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72 California opinions name it 3 courts 1935–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kruse v. Bank of Americagreen2 sentences2000For instance, in Bank of America v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 613 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 596 ] (Bank of America), the court considered the effect of its earlier decision in Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 38 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 217 ] (Kruse), where the trial court had entered judgment for plaintiffs after the jury returned a verdict in favor of them against Bank of America (the Bank) and it denied the Bank’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). 2000For instance, in Bank of America v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 613 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 596 ] (Bank of America), the court considered the effect of its earlier decision in Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 38 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 217 ] (Kruse), where the trial court had entered judgment for plaintiffs after the jury returned a verdict in favor of them against Bank of America (the Bank) and it denied the Bank’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). | 2 | 4 |
Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Americagreen2 sentences1990Since the standard employed by an appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is essentially the same as that used by a trial court considering a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (see Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 906 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 679 , 701 *624 P.2d 826]; Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 681 , 534 P.2d 377 , 74 AA.L.R.3d 1282]; Moore v. City & County of San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 281 ]), Division One’s reversal of the judgment for insufficiency of the evidence 1990Since the standard employed by an appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is essentially the same as that used by a trial court considering a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (see Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 906 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 679 , 701 *624 P.2d 826]; Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 681 , 534 P.2d 377 , 74 AA.L.R.3d 1282]; Moore v. City & County of San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 281 ]), Division One’s reversal of the judgment for insufficiency of the evidence | 2 | 2 |
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green2 sentences2022(See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 849–850 (Aguilar).) As a result, this case is distinguishable from Security Pacific National Bank v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 89 (Security Pacific), where “[t]he sole ground for granting the Bank’s motion for summary judgment was Bradley’s failure to file a separate responsive statement to the Bank’s statement of undisputed facts. 2006As noted in part I., ante, in deciding whether Bank is entitled to summary adjudication, we “must . . . determine what any evidence [submitted by Smith] or inference [therefrom] could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 856.) Therefore, if any evidence or reasonable inference therefrom shows or implies the existence of the required element(s) of a cause of action, the trial court was required to deny Bank’s motion for summary adjudication because a reasonable trier of fact could find for Smith. | 1 | 2 |
Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.green2 sentences2016(Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 520 , disapproved of on another point in Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th 919 .) In her first amended complaint, Allen alleges that the Bank defendants committed unlawful acts when they recorded the void assignments. 2015(Compare Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 515 [borrower lacks standing to challenge lender’s transfer of note because borrower is not aggrieved by the lender’s subsequent ineffective assignment; “[t]he true victim [is] an individual or entity that believes it has a present beneficial interest in the promissory note and may suffer the unauthorized loss of its interest in the note”]; Siliga v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 75, 82 [same] with Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1094-1096 [if assignment of n | 1 | 2 |
Havstad v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co.green1 sentence2025Co. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 654, 661 [declining to consider theory advanced on appeal but not factually developed in the trial court].) The only evidentiary filings he submitted in opposition to U.S. Bank’s motion were two requests for judicial notice, through which he sought judicial notice of facts associated with 20 exhibits.4 As we will explain, these requests do not satisfy Sepehry-Fard’s burden. | 1 | 1 |
Fritz v. Footegreen1 sentence2023(See K.J., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 881 [timely notice of appeal “ ‘is an absolute prerequisite to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction’ ”]; Fritz v. Foote (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 622, 624 [“[t]imely filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional (citation) and a late filing requires the court, of its own motion, to dismiss the appeal”]; In re Del Campo (1961) 55 Cal.2d 816, 817 [“the time requirements for taking an appeal are mandatory, and appellate courts are without jurisdiction to consider a late appeal”].) We therefore dismiss the appeal from the December 3, 2020 judgment entered in favo | 1 | 1 |
In Re Del Campogreen1 sentence2023(See K.J., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 881 [timely notice of appeal “ ‘is an absolute prerequisite to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction’ ”]; Fritz v. Foote (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 622, 624 [“[t]imely filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional (citation) and a late filing requires the court, of its own motion, to dismiss the appeal”]; In re Del Campo (1961) 55 Cal.2d 816, 817 [“the time requirements for taking an appeal are mandatory, and appellate courts are without jurisdiction to consider a late appeal”].) We therefore dismiss the appeal from the December 3, 2020 judgment entered in favo | 1 | 1 |
