modification hearing in Texas

2020Melton, 350 S.W.3d at 238 ; In re D.S., 76 S.W.3d 512, 520 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Farish v. Farish, 921 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, no writ).

2005See Farish v. Farish, 921 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1996, no writ).

2021See Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 589 ; Ceniseros v. Rychlik, No. 03-17-00532-CV, 2018 WL 4265679 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 7, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see TEX.

2020Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 589 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied).

2015The Board argues that the reciprocal-sanctions policy is like the evaluative penalty guidelines this Court concluded did not constitute a rule in Slay v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 351 S.W.3d 532, 548 (Tex.App.–Austin 2011, pet. © 2015 Thomson Reuters.

2014The Board argues that the reciprocal-sanctions policy is like the evaluative penalty guidelines this Court concluded did not constitute a rule in Slay v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, 351 S.W.3d 532, 548 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011, pet. denied).

2011Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 254-56 (discussing post- Malik decisions and stating that "we have interpreted Malik to control sufficiency of the evidence analysis even in the absence of alleged jury charge error "; noting that hypothetically correct jury charge in a kidnapping case must include the victim's name, not merely the statutory term "another" and sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed as to proof that the named victim was abducted). 21.

2011It is only a modification of this rule, that the accusation on which the prosecution is founded, should state the crime which is to be proved and state such a crime as will justify the judgment to be pronounced.”); see also Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979) (“A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from those alleged in an indictment”; defendant could not be convicted in prosecution for making false statements to grand jury, when government alleged that defendant made an inconsistent statement at a September 30 interview–which was not an “

2018In re A.T.M., 281 S.W.3d 67, 72 (Tex.App.-- El Paso 2008, no pet.).

2015“However, a court is not required to consider alternative dispositions in a modification hearing.” In re A.T.M., 281 S.W.3d at 72 (interpreting Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.05(f)).

2011It is only a modification of this rule, that the accusation on which the prosecution is founded, should state the crime which is to be proved and state such a crime as will justify the judgment to be pronounced.”); see also Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 , 99 S.Ct. 2190 , 60 L.Ed.2d 743 (1979) ("A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from those alleged in an indictment”; defendant could not be convicted in prosecution for making false statements to grand jury, when government alleged that defendant made an inconsistent statement at a Septembe

2011It is only a modification of this rule, that the accusation on which the prosecution is founded, should state the crime which is to be proved and state such a crime as will justify the judgment to be pronounced.”); see also Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 , 99 S.Ct. 2190 , 60 L.Ed.2d 743 (1979) ("A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from those alleged in an indictment”; defendant could not be convicted in prosecution for making false statements to grand jury, when government alleged that defendant made an inconsistent statement at a Septembe

2010See Murphy v. State , 860 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1993, no pet.).

1996See Murphy v. State , 860 S.W.2d 639, 643 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1993, no writ) (stating that a modification hearing is not a new adjudication under section 54.03); In re J.K.A. , 855 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Tex. App.--Houston 1993, writ denied) (holding that the modification statute does not require a trial court to conduct a section 54.03 adjudication hearing to modify a disposition for violation of a condition of delinquency probation).

2011It is only a modification of this rule, that the accusation on which the prosecution is founded, should state the crime which is to be proved and state such a crime as will justify the judgment to be pronounced.”); see also Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 , 99 S.Ct. 2190 , 60 L.Ed.2d 743 (1979) ("A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from those alleged in an indictment”; defendant could not be convicted in prosecution for making false statements to grand jury, when government alleged that defendant made an inconsistent statement at a Septembe

2011It is only a modification of this rule, that the accusation on which the prosecution is founded, should state the crime which is to be proved and state such a crime as will justify the judgment to be pronounced.”); see also Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 , 99 S.Ct. 2190 , 60 L.Ed.2d 743 (1979) ("A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from those alleged in an indictment”; defendant could not be convicted in prosecution for making false statements to grand jury, when government alleged that defendant made an inconsistent statement at a Septembe

2024See In re J.M., 287 S.W.3d at 489 (citing K.K.H. v. State, 612 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1981, no writ)).

2024See In re J.M., 287 S.W.3d at 489 (citing K.K.H. v. State, 612 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1981, no writ)).

2024See In re J.M., 287 S.W.3d at 489 (citing K.K.H. v. State, 612 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1981, no writ)).

2024See In re J.M., 287 S.W.3d at 489 (citing K.K.H. v. State, 612 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1981, no writ)).

2010See A.C.S., 157 S.W.3d at 18-19 .

2010See A.C.S. , 157 S.W.3d at 18-19 .

2008See Shaw, 966 S.W.2d at 177 .

2008See Shaw, 966 S.W.2d at 177 .

2006See Serna v. Webster, 908 S.W.2d 487 , 489 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (party waived service by making general appearance before court); Houston Crushed Concrete, Inc. v. Concrete Recycling Corp., 879 S.W.2d 258, 260-61 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (party waived service by appearing at hearing).

