32 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Toddgreen2 sentences2024Regardless of whether the order was temporary or final, the supreme court has held that when determining whether to modify child custody, “[a] chancellor must allow full and complete proof with respect to all circumstances and conditions directly or indirectly related to the care and custody of the children, existing at the time of the original divorce decree [or custody order] and at the time of the modification hearing.” Smith v. Todd, 464 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Miss. 1985); see Powell v. Powell, 976 So. 2d 358, 363 (¶21) (Miss. 2021This court relied on Smith v. Todd, 464 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Miss. 1985), where the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that [i]n considering modification of child custody, the chancellor must allow full and complete proof with respect to all circumstances and conditions directly or indirectly related to the care and custody of the children, existing at the time of the original divorce decree and at the time of the modification hearing. ¶46. | 6 | 6 |
McGehee v. Upchurchgreen2 sentences2003McGehee v. Upchurch, 733 So.2d 364, 369 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). 2002McGehee v. Upchurch, 733 So.2d 364, 369 (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Lee v. Leegreen2 sentences2003Julie argues that while less factors weighed in her favor, these factors are "not the equivalent of a mathematical formula" and are "not an exact science." Lee v. Lee, 798 So.2d 1284, 1287 (Miss.2001). "[T]he chancellor must allow full and complete proof with respect to all circumstances and conditions directly or indirectly related to the care and custody of the children, existing at the time of the original divorce decree and at the time of the modification hearing." Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss. 1985) (citing Marascalco, 445 So.2d at 1382 ). 2002Julie argues that while less factors weighed in her favor, these factors are “not the equivalent of a mathematical formula” and are “ not an exact science.” Lee v. Lee, 798 So.2d 1284, 1287 (Miss. 2001). “[T]he chancellor must allow full and complete proof with respect to all circumstances and conditions directly or indirectly related to the care and custody of the children, existing at the time of the original divorce decree and at the time of the modification hearing.” Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss. 1985) (citing Marascalco, 445 So.2d at 1382 ). | 2 | 2 |
Marascalco v. Marascalcogreen2 sentences2003Julie argues that while less factors weighed in her favor, these factors are "not the equivalent of a mathematical formula" and are "not an exact science." Lee v. Lee, 798 So.2d 1284, 1287 (Miss.2001). "[T]he chancellor must allow full and complete proof with respect to all circumstances and conditions directly or indirectly related to the care and custody of the children, existing at the time of the original divorce decree and at the time of the modification hearing." Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss. 1985) (citing Marascalco, 445 So.2d at 1382 ). 2002Julie argues that while less factors weighed in her favor, these factors are “not the equivalent of a mathematical formula” and are “ not an exact science.” Lee v. Lee, 798 So.2d 1284, 1287 (Miss. 2001). “[T]he chancellor must allow full and complete proof with respect to all circumstances and conditions directly or indirectly related to the care and custody of the children, existing at the time of the original divorce decree and at the time of the modification hearing.” Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss. 1985) (citing Marascalco, 445 So.2d at 1382 ). | 1 | 5 |
Waller v. Wallergreen1 sentence2024Waller v. Waller, 754 So. 2d 1181, 1184 (¶¶14-16) (Miss. 2000) (finding that res judicata did not apply to an order concerning child custody that made no determination “as to the best interest of the child in deciding custody . . . but simply restated the status quo”). | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. Powellgreen1 sentence2024Regardless of whether the order was temporary or final, the supreme court has held that when determining whether to modify child custody, “[a] chancellor must allow full and complete proof with respect to all circumstances and conditions directly or indirectly related to the care and custody of the children, existing at the time of the original divorce decree [or custody order] and at the time of the modification hearing.” Smith v. Todd, 464 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Miss. 1985); see Powell v. Powell, 976 So. 2d 358, 363 (¶21) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Albright v. Albrightgreen2 sentences2018By the time of the modification hearing, all four children were one year older. 2 Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983). 2 on February 3, 2017. 2018Albright v. Albright , 437 So.2d 1003 , 1005 (Miss. 1983). | 1 | 1 |
Mississippi Transp. Comm'n v. McLemoregreen1 sentence2014The Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the Daubert 1 standard and the modification of the rule in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) 2 in Mississippi Transportation Commission v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 35 (¶ 5) (Miss.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Steiner v. Steinergreen1 sentence2014See Steiner, 788 So.2d at 776 (¶ 16). ¶ 25. | 1 | 1 |
Tunica County v. Matthewsgreen1 sentence2014Tunica Cnty. v. Matthews, 926 So.2d 209, 213 (¶ 6) (Miss.2006). ¶ 10. | 1 | 1 |
Allgood v. Allgoodgreen1 sentence2013See Allgood v. Allgood, 473 So.2d 416, 423 (Miss.1985) (citations omitted) (“As a prerequisite to obtaining review in this Court, it is incumbent upon a litigant that he not only plead but press his point in the trial court.”). | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Montgomerygreen1 sentence2011The tender-years doctrine has traditionally provided that if a “child is of such tender age as to require the mother’s care for his or her physical welfare, he or she should be awarded to the mother’s custody....” Montgomery v. Montgomery, 20 So.3d 39, 44 (¶ 22) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (quoting Gilliland v. Gilliland, 969 So.2d 56, 66 (¶ 32) (Miss.Ct.App.2007)). | 1 | 1 |
