modification hearing in Connecticut

2018Applying the foregoing principles in Amodio , we concluded that the trial court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the merits of the modification issue in that case because, under § 46b-1 (4), the Superior Court is vested with "plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction over legal disputes in 'family relations matters,' including alimony and support"; id., at 729, 724 A.2d 1084 ; and because, under § 46b-86 (a), the court is vested "with continuing jurisdiction to modify support orders." Id."Together, [we concluded], these two statutes provided the trial court with subject

2018Applying the foregoing principles in Amodio , we concluded that the trial court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the merits of the modification issue in that case because, under § 46b-1 (4), the Superior Court is vested with "plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction over legal disputes in 'family relations matters,' including alimony and support"; id., at 729, 724 A.2d 1084 ; and because, under § 46b-86 (a), the court is vested "with continuing jurisdiction to modify support orders." Id."Together, [we concluded], these two statutes provided the trial court with subject

2021While a modification hearing entails the presentation of evidence of a sub- stantial change in circumstances, a reconsideration hearing involves consideration of the trial evidence in light of outside factors such as new law, a miscalcula- tion or a misapplication of the law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaser v. Jaser, 37 Conn. App. 194 , 202–203, 655 A.2d 790 (1995). ‘‘[T]he purpose of reargument is . . . to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that th

2021While a modification hearing entails the presentation of evidence of a sub- stantial change in circumstances, a reconsideration hearing involves consideration of the trial evidence in light of outside factors such as new law, a miscalcula- tion or a misapplication of the law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaser v. Jaser, 37 Conn. App. 194 , 202–203, 655 A.2d 790 (1995). ‘‘[T]he purpose of reargument is . . . to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that th

2016By contrast, in today's decision, the majority does not mention stare decisis or offer any explanation as to why the constancy rule, as modified by Troupe , " 'needs modification to serve justice better.' " Id., at 303 , 677 A.2d 917 .

1999The court, however, explicitly stated that the modification of the rule “will apply only to those cases in which constancy of accusation testimony has not yet been admitted into evidence on the date of publication of this opinion.” Id., 305 .

1996"It should evaluate the circumstances of the parties as they exist at the time of the modification hearing, compare them to what they were at the time of the last court order and arrive at a fair and equitable determination." Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729 , 747 (1994).

1996"It should evaluate the circumstances of the parties as they exist at the time of the modification hearing, compare them to what they were at the time of the last court order and arrive at a fair and equitable determination." Borkowski v. Borkowski. 228 Conn. 729 , 747 (1994).

2021It also may be used to address alleged inconsistencies in the trial court’s memorandum of decision as well as claims of law that the [movant] claimed were not addressed by the court. . . . [A] motion to reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity to have a second bite of the apple or to present additional cases or briefs which could have been presented at the time of the original argument.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, National Assn. v. Mamudi, 197 Conn. App. 31 , 47 n.13, 231 A.3d 297 , cert. denied, 335 Conn. 921 , 231 A.3d 1169 (2020); see also Opoku v. Grant, 6

2008Thus, even if we were to assume that the obligations under the listing agreement, which one could argue related to different leases than those ultimately executed, were assignable, we have no written instrument that describes the assignee and “subject matter of the assignment. . . with such particularity as to render it capable of identification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dysart Corp. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 240 Conn. 10, 17 , 688 A.2d 306 (1997) (plaintiff was not assignee of right to sue on labor and material payment bond according to General Statutes § 4942 by virtue of employees

2008Thus, even if we were to assume that the obligations under the listing agreement, which one could argue related to different leases than those ultimately executed, were assignable, we have no written instrument that describes the assignee and “subject matter of the assignment. . . with such particularity as to render it capable of identification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dysart Corp. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 240 Conn. 10, 17 , 688 A.2d 306 (1997) (plaintiff was not assignee of right to sue on labor and material payment bond according to General Statutes § 4942 by virtue of employees

1983Despite our repeated holdings that “the same criteria that determine an initial award of alimony and support are relevant to the question of modification”; Hardisty v. Hardisty, supra, 259 ; Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn. 218, 221-22 , 429 A.2d 474 (1980); Sanchione v. Sanchione, supra, 401-402 ; the plaintiff urges that a modification hearing should not reconsider such matters as the plaintiff’s fault in the marital breakdown in determining the present needs and resources of the parties.

1983Despite our repeated holdings that “the same criteria that determine an initial award of alimony and support are relevant to the question of modification”; Hardisty v. Hardisty, supra, 259 ; Cummock v. Cummock, 180 Conn. 218, 221-22 , 429 A.2d 474 (1980); Sanchione v. Sanchione, supra, 401-402 ; the plaintiff urges that a modification hearing should not reconsider such matters as the plaintiff’s fault in the marital breakdown in determining the present needs and resources of the parties.

1979In considering the general purpose of the statute as a whole, it is clear that it relates only to a modification of the doctrine of contributory negligence and the abolition of the doctrines of last clear chance and assumption of risk. 2 See Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 572 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).

1979In considering the general purpose of the statute as a whole, it is clear that it relates only to a modification of the doctrine of contributory negligence and the abolition of the doctrines of last clear chance and assumption of risk. 2 See Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 572 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975).

1975As this court, however, observed in Baker v. Baker, 166 Conn. 476, 489 , 352 A.2d 277 , quoting from Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 510 , 58 A.2d 729 : “ ‘Where a defendant has by his wrongful conduct made the calculation of damages difficult, he will not he heard to urge such difficulty as a reason for not assessing by approximation.’ ” It also appears that the defendant during the summer of 1973 did some part-time carpentry work for remuneration which was not reported on his affidavit submitted at the hearing for modification.

1975As this court, however, observed in Baker v. Baker, 166 Conn. 476, 489 , 352 A.2d 277 , quoting from Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 510 , 58 A.2d 729 : “ ‘Where a defendant has by his wrongful conduct made the calculation of damages difficult, he will not he heard to urge such difficulty as a reason for not assessing by approximation.’ ” It also appears that the defendant during the summer of 1973 did some part-time carpentry work for remuneration which was not reported on his affidavit submitted at the hearing for modification.

1975As this court, however, observed in Baker v. Baker, 166 Conn. 476, 489 , 352 A.2d 277 , quoting from Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 510 , 58 A.2d 729 : “ ‘Where a defendant has by his wrongful conduct made the calculation of damages difficult, he will not he heard to urge such difficulty as a reason for not assessing by approximation.’ ” It also appears that the defendant during the summer of 1973 did some part-time carpentry work for remuneration which was not reported on his affidavit submitted at the hearing for modification.

1975As this court, however, observed in Baker v. Baker, 166 Conn. 476, 489 , 352 A.2d 277 , quoting from Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 510 , 58 A.2d 729 : “ ‘Where a defendant has by his wrongful conduct made the calculation of damages difficult, he will not he heard to urge such difficulty as a reason for not assessing by approximation.’ ” It also appears that the defendant during the summer of 1973 did some part-time carpentry work for remuneration which was not reported on his affidavit submitted at the hearing for modification.