24 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1902–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Watkinson v. Henleygreen2 sentences2019Niblett v. Niblett, 65 Va. App. 616, 625 (2015); Brody, 16 Va. App. at 650 (“Before imputing income to a party, the trial court must first determine the presumptive amount of child support under the guidelines.”); O’Brien v. Rose, 14 Va. App. 960, 963-64 (1992); Watkinson v. Henley, 13 Va. App. 151, 158 (1991) (“The starting point . . . for determining the child support obligation of a party, whether initially or at a modification hearing, is to compute the presumptive amount using the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B).”); Farley v. Liskey, 12 Va. App. 1, 5 (1991) (“Imputed income is a fact 1999We are, therefore, unable to properly consider on review the factors relevant to a proper support order for such period, and the disputed decree remains presumptively correct. - 4 - DEVIATION FROM PRESUMPTIVE AMOUNT “The starting point . . . for determining the child support obligation of a party, whether initially or at a modification hearing, is to compute the presumptive amount using the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B).” Watkinson v. Henley, 13 Va. App. 151, 158 , 409 S.E.2d 470, 473 (1991) (citation omitted); see Code §§ 20-108.1, -108.2. | 6 | 7 |
Judy Kay Reaves v. James Kelly Tuckergreen2 sentences2026See Code § 8.01-380. - 16 - the modification or waiver provisions of the scheduling order in section XII, because in his view there was already a “specific provision” that “addresses this scenario.” Curiously, however, Thornhill fails to contend that he could not have sought relief based upon the plain meaning of section XII, which states in pertinent part that “[u]pon motion, the time limits and prohibitions contained in this order may be waived or modified by leave of court for good cause shown.” See Reaves, 67 Va. App. at 134 (defining good cause simply as “the burden placed on a litigant ( 2025See Code § 8.01-380. - 16 - the modification or waiver provisions of the scheduling order in section XII, because in his view there was already a “specific provision” that “addresses this scenario.” Curiously, however, Thornhill fails to contend that he could not have sought relief based upon the plain meaning of section XII, which states in pertinent part that “[u]pon motion, the time limits and prohibitions contained in this order may be waived or modified by leave of court for good cause shown.” See Reaves, 67 Va. App. at 134 (defining good cause simply as “the burden placed on a litigant ( | 3 | 3 |
Payne v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2022He argues this “error is not harmless given the lack of evidence of preference at trial.” This Court “reviews a trial court’s ruling admitting or excluding evidence for abuse of discretion.” Payne v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 855, 866 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Amanda Swanson Niblett v. Jason Daniel Niblettgreen1 sentence2019Niblett v. Niblett, 65 Va. App. 616, 625 (2015); Brody, 16 Va. App. at 650 (“Before imputing income to a party, the trial court must first determine the presumptive amount of child support under the guidelines.”); O’Brien v. Rose, 14 Va. App. 960, 963-64 (1992); Watkinson v. Henley, 13 Va. App. 151, 158 (1991) (“The starting point . . . for determining the child support obligation of a party, whether initially or at a modification hearing, is to compute the presumptive amount using the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B).”); Farley v. Liskey, 12 Va. App. 1, 5 (1991) (“Imputed income is a fact | 1 | 1 |
Brody v. Brodygreen1 sentence2019Niblett v. Niblett, 65 Va. App. 616, 625 (2015); Brody, 16 Va. App. at 650 (“Before imputing income to a party, the trial court must first determine the presumptive amount of child support under the guidelines.”); O’Brien v. Rose, 14 Va. App. 960, 963-64 (1992); Watkinson v. Henley, 13 Va. App. 151, 158 (1991) (“The starting point . . . for determining the child support obligation of a party, whether initially or at a modification hearing, is to compute the presumptive amount using the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B).”); Farley v. Liskey, 12 Va. App. 1, 5 (1991) (“Imputed income is a fact | 1 | 1 |
O'BRIEN v. Rosegreen1 sentence2019Niblett v. Niblett, 65 Va. App. 616, 625 (2015); Brody, 16 Va. App. at 650 (“Before imputing income to a party, the trial court must first determine the presumptive amount of child support under the guidelines.”); O’Brien v. Rose, 14 Va. App. 960, 963-64 (1992); Watkinson v. Henley, 13 Va. App. 151, 158 (1991) (“The starting point . . . for determining the child support obligation of a party, whether initially or at a modification hearing, is to compute the presumptive amount using the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B).”); Farley v. Liskey, 12 Va. App. 1, 5 (1991) (“Imputed income is a fact | 1 | 1 |
