Bank motion in Missouri

2024See also First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 222 (explaining the judgment was not eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b) because “[t]he Bank’s claim for declaratory judgment (which the judgment resolves) and the Banks’ claim for money damages due to the Bank’s alleged slander of title (which the judgment does not resolve) arise out of the same transaction or occurrence”).

2020See also First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 222 (explaining the judgment was not eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b) because “[t]he Bank’s claim for declaratory judgment of a “judicial unit” because it was “a ruling on some of several issues arising out of the same transaction or occurrence which does not dispose of the claim.” Buemi and Ndegwa are correct in holding that neither of the orders was eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b), but the language in these cases is at least imprecise.

2024Bilyeu v. Vaill, 349 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (citing Butler v. Tippee Canoe Club, 943 S.W.2d 8323 , 324 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997)) (“Citing to their own First Amended Petition, albeit verified, in support of their statement of uncontroverted fact, was insufficient for Respondents to prove their assertions in the present matter.”); see also Martin v. City of Washington, 848 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Mo. banc 1993) (“The purpose of summary judgment is to move the parties beyond the bare allegations in their pleadings and to determine if a dispute in fact exists for trial.”). 7 Although Rule 74.04

2024Bilyeu v. Vaill, 349 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (citing Butler v. Tippee Canoe Club, 943 S.W.2d 8323 , 324 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997)) (“Citing to their own First Amended Petition, albeit verified, in support of their statement of uncontroverted fact, was insufficient for Respondents to prove their assertions in the present matter.”); see also Martin v. City of Washington, 848 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Mo. banc 1993) (“The purpose of summary judgment is to move the parties beyond the bare allegations in their pleadings and to determine if a dispute in fact exists for trial.”). 7 Although Rule 74.04

2019See Snelling v. Reliance Auto., Inc., 144 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004).

2019This Court’s decision in Plasmeier v. George controls. 575 S.W.3d 485 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).

2019See Plasmeier, 575 S.W.3d at 487 .

2017Jamestowne Homeowners Ass’n Trustees v. Jackson, 417 S.W.3d 348, 359-60 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013); Rx Recalls, Inc. v. Devos Ltd., 317 S.W.3d 95, 96-97 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010).

2017Jamestowne Homeowners Ass’n Trustees v. Jackson, 417 S.W.3d 348, 359-60 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013); Rx Recalls, Inc. v. Devos Ltd., 317 S.W.3d 95, 96-97 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010).

2014With respect to the first issue, “[t]here is no doubt that any default in the performance of a contract may be waived.” Donahue v. State, 655 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Mo.App.1983).

2014With respect to the first issue, “[t]here is no doubt that any default in the performance of a contract may be waived.” Donahue v. State, 655 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Mo. App. 1983).

2012Rule 72.01(a) requires a motion for a directed verdict to “state the specific grounds therefore.” If a motion for directed verdict fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 72.01(a), then it “neither presents a basis for relief in the trial court nor preserves the issue in the appellate court.” Howard v. City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 790 (Mo. banc 2011); see also Pope v. Pope, 179 S.W.3d 442, 451 (Mo.App.2005) (en banc); Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155, 163-64 (Mo.App.1997) (en banc).

2012Analysis In Point One, the Bank argues that the trial court “erred in denying the Bank’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the Missouri Credit Agreement Act bars Plaintiffs’ contract and tort claims in that the purported written credit agreement on which Plaintiffs sued did not provide for the payment of interest or set forth the relevant terms and conditions.” “When the grant or denial of a directed verdict or a JNOV is based upon a matter of law ... we review the trial court’s decision de novo.” Trinity Lutheran Church v. Lipps, 68 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Mo.App.

2012The Bank’s argument is that statute of frauds, Section 432.010, barred Bailey’s claim because, inter alia, the “Loan Summary, which clearly contemplated a five year term, could not be completed in one year and was thus subject to the writing and signature requirement of Section 432.010.” But Missouri law is clear that the statute of frauds defense is inapplicable if the agreement was “capable of being performed within one year.” Adams v. One Park Place Investors, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 742, 748 (Mo.App.

