Bank motion in Alabama

13 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

Case	Followed	Cited
George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reidgreen scotus · 1968 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003See George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288 , 88 S.Ct. 1978 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1968) (the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not enure to the benefit of any organization such as a corporation). 2003See George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288 , 88 S.Ct. 1978 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1968) (the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not enure to the benefit of any organization such as a corporation).	2	2
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Jones, Morrison & Womack, P.C.green ala · 2010 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 1 sentence 2010Part I.B.I, of the main opinion concerns the Bank's claim "that the lawyers wrongly identified [Brewton Neal] Greene as a guarantor of the LCCI debt and thereby wrongly caused Greene to be made a defendant in the Bank's collection action." 42 So.3d at 681.	1	1
Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen by Millergreen ala · 1994 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010In Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196 (Ala.2006), this 691 Court stated: "`[W]e do not review a trial court's denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.'" 953 So.2d at 1205 (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala. 2003), and citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); and Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281 , 1283-84 (11th Cir.2001)). 2010*In Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196 (Ala.2006), this Court stated: “ ‘[W]e do not review a trial court’s denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.’ ” 953 So.2d at 1205 (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala.2003), and citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); and Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281 , 1283-84 (11th Cir.2001)).	1	1
Mitchell v. Folmar & Associates, LLPgreen ala · 2003 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010In Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196 (Ala.2006), this 691 Court stated: "`[W]e do not review a trial court's denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.'" 953 So.2d at 1205 (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala. 2003), and citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); and Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281 , 1283-84 (11th Cir.2001)). 2010*In Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196 (Ala.2006), this Court stated: “ ‘[W]e do not review a trial court’s denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.’ ” 953 So.2d at 1205 (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala.2003), and citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); and Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281 , 1283-84 (11th Cir.2001)).	1	1
Tonsmeire v. AmSouth Bankgreen ala · 1995 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 1 sentence 2010See Tonsmeire, supra; Valentine, supra. As to the Bank’s claim against the lawyers relating to the sworn statement of account, the JML is affirmed. 2.	1	1
Skach v. Geegreen illappct · 1985 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010In reaching its conclusion the Skach court relied primarily on the fact that the "[p]laintiffs presented all the evidence available to them." 137 Ill.App.3d at 221 , 484 N.E.2d at 444 , 91 Ill.Dec. at 885 . [17] As noted, the JML is affirmed as to the Bank's claim that the lawyers breached the standard of care in preparing the sworn statement of account and subsequently relying on it after the Bank had signed it. 2010In reaching its conclusion the Skach court relied primarily on the fact that the "[p]laintiffs presented all the evidence available to them." 137 Ill.App.3d at 221 , 484 N.E.2d at 444 , 91 Ill.Dec. at 885 . [17] As noted, the JML is affirmed as to the Bank's claim that the lawyers breached the standard of care in preparing the sworn statement of account and subsequently relying on it after the Bank had signed it.	1	1
Adkison v. Thompsongreen ala · 1994 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006If its answer is " `liberally construed,'" the Bank argues, the pleading "more than sufficiently gives notice that [it] intended to rely on section 7-4-406(f)." Bank's brief, at 35-36 (quoting Adkison v. Thompson, 650 So.2d 859 , 862 (Ala. 1994) ("Under modern rules of civil procedure, pleadings are to be liberally construed in favor of the pleader; the primary purpose of pleading is to give fair notice to adverse parties of a claim against them.")). 2006If its answer is " `liberally construed,'" the Bank argues, the pleading "more than sufficiently gives notice that [it] intended to rely on section 7-4-406(f)." Bank's brief, at 35-36 (quoting Adkison v. Thompson, 650 So.2d 859 , 862 (Ala. 1994) ("Under modern rules of civil procedure, pleadings are to be liberally construed in favor of the pleader; the primary purpose of pleading is to give fair notice to adverse parties of a claim against them.")).	1	1