Gilliland v. Gillilandgreen1 sentence2011The tender-years doctrine has traditionally provided that if a “child is of such tender age as to require the mother’s care for his or her physical welfare, he or she should be awarded to the mother’s custody....” Montgomery v. Montgomery, 20 So.3d 39, 44 (¶ 22) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (quoting Gilliland v. Gilliland, 969 So.2d 56, 66 (¶ 32) (Miss.Ct.App.2007)). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Graygreen2 sentences2011Indeed, a "chancellor must allow full and complete proof with respect to all circumstances and conditions directly or indirectly related to the care and custody of the children, existing at the time of the original divorce decree and at the time of the modification hearing." Johnson, 859 So.2d at 1013 (¶ 34) (quoting Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss. 1985)). ¶ 45. 2011Indeed, a “chancellor must allow full and complete proof with respect to all circumstances and conditions directly or indirectly related to the care and custody of the children, existing at the time of the original divorce decree and at the time of the modification hearing.” Johnson, 859 So.2d at 1018 (¶ 34) (quoting Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss.1985)). ¶ 45. | 1 | 1 |
East v. Eastgreen1 sentence2008The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that "[a] divorce agreement is `no different from any other contract, and the mere fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a divorce decree, does not change its character.'" Ivison v. Ivison, 762 So.2d 329, 334 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000) (quoting East v. East, 493 So.2d 927, 931-32 (Miss.1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Ivison v. Ivisongreen1 sentence2008The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that "[a] divorce agreement is `no different from any other contract, and the mere fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a divorce decree, does not change its character.'" Ivison v. Ivison, 762 So.2d 329, 334 (¶ 14) (Miss.2000) (quoting East v. East, 493 So.2d 927, 931-32 (Miss.1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Fletcher v. Shawgreen2 sentences2006In Fletcher v. Shaw, 800 So.2d 1212, 1215 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2001), this Court held that where parties enter a court approved custody agreement, the modification standard applies to subsequent custody disputes. 2006Id. at 1215 (¶ 8). ¶ 51. | 1 | 1 |
Sanford v. Arindergreen2 sentences2005Sanford v. Arinder , 800 So.2d 1267 , 1272 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App. 2001). 2005Sanford v. Arinder, 800 So.2d 1267, 1272 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct. | 1 | 1 |
Saddler v. Saddlergreen1 sentence2000Saddler v. Saddler, 556 So.2d 344, 345-46 (Miss.1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roberts v. Brown
green
2 sentences2003Id. at 650 . 2001Id. at 650 . | 2 | 2001–2003 |
John R. Bell v. Lori M. Bell
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McEwen v. McEwen
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 822 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Sanghi v. Sanghi
green
1 sentence2020As such, “[t]he applicable procedural rule is one that applies to petitions to modify or enforce final custody, alimony or support judgments.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing M.R.C.P. 81(d)(2)).13 This Court also recognized in Sanghi that “[t]he supreme court has held that a modification hearing [that also requires 13 Indeed, Rule 81(d)(6) provides that “Rule 5(b) notice shall be sufficient as to any temporary hearing in a pending divorce, separate maintenance, custody or support action provided the defendant has been summoned to answer the original complaint.” (Emphasis added). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
green
2 sentences2014The Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the Daubert 1 standard and the modification of the rule in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) 2 in Mississippi Transportation Commission v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 35 (¶ 5) (Miss.2003). 2014The Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the Daubert 1 standard and the modification of the rule in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) 2 in Mississippi Transportation Commission v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 35 (¶ 5) (Miss.2003). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Armstrong v. Armstrong
green
1 sentence2008Ms. Clower appeals the chancellor’s judgment allowing Mr. Clower a downward alimony modification, presenting the following arguments: (1) Ms. Clower argues that modification was error because Mr. Clower maintained the ability to continue his originally ordered alimony payments; (2) Ms. Clower urges this Court to find that Mr. Clower was barred from receiving a modification under the doctrine of unclean hands; (3) Ms. Clower argues that modification was not appropriate because there did not exist a substantial change in circumstances that was not anticipated at the time of the original decree; | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lipsey v. Lipsey
green
1 sentence2006In reversing the lower court's grant of modification, this Court noted that the lower court's decision was based on nothing more than "the parties' inability to cooperate with one another." Id. at (¶ 7). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Kincaid v. Kincaid
green
1 sentence2005Ben, accordingly, could only satisfy the clean hands doctrine by proving that performance under the terms of the original decree was impossible, and the Mississippi Supreme Court has expressed the need to prove such impossibility “with particularity and not in general terms.” Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Caples v. Caples
green
1 sentence2003Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Wing v. Wing
green
1 sentence1992As stated by Justice Prather in Wing v. Wing, 549 So.2d 944 , 947 (Miss. 1989), "Strong public policy calls for provision for increased financial needs of children without additional litigation, incurring attorney's fees, court congestion and delay, and emotional trauma." If this is an escalation clause and not a modification clause, this Court is called upon to review what the chancellor considered in creating an escalation clause. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Tedford v. Dempsey
green
1 sentence1992In Wing we stated: Tedford [ v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410 (Miss. 1983)] dictates that an escalation clause should be tied to: (1) the inflation rate, (2) the non-custodial parent's increase or decrease in income, (3) the child's expense, and (4) the custodial parent's separate income. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| American National Insurance v. Walters green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Travelers' Fire Ins. v. Price green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.