2006See Serna v. Webster, 908 S.W.2d 487 , 489 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (party waived service by making general appearance before court); Houston Crushed Concrete, Inc. v. Concrete Recycling Corp., 879 S.W.2d 258, 260-61 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (party waived service by appearing at hearing).

2006See Serna v. Webster, 908 S.W.2d 487 , 489 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (party waived service by making general appearance before court); Houston Crushed Concrete, Inc. v. Concrete Recycling Corp., 879 S.W.2d 258, 260-61 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (party waived service by appearing at hearing).

2006See Serna v. Webster, 908 S.W.2d 487 , 489 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ) (party waived service by making general appearance before court); Houston Crushed Concrete, Inc. v. Concrete Recycling Corp., 879 S.W.2d 258, 260-61 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (party waived service by appearing at hearing).

2005See 109 S.W.3d at 781-82 .

2005See 109 S.W.3d at 781-82 .

2005In re Striegler , 915 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1996, writ denied).

2005In re Striegler, 915 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied).

2003After the hearing, the court entered an order overruling the district clerk's and the court reporter's contest, found that Price was indigent, and it entered another order which stated that "Gina Price waives the requirement for the reporter to prepare the reporter's record." (4) SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION We first address Prices's contention that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Smith's 2001 motion to modify. (5) See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993).

2003After the hearing, the court entered an order overruling the district clerk’s and the court reporter’s contest, found that Price was indigent, and it entered another order which stated that “Gina Price waives the requirement for the reporter to prepare the reporter’s record.” (footnote: 4) SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION We first address Prices’s contention that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Smith’s 2001 motion to modify. (footnote: 5) See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993).

2006In Hammond, the spouse seeking reduction in his support obligation presented evidence of his income at the time of the modification hearing, but no evidence of his income at the time of divorce other than the characterization of his job as “high paying.” Id. at 408 .

2006In Hammond , the spouse seeking reduction in his support obligation presented evidence of his income at the time of the modification hearing, but no evidence of his income at the time of divorce other than the characterization of his job as “high paying.” Id. at 408.

2025A trial court may “decline third and fourth chances to a juvenile who has abused a second one.” J.P., 136 S.W.3d at 633 ; see also In re V.L.T., 570 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in committing juvenile to TJJD where “V.L.T.’s brief admits the need for treatment for his [post-traumatic stress disorder],” “[t]he probation officer testified that the best alternative for obtaining counseling was through the commitment to TJJD,” and although there was also “testimony about the alternative programs,” they were not recommend

2022See In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d at 632–33; see also In re G.B., No. 13-19-00581-CV, 2021 WL 3085990 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 22, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Under [§ 54.05], the trial court is not required to exhaust all possible alternatives to commitment before it modifies a disposition and commits a juvenile to TJJD.”); In re J.Y., No. 02-17-00092-CV, 2017 WL 3298301 , at *3 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Aug. 3, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding TJJD commitment appropriate although the evidence revealed there was a less restrictive, inpatient placement option because “a trial

2010Specifically, Seale testified to the following matters at the modification hearing: • Serafin exposed J.D.S. to drugs, alcohol, and “criminal surroundings”; 1 Serafin cites Graves v. Graves, 916 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ), for the proposition that a complaint regarding the sufficiency of a section 156.102 affidavit may be raised for the first time on appeal.

2010Id.

2006Id. at 2-4.

2006Id. at 2-4 .

2006See id. at 315 ; see also London *697 v. London, 192 S.W.3d 6, 15 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

2006See id. at 315 ; see also London v. London, 192 S.W.3d 6, 15 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

2026Burkhart v. Burkhart, 960 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (“In view of the heightened standards for a modification hearing within one year of a custodial order, an affiant must state concrete facts that clearly demonstrate that extraordinary relief is appropriate.”); see In re C.S., 264 S.W.3d 864 , 874–75 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) (comparing allegations that indicate a “pattern of parental alienation”, denied access, and threats of bodily harm with a clinical psychologist’s report explaining how an anticipated international move could significantly impai

2026Burkhart v. Burkhart, 960 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (“In view of the heightened standards for a modification hearing within one year of a custodial order, an affiant must state concrete facts that clearly demonstrate that extraordinary relief is appropriate.”); see In re C.S., 264 S.W.3d 864 , 874–75 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) (comparing allegations that indicate a “pattern of parental alienation”, denied access, and threats of bodily harm with a clinical psychologist’s report explaining how an anticipated international move could significantly impai

2025A trial court may “decline third and fourth chances to a juvenile who has abused a second one.” J.P., 136 S.W.3d at 633 ; see also In re V.L.T., 570 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in committing juvenile to TJJD where “V.L.T.’s brief admits the need for treatment for his [post-traumatic stress disorder],” “[t]he probation officer testified that the best alternative for obtaining counseling was through the commitment to TJJD,” and although there was also “testimony about the alternative programs,” they were not recommend

2025Code § 55.31(b); see In re H.C., 562 S.W.3d at 41 (“[T]he Family Code, unlike the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not require the juvenile court to sua sponte order an evaluation to determine whether a child is fit to proceed with a modification hearing when it has evidence before it suggesting that the child may be unfit to proceed.”).