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasegreen1 sentence2022DISCUSSION “The scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow.” (Department of Personnel Administration v. California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200 .) With very limited exceptions, “an award reached by an arbitrator pursuant to a contractual agreement to arbitrate is not subject to judicial review except on the grounds set forth in sections 1286.2 (to vacate) and 1286.6 (for correction).” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 33 (Moncharsh).) “[C]ourts will not review the arbitrator’s reasoning or the sufficiency of the evide | 1 | 1 |
Kasky v. Nike, Inc.green2 sentences2017Code, § 17200.) Written in the disjunctive, Business and Professions Code section 17200 establishes “ ‘three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’ ” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ]; accord, Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ].) “Violations of federal statutes, including those governing the financial industry, may serve as the predicate for a UCL cause of action.” (Rose v. Bank of America 2017Code, § 17200.) Written in the disjunctive, Business and Professions Code section 17200 establishes “ ‘three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’ ” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ]; accord, Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ].) “Violations of federal statutes, including those governing the financial industry, may serve as the predicate for a UCL cause of action.” (Rose v. Bank of America | 1 | 1 |
Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.green2 sentences2017Code, § 17200.) Written in the disjunctive, Business and Professions Code section 17200 establishes “ ‘three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’ ” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ]; accord, Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ].) “Violations of federal statutes, including those governing the financial industry, may serve as the predicate for a UCL cause of action.” (Rose v. Bank of America 2017Code, § 17200.) Written in the disjunctive, Business and Professions Code section 17200 establishes “ ‘three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’ ” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ]; accord, Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ].) “Violations of federal statutes, including those governing the financial industry, may serve as the predicate for a UCL cause of action.” (Rose v. Bank of America | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Bank of Americagreen2 sentences2017Code, § 17200.) Written in the disjunctive, Business and Professions Code section 17200 establishes “ ‘three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’ ” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ]; accord, Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ].) “Violations of federal statutes, including those governing the financial industry, may serve as the predicate for a UCL cause of action.” (Rose v. Bank of America 2017Code, § 17200.) Written in the disjunctive, Business and Professions Code section 17200 establishes “ ‘three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’ ” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ]; accord, Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ].) “Violations of federal statutes, including those governing the financial industry, may serve as the predicate for a UCL cause of action.” (Rose v. Bank of America | 1 | 1 |
| Younger v. Jensengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hagans v. Lavinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Margaret Stewart Jamey L. Paulson William Keith Laura Spencer Lee Callison Stephanie Glowa Terri Gorecki Dan Berryman v. U.S. Bancorpgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rappleyea v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Griffin v. County of Colusagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Glaski v. Bank of America CA5green | 1 | 1 |
| Siliga v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Schifando v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Padgettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eckstrom v. Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Security Pacific National Bank v. Bradley
green
2 sentences2022(See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 849–850 (Aguilar).) As a result, this case is distinguishable from Security Pacific National Bank v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 89 (Security Pacific), where “[t]he sole ground for granting the Bank’s motion for summary judgment was Bradley’s failure to file a separate responsive statement to the Bank’s statement of undisputed facts. 2018Bank v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 89 , 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 , plaintiff Bradley (who was in pro. per.) filed an *316 opposition to defendant Bank's motion for summary judgment, but he failed to file a separate statement. | 3 | 2018–2022 |
Vanderkous v. Conley
green
2 sentences2018On appeal, the bank argued that the trial court should not have awarded attorney fees, because the bank had a right to dismiss the case under section 581, subdivision (b)(1), which addresses the right to dismiss a case before trial. ( Id . at p. 1209, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 562 .) This Division held that "the Bank no longer had the right to voluntarily dismiss under section 581," because "the trial court *439 had already made a determinative adjudication on the legal merits of the Bank's claim." ( Id . at p. 1210, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 562 .) The court further explained that "the trial court had already su 2018On appeal, the bank argued that the trial court should not have awarded attorney fees, because the bank had a right to dismiss the case under section 581, subdivision (b)(1), which addresses the right to dismiss a case before trial. ( Id . at p. 1209, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 562 .) This Division held that "the Bank no longer had the right to voluntarily dismiss under section 581," because "the trial court *439 had already made a determinative adjudication on the legal merits of the Bank's claim." ( Id . at p. 1210, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 562 .) The court further explained that "the trial court had already su | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2000For instance, in Bank of America v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 613 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 596 ] (Bank of America), the court considered the effect of its earlier decision in Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 38 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 217 ] (Kruse), where the trial court had entered judgment for plaintiffs after the jury returned a verdict in favor of them against Bank of America (the Bank) and it denied the Bank’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). 2000For instance, in Bank of America v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 613 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 596 ] (Bank of America), the court considered the effect of its earlier decision in Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 38 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 217 ] (Kruse), where the trial court had entered judgment for plaintiffs after the jury returned a verdict in favor of them against Bank of America (the Bank) and it denied the Bank’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Stromer v. Browning