Knight v. Beverly H. C. Bay Manor H. C. Ctr.green ala · 2001 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003See note 7. [4] "Under the [detinue] statute and the facts of this case," the Bank argues, "the appropriate period of time [on which to base an interest calculation] would be five days.." The Bank's brief, at 63 (emphasis added). [5] In that connection, "[t]his Court [has] held that in order for a judge to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury as the trier of fact, the judge must be satisfied by substantial evidence." Knight v. Beverly Health Care Bay Manor Health Care Ctr., 820 So.2d 92 , 100 n. 5 (Ala.2001). 2003"Then, the jury must be satisfied that the plaintiff has presented clear and convincing evidence to support the punitive damages award." Id.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (15)

Case	Cited	Years
Ex Parte Baugh green ala · 1988 2 sentences 2003Judge Price commented that the Bank defendants would be able to pursue discovery against Sullivan and Ebbers "at some time" because other discovery in the RSA litigation could be conducted in the meantime and "there is a lot of discovery to go on before then . . . before you get to Sullivan and Ebbers." In their petition to this Court, the Bank defendants contend that Baugh , supra, stands for the proposition that the reason for staying civil proceedings as to all parties, as opposed to only the party facing criminal proceedings, is to avoid placing Page 798 another party in the civil suit "i 2003*Judge Price commented that the Bank defendants would be able to pursue discovery against Sullivan and Ebbers “at some time” because other discovery in the RSA litigation could be conducted in the meantime and “there is a lot of discovery to go on before then ... before you get to Sullivan and Ebbers.” In their petition to this Court, the Bank defendants contend that Baugh, supra, stands for the proposition that the reason for staying civil proceedings as to all parties, as opposed to only the party facing criminal proceedings, is to avoid placing another party in the civil suit “in the posture	2	2003–2003
Folks v. Tuscaloosa County Credit Union green alacivapp · 2007 1 sentence 2025The trial court de facto barred the Bank from recovering the deficiency from Rylee without citing any legal authority indicating why Rylee was entitled to a complete bar against the Bank's ability to recover the deficiency from him. 8 CL-2025-0052 Citing Folks v. Tuscaloosa County Credit Union, 989 So. 2d 531 (Ala. Civ.	1	2025–2025
Michelle Lind v. United Parcel Service, Inc. green ca11 · 2001 2 sentences 2010In Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196 (Ala.2006), this 691 Court stated: "`[W]e do not review a trial court's denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.'" 953 So.2d at 1205 (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala. 2003), and citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); and Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281 , 1283-84 (11th Cir.2001)). 2010*In Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196 (Ala.2006), this Court stated: “ ‘[W]e do not review a trial court’s denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.’ ” 953 So.2d at 1205 (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala.2003), and citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); and Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281 , 1283-84 (11th Cir.2001)).	1	2010–2010
Beiersdoerfer v. HILB, ROGAL AND HAMILTON green ala · 2006 2 sentences 2010In Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196 (Ala.2006), this Court stated: “ ‘[W]e do not review a trial court’s denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.’ ” 953 So.2d at 1205 (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala.2003), and citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); and Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281 , 1283-84 (11th Cir.2001)). 2010In Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196 (Ala.2006), this Court stated: “ ‘[W]e do not review a trial court’s denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.’ ” 953 So.2d at 1205 (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala.2003), and citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); and Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281 , 1283-84 (11th Cir.2001)).	1	2010–2010
Grayson v. Hanson green ala · 2002 2 sentences 2010In Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196 (Ala.2006), this 691 Court stated: "`[W]e do not review a trial court's denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.'" 953 So.2d at 1205 (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala. 2003), and citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); and Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281 , 1283-84 (11th Cir.2001)). 2010*In Beiersdoerfer v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 953 So.2d 1196 (Ala.2006), this Court stated: “ ‘[W]e do not review a trial court’s denial of a summary-judgment motion following a trial on the merits.’ ” 953 So.2d at 1205 (quoting Mitchell v. Folmar & Assocs., LLP, 854 So.2d 1115, 1116 (Ala.2003), and citing Grayson v. Hanson, 843 So.2d 146 (Ala.2002); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.1994); and Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281 , 1283-84 (11th Cir.2001)).	1	2010–2010
Valentine v. Watters green ala · 2004 2 sentences 2010See Tonsmeire, supra; Valentine, supra. As to the Bank’s claim against the lawyers relating to the sworn statement of account, the JML is affirmed. 2. 2010In that regard, the Bank’s claim against Jones Morrison for its delay is analogous to the claims against the attorney in Valentine, 896 So.2d at 392 , in which this Court, in examining the similarities between establishing a breach of the applicable standard of care under the ALSLA for legal-malpractice actions and under the AMLA for medical-malpractice actions, stated: “Recently, this Court in Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., [ 851 So.2d 33 (Ala.2002)], stated that it was obvious that expert testimony was not needed to support a claim that nurses had breached the standard of care in failing to res	1	2010–2010
