Bank motion in Maryland

2021Rather, the bank in that case focused on the more salient argument that legislation proposed by a task force to deal with high closing costs should not be construed to apply after the closing. 344 Md. at 581-82 .

2021Rather, the bank in that case focused on the more salient argument that legislation proposed by a task force to deal with high closing costs should not be construed to apply after the closing. 344 Md. at 581-82 .

1975Even so, the measure of its meaning is not a standard of perfection, but an infirmity of purpose so opprobrious or furtive as to be fairly characterized as dishonest in the common speech of men.” This Court in Suburban Properties Management, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455 , 204 A. 2d 326 (1964) stated: “The elements of legal fraud are: (1) that a representation made by a party was false; (2) that either its falsity was known to that party or the misrepresentation was made with such reckless indifference to truth to impute knowledge to him; (3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose

1975Even so, the measure of its meaning is not a standard of perfection, but an infirmity of purpose so opprobrious or furtive as to be fairly characterized as dishonest in the common speech of men.” This Court in Suburban Properties Management, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455 , 204 A. 2d 326 (1964) stated: “The elements of legal fraud are: (1) that a representation made by a party was false; (2) that either its falsity was known to that party or the misrepresentation was made with such reckless indifference to truth to impute knowledge to him; (3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose

2020See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. De La Paz, 418 Md. 534 (2011); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee, 390 Md. 517 (2006). 2 again that he did not need to produce further documents as the Bank’s error was to blame for the overdraft notice.

2016The Court held that expert testimony was required to establish the Bank’s standard of care in such situation, because “we cannot say with any certainty that most people have added someone’s name to their bank accounts[,]” and even if that were the case, “the relevant activity in this case was by the bank itself, not a bank customer.” Id. at 34 , 990 A.2d 1078 .

2016The Court held that expert testimony was required to establish the Bank’s standard of care in such situation, because “we cannot say with any certainty that most people have added someone’s name to their bank accounts[,]” and even if that were the case, “the relevant activity in this case was by the bank itself, not a bank customer.” Id. at 34 , 990 A.2d 1078 .

2011The guardian alleged that the bank had permitted the children’s mother to abuse her status as trustee for the children’s benefit by permitting the mother to withdraw money from accounts at the bank in violation of her fiduciary duties. 304 F.Supp.2d at 697 .

2011The Court, however, determined that the evidence in the Coles case was “more than sufficient to satisfy the element of intimidation under Maryland law.” 374 Md. at 129 , 821 A.2d at 398 .

2011The Court, however, determined that the evidence in the Coles case was “more than sufficient to satisfy the element of intimidation under Maryland law.” 374 Md. at 129 , 821 A.2d at 398 .

2010Referring to Free State Bank & Trust v. Ellis, 45 Md.App. 159 , 411 A.2d 1090 (1980), which wc discuss in this opinion, the trial court stated: Finally, on the issue of expert witnesses, I did read the [Free State] case last evening, and [Free State] doesn’t really come out and say you need an expert.

2010Referring to Free State Bank & Trust v. Ellis, 45 Md.App. 159 , 411 A.2d 1090 (1980), which wc discuss in this opinion, the trial court stated: Finally, on the issue of expert witnesses, I did read the [Free State] case last evening, and [Free State] doesn’t really come out and say you need an expert.

2010Taylor, 269 Md. at 155-56 , 304 A.2d at 841-42 .

2010Taylor, 269 Md. at 155-56 , 304 A.2d at 841-42 .

2005Specifically, she argues that the affidavits and discovery responses she submitted in opposition to the Bank’s motion showed that she spent all or at least some of the tax refunds on “family support” or to satisfy “antecedent debts.” Accordingly, whether there was fair consideration for the transfers was a disputed question of fact that should not have been decided on summary judgment. *320 The Bank responds that the evidence did not generate a genuine dispute of material fact on the issue of fair consideration because the common law doctrine of necessaries (and its statutory counterpart) was

2005Specifically, she argues that the affidavits and discovery responses she submitted in opposition to the Bank’s motion showed that she spent all or at least some of the tax refunds on “family support” or to satisfy “antecedent debts.” Accordingly, whether there was fair consideration for the transfers was a disputed question of fact that should not have been decided on summary judgment. *320 The Bank responds that the evidence did not generate a genuine dispute of material fact on the issue of fair consideration because the common law doctrine of necessaries (and its statutory counterpart) was

1988Ordway, supra, at 240-241 .

