17 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1894–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mladineo v. Schmidtgreen2 sentences2011See Mladineo v. Schmidt, 52 So.3d 1154, 1163 (Miss.2010) (distinguishing between claims based on misrepresentations that would have been clarified by reading the policy and claims based on misrepresentations that a particular type of coverage was not needed). ¶ 30. 2011See Mladineo v. Schmidt, 52 So.3d 1154, 1163 (Miss.2010) (distinguishing between claims based on misrepresentations that would have been clarified by reading the policy and claims based on misrepresentations that a particular type of coverage was not needed). ¶ 30. | 2 | 2 |
EAST MISSISSIPPI STATE HOSP. v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2008Furthermore, Holland contends that the Bank was dilatory in filing its motion and that such delay should be held to constitute a waiver of claims by the Bank (citing East Mississippi State Hospital v. Adams, 947 So.2d 887, 891 (Miss.2007) (failure to timely pursue affirmative defense, together with active participation in the litigation, served as a waiver of the affirmative defense)). 2007Furthermore, Holland contends that the Bank was dilatory in filing its motion and that such delay should be held to constitute a waiver of claims by the Bank (citing East Mississippi State Hospital v. Adams, 947 So. 2d 887, 891 (Miss. 2007) (failure to timely pursue affirmative defense, together with active participation in the litigation, served as a waiver of the affirmative defense)). | 2 | 2 |
Cindy Henderson v. Copper Ridge Homes, LLCgreen1 sentence2025Id. at 752-53 (¶ 10). ¶19. | 1 | 1 |
Kravetz v. United States Trust Co.green1 sentence2018An application of the law to this case reflects that the language of the offering circulars, containing the federally required notice of purchaser restrictions with reference to publicly available federal law, was sufficient to put the Bank on inquiry notice that "[it] should carefully investigate the materials that suggest that a cause probably or potentially exists." See First Trust , 220 F.3d at 336-37 ; Kravetz , 941 F.Supp. at 1308 (determining that even where a fiduciary relationship was alleged, investors were imputed with knowledge of investment materials for purposes of determining wh | 1 | 1 |
Weathers v. Metropolitan Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2018An application of the law to this case reflects that the language of the offering circulars, containing the federally required notice of purchaser restrictions with reference to publicly available federal law, was sufficient to put the Bank on inquiry notice that “[it] should carefully investigate the materials that suggest that a cause probably or potentially exists.” See First Trust, 220 F.3d at 336-37 ; Kravetz, 941 F. Supp. at 1308 (determining that even where a fiduciary relationship was alleged, investors were imputed with knowledge of investment materials for purposes of determining whe 2018An application of the law to this case reflects that the language of the offering circulars, containing the federally required notice of purchaser restrictions with reference to publicly available federal law, was sufficient to put the Bank on inquiry notice that "[it] should carefully investigate the materials that suggest that a cause probably or potentially exists." See First Trust , 220 F.3d at 336-37 ; Kravetz , 941 F.Supp. at 1308 (determining that even where a fiduciary relationship was alleged, investors were imputed with knowledge of investment materials for purposes of determining wh | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Hernando Bankgreen2 sentences1995Jones v. Hernando Bank, 194 Miss. 474 , 13 So.2d 31 (1943) states, "[A] mistake of fact purges the transaction of usury, whereas a mistake as to the legal effect of a purposeful act is a mistake of law and the actor is bound by the result." Jones, 194 Miss. 474 , 13 So.2d at 32 (emphasis added). 1995Jones v. Hernando Bank, 194 Miss. 474 , 13 So.2d 31 (1943) states, "[A] mistake of fact purges the transaction of usury, whereas a mistake as to the legal effect of a purposeful act is a mistake of law and the actor is bound by the result." Jones, 194 Miss. 474 , 13 So.2d at 32 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Huff v. Polkgreen1 sentence1992See Rules 26(f)(1) and 37(b)(2)(B), Miss.R.Civ.P.; Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1367-68 (Miss. 1990); Ladner v. Ladner, 436 So.2d 1366, 1372 (Miss. 1983); Huff v. Polk, 408 So.2d 1368, 1370 (Miss. 1982); Square D Co. v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327, 1328-29 (Miss. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Ladner v. Ladnergreen1 sentence1992See Rules 26(f)(1) and 37(b)(2)(B), Miss.R.Civ.P.; Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1367-68 (Miss. 1990); Ladner v. Ladner, 436 So.2d 1366, 1372 (Miss. 1983); Huff v. Polk, 408 So.2d 1368, 1370 (Miss. 1982); Square D Co. v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327, 1328-29 (Miss. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Square D Co. v. Edwardsgreen1 sentence1992See Rules 26(f)(1) and 37(b)(2)(B), Miss.R.Civ.P.; Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1367-68 (Miss. 1990); Ladner v. Ladner, 436 So.2d 1366, 1372 (Miss. 1983); Huff v. Polk, 408 So.2d 1368, 1370 (Miss. 1982); Square D Co. v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327, 1328-29 (Miss. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc.green1 sentence1992See Rules 26(f)(1) and 37(b)(2)(B), Miss.R.Civ.P.; Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1367-68 (Miss. 1990); Ladner v. Ladner, 436 So.2d 1366, 1372 (Miss. 1983); Huff v. Polk, 408 So.2d 1368, 1370 (Miss. 1982); Square D Co. v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327, 1328-29 (Miss. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co.