Ex Parte HealthSouth Corp. green ala · 2002 2 sentences 2010In that regard, the Bank’s claim against Jones Morrison for its delay is analogous to the claims against the attorney in Valentine, 896 So.2d at 392 , in which this Court, in examining the similarities between establishing a breach of the applicable standard of care under the ALSLA for legal-malpractice actions and under the AMLA for medical-malpractice actions, stated: “Recently, this Court in Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., [ 851 So.2d 33 (Ala.2002)], stated that it was obvious that expert testimony was not needed to support a claim that nurses had breached the standard of care in failing to res 2010In that regard, the Bank’s claim against Jones Morrison for its delay is analogous to the claims against the attorney in Valentine, 896 So.2d at 392 , in which this Court, in examining the similarities between establishing a breach of the applicable standard of care under the ALSLA for legal-malpractice actions and under the AMLA for medical-malpractice actions, stated: “Recently, this Court in Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., [ 851 So.2d 33 (Ala.2002)], stated that it was obvious that expert testimony was not needed to support a claim that nurses had breached the standard of care in failing to res	1	2010–2010
Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Wallace green alacivapp · 1973 2 sentences 2003Thus, relying on Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Wallace, 49 Ala.App. 308 , 271 So.2d 505 (Ala.Civ.App.1973), the Bank argues that nothing that transpires between the plaintiff and the defendant after the date of the alleged conversion is relevant to the plaintiff's conversion claim. 2003Thus, relying on Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Wallace, 49 Ala.App. 308 , 271 So.2d 505 (Ala.Civ.App.1973), the Bank argues that nothing that transpires between the plaintiff and the defendant after the date of the alleged conversion is relevant to the plaintiff's conversion claim.	1	2003–2003
Gossett v. Twin County Cable TV, Inc. green ala · 1992 1 sentence 2002Gossett v. Twin County Cable TV, Inc ., 594 So.2d 635 , 638 (Ala. 1992).	1	2002–2002
Foshee v. GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF SOUTHEAST green ala · 1975 2 sentences 1993The essence of the theory of money had and received was set out by our supreme court in Foshee v. General Telephone Co. of the Southeast , 295 Ala. 70 , 322 So.2d 715 (1975). 1993The essence of the theory of money had and received was set out by our supreme court in Foshee v. General Telephone Co. of the Southeast , 295 Ala. 70 , 322 So.2d 715 (1975).	1	1993–1993
Wood v. Benedictine Soc. of Alabama, Inc. green ala · 1988 1 sentence 1992"The trial judge has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for continuance." Wood v. Benedictine Society of Alabama, Inc. , 530 So.2d 801 , 805 (Ala. 1988) (citations omitted).	1	1992–1992
Valley Min. Corp., Inc. v. Metro Bank green ala · 1980 1 sentence 1983Because the applicable legal principles are set forth in the Court of Civil Appeals' *418 opinion on the first appeal of this case, citing Valley Mining Corporation, Inc., supra, no lengthy discussion of the issues raised on this appeal is necessary.	1	1983–1983
Foster v. State neutral ala · 1889 1 sentence 1979Foster v. State , 88 Ala. 182 , 7 So. 185 (1890).	1	1979–1979
VERNON CARPET MILLS INC. v. Rossville Spinning Corp. green ala · 1977 1 sentence 1979Vernon Carpet Mills v. Rossville Spinning Corp., 344 So.2d 1205 (Ala.1977).	1	1979–1979
Miles v. Bank of Heflin green ala · 1975 2 sentences 1977In the second case, Miles v. Bank of Heflin , 295 Ala. 286 , 328 So.2d 281 (1975), this court held that the trial court erred in granting the Bank's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the stockholders' counterclaim seeking the 10% statutory penalty provided for in Title 10, § 21 (46) Code. 1977In the second case, Miles v. Bank of Heflin , 295 Ala. 286 , 328 So.2d 281 (1975), this court held that the trial court erred in granting the Bank's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the stockholders' counterclaim seeking the 10% statutory penalty provided for in Title 10, § 21 (46) Code.	1	1977–1977

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AL § Ala. Code § 7-9-507 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 114 (1919–2024) CA 72 (1935–2026) NY 67 (1903–2026) IL 62 (1898–2025) FL 45 (1932–2026) GA 38 (1855–2024) PA 33 (1837–2026) MO 30 (1899–2024) IN 24 (1892–2023) OH 20 (1905–2025) MS 17 (1894–2025) MD 17 (1934–2021) OK 16 (1908–2020) ND 16 (1916–2016) LA 15 (1901–2018) WI 14 (1864–2024) AZ 14 (1970–2022) HI 13 (1919–2025) TN 13 (1970–2026) AL 13 (1977–2025) NM 13 (1979–2021) IA 13 (1900–2021) SC 13 (1925–2022) ME 12 (1997–2020) NJ 12 (1955–2026) ID 11 (1921–2024) AR 11 (1913–2019) KS 10 (1915–2020) OR 10 (1891–1995) MT 10 (1971–2021) NE 8 (1903–2025) WA 8 (1899–2023) SD 7 (1964–2015) MA 7 (1973–2017) MN 7 (1910–1989) UT 6 (1998–2022) NC 6 (1979–2016) KY 6 (1919–2026) WY 5 (1926–2025) CO 5 (1979–2011) VA 4 (1929–2025) CT 4 (1988–2022) AK 4 (1980–2022) WV 4 (1925–1996) DC 3 (1988–2021) RI 3 (1994–2016) DE 2 (2014–2020) VT 2 (1966–2002) NH 2 (1987–1998) MI 2 (2000–2014)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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