2012In Point Four, the Bank argues that the “trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Bailey and Briggs failed to make a submissible case on their negligent misrepresentation claims in that, as a matter of law, the identified representations were non-actionable statements of future intent, were true when offered, and Briggs failed to establish reliance or show damages therefrom.” The Eastern District recently outlined the following applicable law: “The purpose of motions for directed verdict and JNOV is to ‘challenge the submissibility of the

2012In Point Four, the Bank argues that the “trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Bailey and Briggs failed to make a submissible case on their negligent misrepresentation claims in that, as a matter of law, the identified representations were non-actionable statements of future intent, were true when offered, and Briggs failed to establish reliance or show damages therefrom.” The Eastern District recently outlined the following applicable law: “The purpose of motions for directed verdict and JNOV is to ‘challenge the submissibility of the

2012In Point Four, the Bank argues that the “trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Bailey and Briggs failed to make a submissible case on their negligent misrepresentation claims in that, as a matter of law, the identified representations were non-actionable statements of future intent, were true when offered, and Briggs failed to establish reliance or show damages therefrom.” The Eastern District recently outlined the following applicable law: “The purpose of motions for directed verdict and JNOV is to ‘challenge the submissibility of the

2012In Point Four, the Bank argues that the “trial court erred in denying the Bank’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Bailey and Briggs failed to make a submissible case on their negligent misrepresentation claims in that, as a matter of law, the identified representations were non-actionable statements of future intent, were true when offered, and Briggs failed to establish reliance or show damages therefrom.” The Eastern District recently outlined the following applicable law: “The purpose of motions for directed verdict and JNOV is to ‘challenge the submissibility of the

2012Rule 72.01(a) requires a motion for a directed verdict to “state the specific grounds therefore.” If a motion for directed verdict fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 72.01(a), then it “neither presents a basis for relief in the trial court nor preserves the issue in the appellate court.” Howard v. City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 790 (Mo. banc 2011); see also Pope v. Pope, 179 S.W.3d 442, 451 (Mo.App.2005) (en banc); Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155, 163-64 (Mo.App.1997) (en banc).

2012Rule 72.01(a) requires a motion for a directed verdict to “state the specific grounds therefore.” If a motion for directed verdict fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 72.01(a), then it “neither presents a basis for relief in the trial court nor preserves the issue in the appellate court.” Howard v. City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 790 (Mo. banc 2011); see also Pope v. Pope, 179 S.W.3d 442, 451 (Mo.App.2005) (en banc); Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155, 163-64 (Mo.App.1997) (en banc).

2011See Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Mincks, 135 S.W.3d 545, 548 (Mo.App.

2005Co. of N.Y. v. Traders Gate City Nat’l Bank of Kansas City, Mo., 239 Mo.App. 132 , 186 S.W.2d 491, 497 (1945).

2005Co. of N.Y. v. Traders Gate City Nat’l Bank of Kansas City, Mo., 239 Mo.App. 132 , 186 S.W.2d 491, 497 (1945).

2005See Treon, 926 S.W.2d at 15 ; Walsh, 822 S.W.2d at 563 .

1999With respect to this argument, we are guided by Koenig , wherein the trial court borrowed the language of Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 46 (1st Cir.1988) 9 in admonishing trial courts about routinely entering Rule 74.01(b) certification: To entertain an early appeal just because reversal of a ruling made by the district court might transpire and might *789 expedite a particular appellant’s case would defoliate Rule 54(b)’s protective copse.

1990The fact that the first action involved a defendant who was not a party in the second action and the fact that the second action has three additional defendants not sued in the first action do not deprive the bank of its defense of res judicata. “[0]ne who has had his day in court may not reopen the identical issues by merely adding new parties who are unnecessary to the determination of those issues.” Reis v. LaPresto, 324 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Mo.1959).