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9 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1833–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital Incorporatedgreen2 sentences1979See Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital, Inc. , 269 N.C. 1 , 152 S.E. (2d) 485 (1967). 234 S.E. (2d) at 877 . 1979See Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital, Inc. , 269 N.C. 1 , 152 S.E. (2d) 485 (1967). 234 S.E. (2d) at 877 . | 2 | 2 |
Brown Ex Rel. Estate of Brown v. Anderson County Hospital Ass'ngreen2 sentences1984In Douglass v. Florence General Hospital, 273 S. C. 716, 259 S. E. (2d) 117 (1979), the Court reaffirmed its statement in Brown, supra, that the modification of the doctrine of charitable immunity to permit recovery based upon a hospital’s reckless conduct would be applied prospectively only. 1979See Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital, Inc. , 269 N.C. 1 , 152 S.E. (2d) 485 (1967). 234 S.E. (2d) at 877 . | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Walter Oliver, Jr.green1 sentence2016Id.-, see also United States v. Oliver, 766 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1985) (“When the trial court determined that the jury should be re-instructed, it presented the attorneys the option of rearguing their respective positions in light of the revised instructions or, in the alternative, the court proposed to explain the reason for the modification of the instruction to the jury .... [D]efense counsel expressly tailored his closing argument upon the alleged failure of the government to prove a critical element of the crime ... as directed by the original jury charge. | 1 | 1 |
Murray v. Stategreen1 sentence2016When the court subsequently omitted that element as a prerequisite for conviction, the defense attorney was left with the impossible task of rearguing to the jury points which he had conceded during his first argument.”); Cruz v. State, 407 Md. 202 , 963 A.2d 1184 , 1192 (2009) (“We are not persuaded that a supplemental closing argument would have cured the problem created by the court’s eleventh hour insertion of this new theory of culpability.”); Murray v. State, 857 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Woodall v. Woodallgreen2 sentences2007“When awarding visitation, the controlling consideration is the welfare and best interest of the child.” Woodall v. Woodall , 322 S.C. 7, 12 , 471 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1996). 2007“When awarding visitation, the controlling consideration is the welfare and best interest of the child.” Woodall v. Woodall , 322 S.C. 7, 12 , 471 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Millergreen2 sentences2006Miller v. Miller, 299 S.C. 307, 310-11 , 384 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (1989) (reviewing the denial of a petition to decrease child support set by the divorce decree using the modification standard of changed circumstances). 2006Miller v. Miller, 299 S.C. 307, 310-11 , 384 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (1989) (reviewing the denial of a petition to decrease child support set by the divorce decree using the modification standard of changed circumstances). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cruz v. State
green
2 sentences2016When the court subsequently omitted that element as a prerequisite for conviction, the defense attorney was left with the impossible task of rearguing to the jury points which he had conceded during his first argument.”); Cruz v. State, 407 Md. 202 , 963 A.2d 1184 , 1192 (2009) (“We are not persuaded that a supplemental closing argument would have cured the problem created by the court’s eleventh hour insertion of this new theory of culpability.”); Murray v. State, 857 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Tex. Crim. 2016When the court subsequently omitted that element as a prerequisite for conviction, the defense attorney was left with the impossible task of rearguing to the jury points which he had conceded during his first argument.”); Cruz v. State, 407 Md. 202 , 963 A.2d 1184 , 1192 (2009) (“We are not persuaded that a supplemental closing argument would have cured the problem created by the court’s eleventh hour insertion of this new theory of culpability.”); Murray v. State, 857 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Douglass v. Florence General Hospital
green
2 sentences1984In Douglass v. Florence General Hospital , 273 S.C. 716 , 259 S.E. (2d) 117 (1979), the Court reaffirmed its statement in Brown, supra , that the modification of the doctrine of charitable immunity to permit recovery based upon a hospital's reckless conduct would be applied prospectively only. 1984In Douglass v. Florence General Hospital , 273 S.C. 716 , 259 S.E. (2d) 117 (1979), the Court reaffirmed its statement in Brown, supra , that the modification of the doctrine of charitable immunity to permit recovery based upon a hospital's reckless conduct would be applied prospectively only. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Gordon v. Gordon
green
1 sentence1915The case of Gordon v. Gordon, 91 S. C. 245, 74 S. E. 360 , states the rule by which this case can be determined as follows : “If a wife voluntarily leaves her husband’s home, as a condition of obtaining even temporary alimony and suit money, she must assume the burden of showing prima facie that her husband has inflicted on her such physical violence *300 or personal indignity as would make her living with him as wife intolerable.” It is undisputed that Mrs. Dagnall le-ft her husband’s home contrary to his wishes and in spite of his protest. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Komorowski v. Krumdick
neutral
1 sentence1892It will be observed that the cases which establish or recognize this modification of the rule only go to the extent of holding that a common carrier may deliver the goods entrusted to him for transportation to the rightful owner upon his demand; and if he does, he may defend himself against an action brought by his bailor to recover damages for the non-delivery according to the contract of bailment, by showing that he has delivered the goods to the rightful owner; but none of them go to the extent of holding that he is bound to deliver them to one who demands them as rightful owner, unless it | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Bogart v. De Bussy
green
1 sentence1833The rule has been recognized and adopted in New-York, Massachusetts and Maine, Bogart v. De Bussey, 6 John. 94 . | 1 | 1833–1833 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.