green
2 sentences2000(Id. at p. 617.) In granting the relief requested, the court in Bank of America applied law of the case and a statutory policy similar to the exception to the general reversal rule that an unqualified reversal of a judgment remands the case for new trial (Stromer v. Browning (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 513 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 155 ]) to avoid the anomaly that would result if the trial court’s denial of the Bank’s motion for JNOV were to stand in light of the appellate court’s determination in Kruse that the judgment should be reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. 2000(Id. at p. 617.) In granting the relief requested, the court in Bank of America applied law of the case and a statutory policy similar to the exception to the general reversal rule that an unqualified reversal of a judgment remands the case for new trial (Stromer v. Browning (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 513 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 155 ]) to avoid the anomaly that would result if the trial court’s denial of the Bank’s motion for JNOV were to stand in light of the appellate court’s determination in Kruse that the judgment should be reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank
green
2 sentences1990The relationship of bank to depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary, and depositors reasonably expect a bank not to claim nonexistent legal defenses to avoid reimbursement when the bank negligently disburses the entrusted funds." ( 163 Cal. App.3d at p. 516 .) Other courts, although not always expressly discussing this issue, appear to agree a bank customer, under the proper facts, may proceed against her bank for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 1990The relationship of bank to depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary, and depositors reasonably expect a bank not to claim nonexistent legal defenses to avoid reimbursement when the bank negligently disburses the entrusted funds.” ( 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 516 .) Other courts, although not always expressly discussing this issue, appear to agree a bank customer, under the proper facts, may proceed against her bank for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. | 2 | 1988–1990 |
International Industries, Inc. v. Olen
green
1 sentence2026“Having concluded that under the cost statutes and under the terms of their agreement with plaintiffs the seller defendants are entitled to recover their attorney fees as costs, we come to the main issue presented here, which is whether such recovery is precluded by either . . . section 1717 . . . or the decision of this court in [International Industries, Inc. v. Olen (1978) 21 Cal.3d 218 (Olen)].”5 (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 609 .) 5 The Supreme Court concluded that Olen “has been effectively superseded by the 1981 amendment of section 1717 codifying its holding.” (Santisas, supra, 1 | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Santisas v. Goodin
green
2 sentences2026“Having concluded that under the cost statutes and under the terms of their agreement with plaintiffs the seller defendants are entitled to recover their attorney fees as costs, we come to the main issue presented here, which is whether such recovery is precluded by either . . . section 1717 . . . or the decision of this court in [International Industries, Inc. v. Olen (1978) 21 Cal.3d 218 (Olen)].”5 (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 609 .) 5 The Supreme Court concluded that Olen “has been effectively superseded by the 1981 amendment of section 1717 codifying its holding.” (Santisas, supra, 1 2026“Having concluded that under the cost statutes and under the terms of their agreement with plaintiffs the seller defendants are entitled to recover their attorney fees as costs, we come to the main issue presented here, which is whether such recovery is precluded by either . . . section 1717 . . . or the decision of this court in [International Industries, Inc. v. Olen (1978) 21 Cal.3d 218 (Olen)].”5 (Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 609 .) 5 The Supreme Court concluded that Olen “has been effectively superseded by the 1981 amendment of section 1717 codifying its holding.” (Santisas, supra, 1 | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson
green
1 sentence2026First, as argued by Bank, “[a]ttorney’s fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed.” (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129-130 .) Where, as here, all of NMA’s damages were premised on tort theories, arguably all of Bank’s defense costs were incurred in connection with common issues, such that Bank was not required to apportion its attorney fees between time expended on contract defense and tort defense. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Khan v. Shim
green
1 sentence2026Second, while courts have cautioned against “the simple expedient of adding up the tort claims in a complaint to see if they outnumber the contract claims” when allocating attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), Bank’s analysis was more than such a “simple expedient.” (Khan, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 58 .) In its attorney fee motion, Bank argued that NMA’s operative complaint contained four tort and three contract claims. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Grant v. List & Lathrop
green
1 sentence2023The appeal is dismissed as to the Bank defendants A. Rules regarding time to appeal “ ‘[T]he timely filing of an appropriate notice of appeal or its legal equivalent is an absolute prerequisite to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.’ ” (K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875 , 881 (K.J.)) “It is also well settled an appellate court cannot relieve a party from a default occasioned by the failure to file a timely appeal.” (Grant v. List & Lathrop (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 993, 997 .) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(1), “[t]o appeal from a superior court | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co.
