.

2024In re Bernard, 993 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

2022Whether Claims Could Have Been Raised To determine whether a claim could have been raised in a prior suit, we use a “transactional approach to res judicata, which requires claims arising out of the same subject matter to be litigated in a single lawsuit.” Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 58 (Tex. 2006) (citing Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 631 ).

2022See Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Tex. 2017); Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 628 .