1983ORDER The Court having considered the favorable recommendations of the State Board of Law Examiners and the Character Committee for the Sixth Judicial Circuit; and The Court, at a hearing held on October 4, 1983, having heard and considered the petitioner’s arguments in support of the recommendations of the State Board and the Character Committee; and The Court finding that the felony offense of which the petitioner was convicted, namely, attempted armed robbery of a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113 (d) (and involving an exchange of gunfire between the petitioner and a bank guard), to be a

1983ORDER The Court having considered the favorable recommendations of the State Board of Law Examiners and the Character Committee for the Sixth Judicial Circuit; and The Court, at a hearing held on October 4, 1983, having heard and considered the petitioner’s arguments in support of the recommendations of the State Board and the Character Committee; and The Court finding that the felony offense of which the petitioner was convicted, namely, attempted armed robbery of a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113 (d) (and involving an exchange of gunfire between the petitioner and a bank guard), to be a

1980“The trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for directed verdict where Ellis failed to introduce evidence of the commercially reasonable standard of care to which the Bank was held.” The Bank, in its argument, seeks to have us adopt a rule that expert testimony is required in order to establish a negligent deviation from the “commercially reasonable standard” against which the Bank’s actions are to be measured, citing, Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972); Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156 , 277 A.2d 67 (1971); Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Genda, 255 Md. 616 , 258 A.2d 5

1980“The trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for directed verdict where Ellis failed to introduce evidence of the commercially reasonable standard of care to which the Bank was held.” The Bank, in its argument, seeks to have us adopt a rule that expert testimony is required in order to establish a negligent deviation from the “commercially reasonable standard” against which the Bank’s actions are to be measured, citing, Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972); Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156 , 277 A.2d 67 (1971); Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Genda, 255 Md. 616 , 258 A.2d 5

1980If they intend to rely upon the bond, which was a Bank requirement to loaning them money, they are at the very least charged with the terms of the agreement which appear upon its face, and that includes the phrase found to have been ambiguous by the trial judge, which ambiguity was sufficient to put them upon inquiry ( Regester, supra).

1980“The trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for directed verdict where Ellis failed to introduce evidence of the commercially reasonable standard of care to which the Bank was held.” The Bank, in its argument, seeks to have us adopt a rule that expert testimony is required in order to establish a negligent deviation from the “commercially reasonable standard” against which the Bank’s actions are to be measured, citing, Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972); Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156 , 277 A.2d 67 (1971); Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Genda, 255 Md. 616 , 258 A.2d 5

1980“The trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for directed verdict where Ellis failed to introduce evidence of the commercially reasonable standard of care to which the Bank was held.” The Bank, in its argument, seeks to have us adopt a rule that expert testimony is required in order to establish a negligent deviation from the “commercially reasonable standard” against which the Bank’s actions are to be measured, citing, Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972); Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156 , 277 A.2d 67 (1971); Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Genda, 255 Md. 616 , 258 A.2d 5

1980“The trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for directed verdict where Ellis failed to introduce evidence of the commercially reasonable standard of care to which the Bank was held.” The Bank, in its argument, seeks to have us adopt a rule that expert testimony is required in order to establish a negligent deviation from the “commercially reasonable standard” against which the Bank’s actions are to be measured, citing, Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972); Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156 , 277 A.2d 67 (1971); Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Genda, 255 Md. 616 , 258 A.2d 5

1980“The trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for directed verdict where Ellis failed to introduce evidence of the commercially reasonable standard of care to which the Bank was held.” The Bank, in its argument, seeks to have us adopt a rule that expert testimony is required in order to establish a negligent deviation from the “commercially reasonable standard” against which the Bank’s actions are to be measured, citing, Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972); Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156 , 277 A.2d 67 (1971); Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Genda, 255 Md. 616 , 258 A.2d 5

1980“The trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for directed verdict where Ellis failed to introduce evidence of the commercially reasonable standard of care to which the Bank was held.” The Bank, in its argument, seeks to have us adopt a rule that expert testimony is required in order to establish a negligent deviation from the “commercially reasonable standard” against which the Bank’s actions are to be measured, citing, Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972); Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156 , 277 A.2d 67 (1971); Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Genda, 255 Md. 616 , 258 A.2d 5

1980“The trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for directed verdict where Ellis failed to introduce evidence of the commercially reasonable standard of care to which the Bank was held.” The Bank, in its argument, seeks to have us adopt a rule that expert testimony is required in order to establish a negligent deviation from the “commercially reasonable standard” against which the Bank’s actions are to be measured, citing, Crockett v. Crothers, 264 Md. 222 , 285 A.2d 612 (1972); Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156 , 277 A.2d 67 (1971); Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Genda, 255 Md. 616 , 258 A.2d 5

1940Set-off was denied and the petition dismissed by the Circuit Court of Appeals ( 278 Fed. 509 ).

1934Cohen v. Karp, supra; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Poe, 147 Md. 508 , 128 A. 465 ; 57 C.