Bank motion in Illinois

2023In support, the Bank cited the attached affidavit of Carlos Restrepo, a construction -12- No. 1-22-1403 escrow administrator at Chicago Title, who attested that Chicago Title never received any inspection reports in connection with plaintiff’s Project. ¶ 39 The Bank also argued that plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine stated in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69 (1982), and that the Consumer Fraud Act count fails because the Bank did not engage in a fraudulent bait-and-switch. ¶ 40 The circuit court granted the Bank’s

2007The court dismissed the negligence count without prejudice, finding that the defendant failed to state a cause of action under the Moorman doctrine (Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69 , 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982)).

2025Bank of America, N.A. v. Steve S. Yun, 2022 IL App (3d) 210210 . ¶ 24 On May 18, 2022, we reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Yun’s FCRA counterclaim under section 2-619(a)(9), finding that Yun’s counterclaim and the Bank’s motion to dismiss raised disputed factual issues that were not appropriate for dismissal pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9).

2025Bank of America, N.A. v. Steve S. Yun, 2022 IL App (3d) 210210 . ¶ 24 On May 18, 2022, we reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Yun’s FCRA counterclaim under section 2-619(a)(9), finding that Yun’s counterclaim and the Bank’s motion to dismiss raised disputed factual issues that were not appropriate for dismissal pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9).

2021Rahman, 2016 IL App (2d) 150040, ¶ 44 .

2020Rahman, 2016 IL App (2d) 150040, ¶ 44 .

2018The sole question of law presented for consideration is whether U.S. Bank's payment of postforeclosure sale assessments, several months after purchasing a condominium unit at a judicial foreclosure sale, extinguished the Association's lien for preforeclosure sale assessments, pursuant to section 9(g)(3) of the Condominium Property Act (Act) ( 765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3) (West 2016) ), and as interpreted by 1010 Lake Shore Ass'n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. , 2015 IL 118372 , 398 Ill.Dec. 95 , 43 N.E.3d 1005 .

2018The sole question of law presented for consideration is whether U.S. Bank's payment of postforeclosure sale assessments, several months after purchasing a condominium unit at a judicial foreclosure sale, extinguished the Association's lien for preforeclosure sale assessments, pursuant to section 9(g)(3) of the Condominium Property Act (Act) ( 765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3) (West 2016) ), and as interpreted by 1010 Lake Shore Ass'n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. , 2015 IL 118372 , 398 Ill.Dec. 95 , 43 N.E.3d 1005 .

2014Karbowski cites Illinois Valley Bank v. Newman, 351 Ill. 380 (1933), in support of his contention that the 50-day delay between the execution of the affidavit and the filing of the Bank’s motion precluded the Bank from establishing due diligence in its efforts to locate and serve him.

2014Karbowski cites Illinois Valley Bank v. Newman, 351 Ill. 380 (1933), in support of his contention that the 50-day delay between the execution of the affidavit and the filing of the Bank's motion precluded the Bank from establishing due diligence in its efforts to locate and serve him.

2014In June 2012, the trial court heard, in a single trial, plaintiff’s claim to foreclose its mechanic’s lien, Dukane’s claim against plaintiff for breach of contract, plaintiff’s claim against Dukane for breach of -2- 2014 IL App (2d) 131131 contract, and the Bank’s claim for a setoff against plaintiff for the repair of the retaining wall.

2014In June 2012, the trial court heard, in a single trial, plaintiff’s claim to foreclose its mechanic’s lien, Dukane’s claim against plaintiff for breach of contract, plaintiff’s claim against Dukane for breach of -2- 2014 IL App (2d) 131131 contract, and the Bank’s claim for a setoff against plaintiff for the repair of the retaining wall.

2010The appellate court reversed, holding that guarantors may seek protection under the Sureties Act. 386 Ill.

2010The appellate court reversed, holding that guarantors may seek -2- protection under the Sureties Act. 386 Ill.

1905We think the mere fact that the time of payment had not arrived was not sufficient to put the bank on inquiry or to charge it with notice that the notes had been endorsed to appellant and were unpaid, and to give his claim a preference the bank must have had notice in fact or of circumstances pointing to notice.” The above case is strongly supported by the later case of Mann v. Jummel, 183 Ill. 523 , and Williams v. Jackson, 107 U. S. 478 .

1904We think the mere fact that the time of payment had not arrived, was not sufficient to put the bank on inquiry, or to charge it with notice that the notes had been indorsed to appellant, and were unpaid, and to give his claim a preference the bank must have had notice in fact, or of circumstances pointing to notice.” Williams v. Jackson, 107 U. S. 478 , is very much like the case at bar.

2025CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Lewis, 2014 IL App (1st) 131272, ¶ 31 .

2024Nevertheless, restitution is a viable remedy only “on the reversal of a foreclosure judgment.” Herzog, 2024 IL App (1st) 221467, ¶ 40 .