Farley v. Liskeygreen1 sentence2019Niblett v. Niblett, 65 Va. App. 616, 625 (2015); Brody, 16 Va. App. at 650 (“Before imputing income to a party, the trial court must first determine the presumptive amount of child support under the guidelines.”); O’Brien v. Rose, 14 Va. App. 960, 963-64 (1992); Watkinson v. Henley, 13 Va. App. 151, 158 (1991) (“The starting point . . . for determining the child support obligation of a party, whether initially or at a modification hearing, is to compute the presumptive amount using the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B).”); Farley v. Liskey, 12 Va. App. 1, 5 (1991) (“Imputed income is a fact | 1 | 1 |
Driscoll v. Huntergreen2 sentences2014“The crucial question, once a material change in circumstances has been shown, is the ‘ability of the supporting spouse to pay.’” Driscoll v. Hunter, 59 Va. App. 22, 33 , 716 S.E.2d 477, 482 (2011) (quoting Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 195 , 480 S.E.2d 792 , 795 1 At the modification hearing, husband told the circuit court that it needed to consider the Code § 20-107.1(E) factors in determining whether to modify the spousal support award. 2014“The crucial question, once a material change in circumstances has been shown, is the ‘ability of the supporting spouse to pay.’” Driscoll v. Hunter, 59 Va. App. 22, 33 , 716 S.E.2d 477, 482 (2011) (quoting Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 195 , 480 S.E.2d 792 , 795 1 At the modification hearing, husband told the circuit court that it needed to consider the Code § 20-107.1(E) factors in determining whether to modify the spousal support award. | 1 | 1 |
Slonka v. Pennlinegreen2 sentences2008The child support order also does not explain the deviation. 2 As we explained in Slaonka v. Pennline, 17 Va. App. 662, 665 , 440 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted): It is well settled that the starting point . . . for determining the child support obligation of a party, whether initially or at a modification hearing, is to compute the presumptive amount using the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B). 2008The child support order also does not explain the deviation. 2 As we explained in Slaonka v. Pennline, 17 Va. App. 662, 665 , 440 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted): It is well settled that the starting point . . . for determining the child support obligation of a party, whether initially or at a modification hearing, is to compute the presumptive amount using the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B). | 1 | 1 |
McGinnis v. McGinnisgreen2 sentences2004While we generally assume a trial court has followed the law, McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277 , 338 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1985), the opinion letter in this case clearly indicates the court considered only the increase in husband’s child support payments. 2004While we generally assume a trial court has followed the law, McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277 , 338 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1985), the opinion letter in this case clearly indicates the court considered only the increase in husband’s child support payments. | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Scottgreen2 sentences1999However, “a trial court need not award child support in the statutorily presumptive amount if a deviation from such an amount is justified.” Scott v. Scott, 12 Va. App. 1245, 1249 , 408 S.E.2d 579, 582 (1991); see Code §§ 20-108.1, -108.2. 1999However, “a trial court need not award child support in the statutorily presumptive amount if a deviation from such an amount is justified.” Scott v. Scott, 12 Va. App. 1245, 1249 , 408 S.E.2d 579, 582 (1991); see Code §§ 20-108.1, -108.2. | 1 | 1 |
Head v. Headgreen2 sentences1998DEVIATION FROM THE PRESUMPTIVELY CORRECT AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT When determining a party's child support obligation at a modification hearing, "the court must begin by computing the * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. presumptive amount using the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B)." Head v. Head, 24 Va. App. 166, 178 , 480 S.E.2d 780, 786 (1997). 1998DEVIATION FROM THE PRESUMPTIVELY CORRECT AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT When determining a party's child support obligation at a modification hearing, "the court must begin by computing the * Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication. presumptive amount using the schedule found in Code § 20-108.2(B)." Head v. Head, 24 Va. App. 166, 178 , 480 S.E.2d 780, 786 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Venable
green
2 sentences1953Co. v. Venable, 194 Va. 357 , 73 S. E. (2d) 366 . 1953Co. v. Venable, 194 Va. 357 , 73 S. E. (2d) 366 . | 2 | 1953–1953 |
Moreno v. Moreno
green
2 sentences2014“The crucial question, once a material change in circumstances has been shown, is the ‘ability of the supporting spouse to pay.’” Driscoll v. Hunter, 59 Va. App. 22, 33 , 716 S.E.2d 477, 482 (2011) (quoting Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 195 , 480 S.E.2d 792 , 795 1 At the modification hearing, husband told the circuit court that it needed to consider the Code § 20-107.1(E) factors in determining whether to modify the spousal support award. 2014“The crucial question, once a material change in circumstances has been shown, is the ‘ability of the supporting spouse to pay.’” Driscoll v. Hunter, 59 Va. App. 22, 33 , 716 S.E.2d 477, 482 (2011) (quoting Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 195 , 480 S.E.2d 792 , 795 1 At the modification hearing, husband told the circuit court that it needed to consider the Code § 20-107.1(E) factors in determining whether to modify the spousal support award. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Harris v. Harrington