green
2 sentences2008Judge Lee relied on Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So.2d 259 (Miss. 1999), as the basis for his reconsideration of Judge Coleman’s previous denial of the Bank’s motion for summary judgment insomuch as Maude stood for the premise that a denial of summary judgment is not a final judgment on the merits, nor is it binding upon successor courts. 2007Judge Lee relied on Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So. 2d 259 (Miss. 1999), as the basis for his reconsideration of Judge Coleman’s previous denial of the Bank’s motion for summary judgment insomuch as Mauck stood for the premise that a denial of summary judgment is not a final judgment on the merits, nor is it binding upon successor courts. | 2 | 2007–2008 |
AUSTIN DEVELOPMENT v. Bank of Meridian
green
2 sentences2008The trial court cited Austin Development Co., Inc. v. Bank of Meridian, 569 So.2d 1209 (Miss.1990) in support of its granting the Bank’s motion for summary judgment on this issue. 2007The trial court cited Austin Development Co., Inc. v. Bank of Meridian, 569 So. 2d 1209 (Miss. 1990) in support of its granting the Bank’s motion for summary judgment on this issue. | 2 | 2007–2008 |
Chassaniol v. Bank of Kilmichael
green
2 sentences2006Id. 2004Id. | 2 | 2004–2006 |
Levy v. McMullen
green
2 sentences1999The Slighs cite Levy v. McMullen, 169 Miss. 659 , 152 So. 899 (Miss.1934), for the proposition that even if the bank only knew that Lorance was an occasional drinker, that knowledge amounts to actual knowledge sufficient to put the bank on inquiry which would have led to full knowledge of his general reputation as an habitual drunkard. ¶ 48. 1999The Slighs cite Levy v. McMullen, 169 Miss. 659 , 152 So. 899 (Miss.1934), for the proposition that even if the bank only knew that Lorance was an occasional drinker, that knowledge amounts to actual knowledge sufficient to put the bank on inquiry which would have led to full knowledge of his general reputation as an habitual drunkard. ¶ 48. | 2 | 1997–1999 |
Hudson v. Bank of Edwards
green
1 sentence2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
First Trust National Association, as Indenture Trustee v. First National Bank of Commerce
green
2 sentences2018An application of the law to this case reflects that the language of the offering circulars, containing the federally required notice of purchaser restrictions with reference to publicly available federal law, was sufficient to put the Bank on inquiry notice that “[it] should carefully investigate the materials that suggest that a cause probably or potentially exists.” See First Trust, 220 F.3d at 336-37 ; Kravetz, 941 F. Supp. at 1308 (determining that even where a fiduciary relationship was alleged, investors were imputed with knowledge of investment materials for purposes of determining whe 2018An application of the law to this case reflects that the language of the offering circulars, containing the federally required notice of purchaser restrictions with reference to publicly available federal law, was sufficient to put the Bank on inquiry notice that "[it] should carefully investigate the materials that suggest that a cause probably or potentially exists." See First Trust , 220 F.3d at 336-37 ; Kravetz , 941 F.Supp. at 1308 (determining that even where a fiduciary relationship was alleged, investors were imputed with knowledge of investment materials for purposes of determining wh | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Smith v. Franklin Custodian Funds, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015As such, this Court finds that the trial court improperly denied the Bank’s motion for summary judgment on this issue, finding Smith, supra, to be controlling. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A.
green
1 sentence2013Borowski, 579 N.W.2d at 251 . ¶ 13. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Sunflower Compress Co. v. Clark
neutral
1 sentence1952The appellant cites the case of Sunflower Compress Company v. Clark, 165 Miss. 219 , 144 So 477, 145 So. 617 , in support of his contention that a reasonable time for presentment of a check on a bank where the person receiving- the same and the bank on which it is drawn are in the same community is not later than the next business day after it is received. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Merchants & Planters Bank v. Clifton Mfg. Co.
green
1 sentence1952Co., 56 S. C. 320, 33 S. E. 750 , the Court held that a check drawn on Christmas Eve does not become stale in six days, so as to put the bank on inquiry upon its presentation at the end of that period. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
National Bank v. Whitney
green
1 sentence1894In Bank v. Matthews, 90 U. S., it was held that, though the act under which the bank was incorporated prohibited it from accepting real estate as security for a loan to be made, yet that a mortgage executed to the bank in violation of the act was valid, and might be enforced by the bank; and to the same effect are Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S., 99 , and Fritts v. Palmer, 132 Ib., 282. | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.