2022Although they acknowledge that approval of a judicial sale is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, they cite City of Champaign v. Torres, 214 Ill. 2d 234 (2005), for the proposition that we should review de novo whether the circuit court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing because, according to defendants, the issue turns on questions of statutory construction.

2022In sum, Mr. Kasimir’s arguments are that the trial court erred in multiple ways: by not finding that Mr. Kasimir’s allegations that he was approved for a HAMP loan -6- 1-22-0172 modification created a genuine issue of material fact; by finding Mr. Kasimir’s affidavit to be conclusory; and by considering U.S. Bank’s business records affidavit even though it failed to comply with supreme court rules and contained inadmissible hearsay. ¶ 23 Summary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the n

2022Id. ¶ 24 Here, the thrust of Mr. Kasimir’s objections to U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment and arguments in support of his own motion for summary judgment is that he had entered into a HAMP loan modification agreement with J.P.

2021These defendants are not part of this appeal. 2021 IL App (2d) 200099 note and (2) a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when Miriam defaulted on the loan.

2021The court heard arguments on Miriam’s motion for leave and took the matter under advisement with the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. ¶ 16 On October 10, 2019, in a written order, the trial court granted the Bank summary judgment, stating, “In summary analysis, the Court agrees with the [Bank] with regard to both motions. -4- 2021 IL App (2d) 200099 The Motion for Leave concerns a case argued on appeal, involving malpractice claims against previous counsel for the [Bank].

2021PennyMac Corp. v. Colley, 2015 IL App (3d) 140964, ¶ 10 .

2020Id. at 121 . ¶ 13 In this case, Rouie attached the following exhibits in opposition to the Bank’s motion: (i) 2019 tax year property information for the residence showing that it is located in Glenview, Northfield Township; (ii) a certificate of publication signed by Stefanie Sobie stating that Glenview Announcements is published weekly in the township where the real estate is located; (iii) a newspaper article regarding Glenview Announcements’ office closures.

2020ANALYSIS -3- 2020 IL App (2d) 190175 ¶ 9 On appeal, Reinish’s sole argument is that the trial court erred in granting U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment, because there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether U.S. Bank complied with the mortgage contract’s condition precedent that it provide a notice of acceleration.

2020Despite defendants’ contention that U.S. Bank failed to introduce the original note in the circuit court, the record shows that in granting U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment, the circuit court stated that it had “viewed the original note and original mortgage.” By filing a proper complaint with the appropriate documents attached, 1 U.S. Bank established a prima facie case for mortgage foreclosure (See 735 ILCS 5/15– 1504(a), (b) (West 2012); Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380 , ¶ 24) and its complaint was legally and factually sufficient and included allegations relative to standing (Barne

2020Despite defendants’ contention that U.S. Bank failed to introduce the original note in the circuit court, the record shows that in granting U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment, the circuit court stated that it had “viewed the original note and original mortgage.” By filing a proper complaint with the appropriate documents attached, 1 U.S. Bank established a prima facie case for mortgage foreclosure (See 735 ILCS 5/15– 1504(a), (b) (West 2012); Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380 , ¶ 24) and its complaint was legally and factually sufficient and included allegations relative to standing (Barne

2020Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 122481, ¶ 39 . ¶ 29 Since we have no transcript of the hearing after which the court denied the Bank’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, no bystander’s report, and no written findings in the court’s order, we have no basis upon which to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Bank’s motion for leave to amend.

2019First Midwest Bank v. Cobo, 2018 IL 123038, ¶ 42 . 3 This was during the same time period that the defendants were also advising the Bank that the trial court’s ruling on the counterclaim was “illogical” and would be reversed on appeal. -3- have an absolute right to refile a counterclaim even if barred by a statute of limitations.” The defendants thus assured the Bank that the federal district court’s order in the Wisconsin lawsuit would be reversed on appeal.

2019CONCLUSION ¶ 35 For the reasons stated, the decision of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed. ¶ 36 Affirmed. - 14 - 2019 IL App (2d) 190210 No. 2-19-0210 Cite as: First Bank of Highland Park v. Sklarov, 2019 IL App (2d) 190210 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 16-CH- 1548; the Hon.

2019CONCLUSION ¶ 35 For the reasons stated, the decision of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed. ¶ 36 Affirmed. - 14 - 2019 IL App (2d) 190210 No. 2-19-0210 Cite as: First Bank of Highland Park v. Sklarov, 2019 IL App (2d) 190210 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 16-CH- 1548; the Hon.

2016“The note creates the debt secured by the mortgage, but the mortgage is owned by MERSCORP by virtue of the assignment of the mortgage to it, and not by the note holder.” Id. ¶ 45 M&T Bank argues that U.S. Bank’s motion for summary judgment states that before its closing it had constructive notice of the MERS mortgage and actual notice that M&T Bank had the first lien and was required to be paid for a release of that mortgage before U.S. Bank would hold the senior lien.