Bank motion in Florida

2023In the absence of a transcript, we must presume that the trial court's order denying the Bank's motion ‘was based on additional evidence adduced at the hearing.’ We thus AFFIRM the order denying relief from the . . . judgment.” (quoting Snowden v. Wells Fargo Bank, 172 So. 3d 506, 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015))). 2

2019In the absence of a transcript, we must presume that the trial court’s order denying the Bank’s motion “was based on additional evidence adduced at the hearing.” Snowden v. Wells Fargo Bank, 172 So. 3d 506, 508 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

2018Analysis “The standard of review for evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion.” Holt v. Calchas, LLC, 155 So. 3d 499, 503 (Fla. 4th DCA DCA 2015).

2018Analysis “The standard of review for evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion.” Holt v. Calchas, LLC, 155 So. 3d 499, 503 (Fla. 4th DCA DCA 2015).

2019In Peters, one of the issues raised by the appellants was “that the Bank’s claim to reestablish the lost note is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” Id. at 178 .

2018Mellon, 227 So. 3d 175, 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (finding testimony of "case manager" employed by servicer—who took over servicing after the filing of the lawsuit— was insufficient to establish ownership of the lost note because "Ms. Stevens had no personal knowledge about the Bank's claim to have acquired ownership of the note in 2006.

2026This appeal followed. 3 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS Simply put, we hold the trial court violated U.S. Bank’s due process rights when it “changed the nature and expanded the scope of the scheduled hearing without proper notice.” Shah v. Shah, 178 So. 3d 70, 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“Due process requires proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.”) (citing Epic Metals Corp. v. Samari Lake E.

2025Thus, the default issue was not preserved for our review.”); see also Rangel v. MidFirst Bank, 187 So. 3d 289, 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“We nonetheless hold that by failing to provide this Court with a transcript from the hearing on the Bank's motion to strike the answer, and by further failing to appear at trial, we have no record to indicate that Homeowner notified the trial court that it erred in striking his answer on the basis of default.

2024See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court’s judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory.

2017The Prior Loan History “The standard of review for admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion, limited by the rules of evidence.” Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Gundersen, 204 So.3d 530, 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Tengbergen v. State, 9 So.3d 729, 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “[T]he question of whether evidence falls within the statutory definition of hearsay is a matter of law, subject to de novo review.” Id. (quoting Burkey v. State, 922 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)).

2017The Prior Loan History “The standard of review for admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion, limited by the rules of evidence.” Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Gundersen, 204 So.3d 530, 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Tengbergen v. State, 9 So.3d 729, 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “[T]he question of whether evidence falls within the statutory definition of hearsay is a matter of law, subject to de novo review.” Id. (quoting Burkey v. State, 922 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)).

2017The Prior Loan History “The standard of review for admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion, limited by the rules of evidence.” Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Gundersen, 204 So.3d 530, 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Tengbergen v. State, 9 So.3d 729, 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “[T]he question of whether evidence falls within the statutory definition of hearsay is a matter of law, subject to de novo review.” Id. (quoting Burkey v. State, 922 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)).

2017The Prior Loan History “The standard of review for admissibility of evidence is abuse of discretion, limited by the rules of evidence.” Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Gundersen, 204 So.3d 530, 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Tengbergen v. State, 9 So.3d 729, 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). “[T]he question of whether evidence falls within the statutory definition of hearsay is a matter of law, subject to de novo review.” Id. (quoting Burkey v. State, 922 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)).

2016Analysis In a reformation case, the lower court’s findings of fact “are entitled to a presumption of correctness.” Providence Square Ass’n v. Biancardi, 507 So.2d 1366, 1372 (Fla.1987) (per curiam).

2016Grove Isle Ass’n, Inc. v. Grove Isle Assocs., LLLP, 137 So.3d 1081, 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

2016See Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Brogdon, 185 So.3d 627, 628 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (reversing trial court’s dismissal of foreclosure complaint without prejudice, where counsel’s failure to appear at hearing due *109 to inadvertent secretarial error amounted to excusable neglect under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.640(b)).

2015Ventures, Inc. v. First Bank, 19 So.3d. 1126, 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (noting that the trial court ruled on the issues of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction and explaining that "[a]s to the issue of whother the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over First Bank's motion for deficiency judgment, this court does not have jurisdiction over the issue in this appeal [because] '[sjubject matter jurisdiction is not one of the categories’ of nonfinal orders that may be appealed under rule 9.130(a)(3)'') (citation omitted); Fisher v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 827 So.2d 109

2015Ventures, Inc. v. First Bank, 19 So.3d. 1126, 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (noting that the trial court ruled on the issues of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction and explaining that "[a]s to the issue of whother the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over First Bank's motion for deficiency judgment, this court does not have jurisdiction over the issue in this appeal [because] '[sjubject matter jurisdiction is not one of the categories’ of nonfinal orders that may be appealed under rule 9.130(a)(3)'') (citation omitted); Fisher v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 827 So.2d 109

2015Although this Court reviews the denial of a motion to vacate a final judgment under an abuse of discretion standard, see Shiver v. Wharton, 9 So.3d 687, 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding that an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to vacate a final order filed pursuant to rule 1.540(b) for an abuse of discretion), we find that in this case the trial court abused its discretion.

2015Ventures, Inc. v. First Bank, 19 So.3d. 1126, 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (noting that the trial court ruled on the issues of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction and explaining that "[a]s to the issue of whother the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over First Bank's motion for deficiency judgment, this court does not have jurisdiction over the issue in this appeal [because] '[sjubject matter jurisdiction is not one of the categories’ of nonfinal orders that may be appealed under rule 9.130(a)(3)'') (citation omitted); Fisher v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 827 So.2d 109

2015See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Corr v. Schwarz, 134 So.3d 1002, 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (permitting review of nonfinal order where “the prematurely filed notice of appeal became effective and conferred jurisdiction when [Public Employees Relations Commission] entered its final orders”).

2015Ventures, Inc. v. First Bank, 19 So.3d. 1126, 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (noting that the trial court ruled on the issues of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction and explaining that "[a]s to the issue of whother the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over First Bank's motion for deficiency judgment, this court does not have jurisdiction over the issue in this appeal [because] '[sjubject matter jurisdiction is not one of the categories’ of nonfinal orders that may be appealed under rule 9.130(a)(3)'') (citation omitted); Fisher v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 827 So.2d 109

2015See Seffar, 160 So.3d at 126-27 (finding that a letter from a loan servicer to the mortgagor informing him of the transfer of servicing rights was insufficient to establish that the servicer had standing when the letter did not address the servicer’s specific right to' enforce the instrument).

2011See Tulli v. Tulli, 780 So.2d 213, 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reversing denial of motion to transfer where appellants’ affidavit established a more convenient forum, the appellee did not file a countervailing affidavit, and the complaint was unsworn); Eggers v. Eggers, 776 So.2d 1096, 1098 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant’s sworn motion to transfer where the appellee countered with no sworn evidence, and the trial court had before it only evidence that another county was the more convenient forum); accord Holiday Truck & Car Sales, Inc. v

2011See Tulli v. Tulli, 780 So.2d 213, 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reversing denial of motion to transfer where appellants' affidavit established a more convenient forum, the appellee did not file a countervailing affidavit, and the complaint was unsworn); Eggers v. Eggers, 776 So.2d 1096, 1098 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's sworn motion to transfer where the appellee countered with no sworn evidence, and the trial court had before it only evidence that another county was the more convenient forum); accord Holiday Truck & Car Sales, Inc. v