modification test in Florida

2019See Chiarenza v. State, 217 So. 3d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); see also Stephens, 787 So. 2d at 755 (citation omitted).

2007Although the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed *840 on his theory of defense, a trial court's failure to grant a modification to a standard jury instruction "does not constitute error where the instructions given adequately address the applicable legal standards." Id. at 755 ; see also O'Brien v. State, 771 So.2d 563, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("If an instruction sufficiently sets forth the applicable legal standard, the refusal to give a special instruction is not error.") III.

2026Co., 245 So. 2d 259, 263, 265 (Fla. 4th a verdict until long after the rendering jury had been discharged.”); Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 241 (1998) (“[L]iability can exist under a failure-to-warn theory in cases in which the substantial modification defense . . . might otherwise preclude a design defect claim.”).

2026Co., 245 So. 2d 259, 263, 265 (Fla. 4th a verdict until long after the rendering jury had been discharged.”); Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 241 (1998) (“[L]iability can exist under a failure-to-warn theory in cases in which the substantial modification defense . . . might otherwise preclude a design defect claim.”).

2019See Chiarenza v. State, 217 So. 3d 128 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); see also Stephens, 787 So. 2d at 755 (citation omitted).

2014See Kernan v. Kernan, 495 So.2d 275, 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).

2011See Stark v. State, 712 So.2d 454, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (finding that the written order of probation should match the trial court’s oral pronouncements); Reiter v. State, 674 So.2d 189, 190-91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (finding that the “written [probation] order must be modified to conform to the court’s oral pronouncement”).

2011See Stark v. State, 712 So.2d 454, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (finding that the written order of probation should match the trial court’s oral pronouncements); Reiter v. State, 674 So.2d 189, 190-91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (finding that the “written [probation] order must be modified to conform to the court’s oral pronouncement”).

2010See Green v. State, 638 So.2d 1006, 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (analyzing the State’s request to modify the defendant’s probation to reporting status against the trial court’s prior order modifying defendant’s probation to administrative or nonreporting status; holding that the trial court could not modify the defendant’s probation to reporting status absent proof of a violation even though the State claimed the prior modification was in error).

2009From our review of the hearing transcript, it is clear that the former wife’s testimony and verified financial affidavit provided competent, substantial evidence from which the trier of fact could determine the parties’ respective incomes and the former husband’s average number of hours/days worked. “[I]t is the burden of the trial court to determine the amounts based upon the evidence presented.” Deoca v. Deoca, 837 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

2009See Hicks v. Hicks, 948 So.2d 63, 64 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (recognizing that a party who fails to provide full, complete financial disclosures will not be heard to complain about the trial court’s inability to make a specific calculation).

2007Although the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed *840 on his theory of defense, a trial court's failure to grant a modification to a standard jury instruction "does not constitute error where the instructions given adequately address the applicable legal standards." Id. at 755 ; see also O'Brien v. State, 771 So.2d 563, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("If an instruction sufficiently sets forth the applicable legal standard, the refusal to give a special instruction is not error.") III.

2007See also Morales v. Salazar, 833 So.2d 226 , 228 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (noting change in modification jurisdiction standard upon adoption of section 61.516, effective October 1, 2002). [2] Once the burden of showing a substantial, material change has been met, the second part of the modification test involves the same broad "best interest" inquiry as an initial custody determination.

2007See Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So.2d 928, 933-34 (Fla.2005) (noting the stabilizing effect of requiring proof of a substantial, material change in circumstances as a prerequisite to considering "best interests" and possible modification).

2005In Ventriglia v. Vaughan, 623 So.2d 836, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), this court determined that although the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce or modify a final judgment of dissolution providing for visitation, “[t]he correct procedure to modify visitation, however, is for the party to file a petition for modification.” The Ventriglia court noted that nothing in the judgment indicated that the visitation was “in the nature of a trial visitation” and that the same visitation schedule had been in effect prior to entry of the final judgment.

2005In Garden v. Garden, 834 So.2d 190, 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), the court reversed where counsel had been allowed to withdraw at trial, explaining: Withdrawal at the moment a trial is to commence can seldom be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client.

2003See Housing by Vogue v. Caswell, 421 So.2d 556, 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding that evidence regarding an individual’s job status could have been discovered at the time of the original hearing).

1994See Casella, 569 So.2d at 849 . [1] Here, because an error of law is apparent on the face of the final judgment, the mother's failure to provide this court with a transcript of the modification hearing is not dispositive.

1990This court stated in Westwinds Transp., Inc. v. Murphy, 494 So.2d 519, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), that section 440.28 was designed to "afford relief to a claimant whose condition either 1) becomes progressively worse when not anticipated by the original diagnosis or 2) is the product of evidentiary factors not known at the time of the initial claim proceeding." Additionally, and most importantly, while most of the doctors and psychologists who examined claimant limited their evaluations to merely describing claimant's psychiatric state, Dr. Legum expressly linked claimant's psychological disabil

1988See Dawkins v. Dawkins, 494 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).