modification hearing in Massachusetts

2016See Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 377-378 (1981) (affirming denial of alimony modification where judge found “at the time of the modification hearing [payor spouse] had the ability to make the payments”); Katz v. Katz, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 483 (2002) (reversing judge’s decision to terminate alimony where payor spouse had income-generating assets “at the time of the hearing on the complaint for modification”).

1998The modification standard to be applied in such circumstances is similar to the common law rule that a party seeking to modify a judgment for alimony or child support must “demonstrate a material change of circumstances since the entry of the earlier judgment.” Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 368 (1981).

2025See Bump, 24 Mass. App. Ct. at 312 (expended time treated as "loss of money or property" under Chapter 93A); Arthur D.

2016See Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366, 377-378 (1981) (affirming denial of alimony modification where judge found “at the time of the modification hearing [payor spouse] had the ability to make the payments”); Katz v. Katz, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 483 (2002) (reversing judge’s decision to terminate alimony where payor spouse had income-generating assets “at the time of the hearing on the complaint for modification”).

2014L. c. 208, § 49(e) (“Unless the payor and recipient agree otherwise, general term alimony may be modified in duration or amount upon a material change of circumstances warranting modification”); Kelley v. Kelley, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 733, 739, 740 (2005) (although power of Probate and Family Court to modify alimony order is “broad and general,” “no modification can be made unless the party seeking modification shows a change of circumstances since the entry of the earlier judgment,” quoting from Binder v. Binder, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 754 [1979]; “The proper focus of the modification inquiry must

2014L. c. 208, § 49(e) (“Unless the payor and recipient agree otherwise, general term alimony may be modified in duration or amount upon a material change of circumstances warranting modification”); Kelley v. Kelley, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 733, 739, 740 (2005) (although power of Probate and Family Court to modify alimony order is “broad and general,” “no modification can be made unless the party seeking modification shows a change of circumstances since the entry of the earlier judgment,” quoting from Binder v. Binder, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 754 [1979]; “The proper focus of the modification inquiry must

2007A refusal to sublet to a qualified tenant, or to permit assignment without reason, “was a substantial breach going to the root of the contract. ...” Aerostatic Eng’g Corp. v. Szczawinski, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 145 (1973).

2002See Connolly v. Connolly, 400 Mass. 1002, 1003 (1987).

1996Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 437 (1976).

1991See Trustees of Stigmatine Fathers, Inc. v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 369 Mass. 562, 565 (1976).

1990See DeCristofaro v. DeCristofaro, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 231 , 234 n.5 (1987). 3 The Knox court also stated, at 437, that “[a]n agreement to fix a spouse’s support obligation for minor children stands on a different footing.

1989See Pearson v. Fair, supra. The parties’ attorneys met before March 9 to draft a purchase and sale agreement acceptable to both parties.

1981We note, however, our statement made in the analogous context of a petition for alimony brought by a wife after her former husband’s remarriage: “When the respondent married his present wife, no application for alimony had been made by the petitioner .... [W]hile such marriage would not be a bar to the petitioner’s claim for alimony, still it is a circumstance to be considered with other pertinent facts by the court in determining whether alimony should be granted, and if so, for what amount.” Brown v. Brown, 222 Mass. 415, 418 (1916).

1931See Parkhurst v. Ginn, 228 Mass. 159, 170 ; and see G.