green
2 sentences2012Further, “[t]he statute was intended to correct these abuses, and, to this extent, it is a modification of the rule as to best evidence, but it was never intended to prohibit the proof of prior inconsistent statements by oral testimony.” Id. at 220 , 22 S.E.2d at 17 . 2012Further, “[t]he statute was intended to correct these abuses, and, to this extent, it is a modification of the rule as to best evidence, but it was never intended to prohibit the proof of prior inconsistent statements by oral testimony.” Id. at 220 , 22 S.E.2d at 17 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Virginia Department of Taxation v. Daughtry
green
2 sentences2009Rather, these implementation proceedings recognize that the hearing officer’s decision is “final and binding,” Code § 2.2-3005.1(C)(iii) (the decision of the hearing officer shall “be final and binding if consistent with law and policy”), and the circuit court proceeding is “analogous to a proceeding to domesticate and enforce a foreign judgment,” Daughtry, 19 Va.App. at 137 , 449 S.E.2d at 59 . 2009Rather, these implementation proceedings recognize that the hearing officer’s decision is “final and binding,” Code § 2.2-3005.1(C)(iii) (the decision of the hearing officer shall “be final and binding if consistent with law and policy”), and the circuit court proceeding is “analogous to a proceeding to domesticate and enforce a foreign judgment,” Daughtry, 19 Va.App. at 137 , 449 S.E.2d at 59 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hiner v. Hadeed
green
2 sentences1997Hiner, 15 Va.App. at 579 , 425 S.E.2d at 814 . 1997Hiner, 15 Va.App. at 579 , 425 S.E.2d at 814 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Richardson v. Richardson
green
1 sentence1991Richardson, 12 Va. App. at 21, 401 S.E.2d at 896 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Seaboard Ice Co. v. Lee
green
2 sentences1971Moreover, in Virginia, the burden is on the releasor to show that his release should be set aside for mutual mistake by “clear, cogent and convincing evidence.” Ice Company v. Lee, supra, 199 Va. at 251 , 99 S. E. 2d at 727 . 1971Moreover, in Virginia, the burden is on the releasor to show that his release should be set aside for mutual mistake by “clear, cogent and convincing evidence.” Ice Company v. Lee, supra, 199 Va. at 251 , 99 S. E. 2d at 727 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Stevens v. Hulse
neutral
2 sentences1935For instance, in Stevens v. Hulse (1934), 263 N. Y. 421 , 189 N. E. 478 , while the court adhered to its former holding that a keeper of wild animals must see at his peril that they do not harm others, it applied a modification of the doctrine of absolute liability by saying that the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and the sufficiency of the warning contained in a notice were, questions for the jury. 1935For instance, in Stevens v. Hulse (1934), 263 N. Y. 421 , 189 N. E. 478 , while the court adhered to its former holding that a keeper of wild animals must see at his peril that they do not harm others, it applied a modification of the doctrine of absolute liability by saying that the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and the sufficiency of the warning contained in a notice were, questions for the jury. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
City of Tonkawa v. Danielson
green
2 sentences1935To the same effect, see City of Tonkawa v. Danielson (1933), 166 Okl. 241 , 27 Pac. (2d) 348 ; Opelt v. Al. 1935To the same effect, see City of Tonkawa v. Danielson (1933), 166 Okl. 241 , 27 Pac. (2d) 348 ; Opelt v. Al. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Shank v. Town of Ravenswood
neutral
1 sentence1927Ex parte Marx, 86 Va. 40 , 9 S. E. 475 ; Shank v. Ravenswood, 43 W. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Ex parte Marx
green
2 sentences1927Ex parte Marx, 86 Va. 40 , 9 S. E. 475 ; Shank v. Ravenswood, 43 W. 1927Ex parte Marx, 86 Va. 40 , 9 S. E. 475 ; Shank v. Ravenswood, 43 W. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Baker v. . Drake
green
1 sentence1912This modification of the rule was very ably enforced in an opinion of the Court of Appeals delivered by Judge Rapallo in the case of Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211 [ 13 Am. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Baker v. . Drake
green
1 sentence1912Rep. 507 ], which was subsequently followed in the same case in 66 N. Y. 518 [ 23 Am. | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Leftwich v. City of Richmond
green
2 sentences1902Leftwich v. City of Richmond, 100 Va. 164 , 40 S. E. 651 . 1902Leftwich v. City of Richmond, 100 Va. 164 , 40 S. E. 651 . | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.