modification doctrine in South Carolina

1979See Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital, Inc. , 269 N.C. 1 , 152 S.E. (2d) 485 (1967). 234 S.E. (2d) at 877 .

1979See Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital, Inc. , 269 N.C. 1 , 152 S.E. (2d) 485 (1967). 234 S.E. (2d) at 877 .

1984In Douglass v. Florence General Hospital, 273 S. C. 716, 259 S. E. (2d) 117 (1979), the Court reaffirmed its statement in Brown, supra, that the modification of the doctrine of charitable immunity to permit recovery based upon a hospital’s reckless conduct would be applied prospectively only.

1979See Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital, Inc. , 269 N.C. 1 , 152 S.E. (2d) 485 (1967). 234 S.E. (2d) at 877 .

2016Id.-, see also United States v. Oliver, 766 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1985) (“When the trial court determined that the jury should be re-instructed, it presented the attorneys the option of rearguing their respective positions in light of the revised instructions or, in the alternative, the court proposed to explain the reason for the modification of the instruction to the jury .... [D]efense counsel expressly tailored his closing argument upon the alleged failure of the government to prove a critical element of the crime ... as directed by the original jury charge.

2016When the court subsequently omitted that element as a prerequisite for conviction, the defense attorney was left with the impossible task of rearguing to the jury points which he had conceded during his first argument.”); Cruz v. State, 407 Md. 202 , 963 A.2d 1184 , 1192 (2009) (“We are not persuaded that a supplemental closing argument would have cured the problem created by the court’s eleventh hour insertion of this new theory of culpability.”); Murray v. State, 857 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Tex. Crim.

2007Mother argues the modification was in error because: there was already a court-approved agreement regarding visitation filed less than two months before the present action was filed; the modified visitation was not in the child’s best interest; the modification was not necessary or appropriate to resolve the parties’ visitation problems; and neither party requested such a modification in his/her pleadings.[2] Mother argues that the only visitation problems raised at trial had to do with Father’s failure to give notice of the weeks he chose to exercise visitation during the summer of 2003 and t

2007Mother argues the modification was in error because: there was already a court-approved agreement regarding visitation filed less than two months before the present action was filed; the modified visitation was not in the child’s best interest; the modification was not necessary or appropriate to resolve the parties’ visitation problems; and neither party requested such a modification in his/her pleadings.[2] Mother argues that the only visitation problems raised at trial had to do with Father’s failure to give notice of the weeks he chose to exercise visitation during the summer of 2003 and t

2006Miller v. Miller, 299 S.C. 307, 310-11 , 384 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (1989) (reviewing the denial of a petition to decrease child support set by the divorce decree using the modification standard of changed circumstances).

2006Miller v. Miller, 299 S.C. 307, 310-11 , 384 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (1989) (reviewing the denial of a petition to decrease child support set by the divorce decree using the modification standard of changed circumstances).