green
1 sentence2022Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 .) We perform an independent review of a ruling on a demurrer and decide de novo whether the challenged pleading states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Department of Personnel Administration v. California Correctional Peace Officers Ass'n
green
1 sentence2022DISCUSSION “The scope of judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely narrow.” (Department of Personnel Administration v. California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200 .) With very limited exceptions, “an award reached by an arbitrator pursuant to a contractual agreement to arbitrate is not subject to judicial review except on the grounds set forth in sections 1286.2 (to vacate) and 1286.6 (for correction).” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 33 (Moncharsh).) “[C]ourts will not review the arbitrator’s reasoning or the sufficiency of the evide | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino
green
1 sentence2022He filed these motions well after making a general appearance in the action. 9 [the] case.’ [Citation.] And any judgment or order rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is ‘void on its face. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 196 .) Relying on the trial court’s May 2018 order denying the Bank’s motion for summary judgment, Sepehry-Fard bases his contention that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction on claims that the unverified complaint filed by the Bank was incomplete and did not prove a claim under Code of | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Davenport v. Davenport
green
1 sentence2021(In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1531 .) Judge Fineman made various “findings,” specifically noting that her statement did not set out “all the facts supporting [her] decision, but the ones the court finds the most material.” These findings included the ownership history of the properties; the tenants’ use of the Willow property; the lack of any notice provided by the Bank to Husain’s predecessor of the Bank’s interest in the Willow property; and Husain’s knowledge of the Bank’s claim to a prescriptive easement prior to the time he purchased the property. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Angelucci v. Century Supper Club
green
1 sentence2021“In an appeal from a motion granting judgment on the pleadings, we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and review the legal issues de novo. ‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a general demurrer, tests the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint, supplemented by any matter of which the trial court takes judicial notice, to determine whether plaintiff or cross-complainant has stated a cause of action. [Citation.] Because the trial court’s determination is made as a matter of law, we review the ruling de novo, assuming the truth of all material facts properly pled | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Gitmed v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2018(See, e.g., Gitmed v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 824, 827 .) In addition, although section 581, subdivision (d) also states that the court “shall” dismiss a case if the plaintiff abandons it, Witkin states that “a motion to dismiss under C.C.P. 581(d) is addressed to the court’s discretion.” (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Dismissal on Abandonment, § 312.) Witkin notes that the “theoretical basis of this distinction is not entirely clear,” and cites cases that predate the modern version of section 581. 12 had already made a determinative adjudication on the legal merit | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bank of America v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences2018On appeal, the bank argued that the trial court should not have awarded attorney fees, because the bank had a right to dismiss the case under section 581, subdivision (b)(1), which addresses the right to dismiss a case before trial. ( Id . at p. 1209, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 562 .) This Division held that "the Bank no longer had the right to voluntarily dismiss under section 581," because "the trial court *439 had already made a determinative adjudication on the legal merits of the Bank's claim." ( Id . at p. 1210, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 562 .) The court further explained that "the trial court had already su 2018On appeal, the bank argued that the trial court should not have awarded attorney fees, because the bank had a right to dismiss the case under section 581, subdivision (b)(1), which addresses the right to dismiss a case before trial. ( Id . at p. 1209, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 562 .) This Division held that "the Bank no longer had the right to voluntarily dismiss under section 581," because "the trial court *439 had already made a determinative adjudication on the legal merits of the Bank's claim." ( Id . at p. 1210, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 562 .) The court further explained that "the trial court had already su | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Powell v. Kleinman green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Carnes v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Goodman v. Lozano green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Dodd v. Citizens Bank of Costa Mesa green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.
green
2 sentences2016(Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 520 , disapproved of on another point in Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th 919 .) In her first amended complaint, Allen alleges that the Bank defendants committed unlawful acts when they recorded the void assignments. 2016(Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 520 , disapproved of on another point in Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th 919 .) In her first amended complaint, Allen alleges that the Bank defendants committed unlawful acts when they recorded the void assignments. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| City of Atascadero v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Czajkowski v. White green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Holland v. MORSE DIESEL INTERNAT., INC. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors
green
1 sentence2016Evergreen Mortgage Servicing, LP answered the first amended complaint and is not a part of this appeal. 2 Collectively, we refer to Bank of New York, Bank of America, and ReconTrust as the Bank defendants. 3 When reviewing a demurrer, “ ‘we accept as true the well-pleaded facts in [Allen’s] complaint.’ ” (Beacon Residential Community Assn. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP (2014) 59 Cal.4th 568, 571 .) “We may also consider matters that have been judicially noticed.” (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42 .) Facts appearing in exhibits | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Ing Bank, Fsb v. Chang Seob Ahn green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Beacon Residential Community Ass'n v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Coalition for a Sustainable Future in Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa CA4/2 green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Manson, Iver & York v. Black green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Gibble v. Car-Lene Research, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| California Bank & Trust v. DelPonti green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Multani v. Witkin & Neal green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| FOUNDATION FOR TAXPAYER RIGHTS v. Nextel Communications green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Desaigoudar v. Meyercord green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.