modification hearing in Alaska

2025The superior court may modify a child custody award “if the court determines that a change of circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child.”17 The parent seeking the modification “must make a prima facie showing of substantially changed circumstances sufficient to justify a modification hearing.” 18 “The ‘change in circumstances’ requirement is ‘intended to discourage continual relitigation of custody decisions, a policy motivated by the judicial assumption that finality and certainty in custody matters are critical to the chil

2025The superior court may modify a child custody award “if the court determines that a change of circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child.”17 The parent seeking the modification “must make a prima facie showing of substantially changed circumstances sufficient to justify a modification hearing.” 18 “The ‘change in circumstances’ requirement is ‘intended to discourage continual relitigation of custody decisions, a policy motivated by the judicial assumption that finality and certainty in custody matters are critical to the chil

2026He alleged a substantial change of circumstances by claiming that Jessica “neglected” the children “both physically and emotionally.” On appeal Glen did not elaborate on how the children were neglected, but he raised three main contentions at the modification hearing: that Jessica did not feed the children, that 6 Id. at 482. 7 See AS 25.20.110(a) (“An award of custody of a child . . . may be modified if the court determines that a change in circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child.”). 8 Collier, 377 P.3d at 20. 9 Hunter v.

2020DISCUSSION “A parent seeking a modification of legal custody must make a prima facie showing of substantially changed circumstances sufficient to justify a modification hearing.”3 The superior court may deny a hearing on a motion to modify custody “if it considers [the] motion and finds it plain that the facts alleged in the moving papers, even if established, would not warrant a change in custody.”4 “[W]e review the [superior 3 Collier v. Harris, 261 P.3d 397, 403 (Alaska 2011) (citing Hunter v. Conwell, 219 P.3d 191, 195-97 (Alaska 2009)). 4 Maxwell v. Maxwell, 37 P.3d 424, 425 (Alaska 2001)

2025The superior court may modify a child custody award “if the court determines that a change of circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child.”17 The parent seeking the modification “must make a prima facie showing of substantially changed circumstances sufficient to justify a modification hearing.” 18 “The ‘change in circumstances’ requirement is ‘intended to discourage continual relitigation of custody decisions, a policy motivated by the judicial assumption that finality and certainty in custody matters are critical to the chil

2021Jay argues that four separate issues each constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification hearing: (1) Alisa’s interference with the children’s therapy; (2) new evidence about Alisa’s parenting that was unavailable at the 14 Id. (quoting Bagby v. Bagby, 250 P.3d 1127, 1128 (Alaska 2011)). 15 Id. at 394 (quoting Hunter v. Conwell, 276 P.3d 413, 419 (Alaska 2012)). 16 Id. (quoting Hope P., 355 P.3d at 565 ). 17 Id. (quoting Heather W. v. Rudy R., 274 P.3d 478, 481-82 (Alaska 2012)). 18 Id. (quoting Hope P., 355 P.3d at 565 ). -8- 1816 time of the modification hearing;

2026He alleged a substantial change of circumstances by claiming that Jessica “neglected” the children “both physically and emotionally.” On appeal Glen did not elaborate on how the children were neglected, but he raised three main contentions at the modification hearing: that Jessica did not feed the children, that 6 Id. at 482. 7 See AS 25.20.110(a) (“An award of custody of a child . . . may be modified if the court determines that a change in circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child.”). 8 Collier, 377 P.3d at 20. 9 Hunter v.

2026He alleged a substantial change of circumstances by claiming that Jessica “neglected” the children “both physically and emotionally.” On appeal Glen did not elaborate on how the children were neglected, but he raised three main contentions at the modification hearing: that Jessica did not feed the children, that 6 Id. at 482. 7 See AS 25.20.110(a) (“An award of custody of a child . . . may be modified if the court determines that a change in circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child.”). 8 Collier, 377 P.3d at 20. 9 Hunter v.

2025The superior court may modify a child custody award “if the court determines that a change of circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child.”17 The parent seeking the modification “must make a prima facie showing of substantially changed circumstances sufficient to justify a modification hearing.” 18 “The ‘change in circumstances’ requirement is ‘intended to discourage continual relitigation of custody decisions, a policy motivated by the judicial assumption that finality and certainty in custody matters are critical to the chil

2025The superior court may modify a child custody award “if the court determines that a change of circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child.”17 The parent seeking the modification “must make a prima facie showing of substantially changed circumstances sufficient to justify a modification hearing.” 18 “The ‘change in circumstances’ requirement is ‘intended to discourage continual relitigation of custody decisions, a policy motivated by the judicial assumption that finality and certainty in custody matters are critical to the chil

2025Air Serv., Inc., 120 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 2005). 27 Id. 28 She argues that the court assigned too much weight to the therapist’s testimony, that it conflated the modification hearing with her separate divorce proceedings, that the modification was an “over correction,” and that it violated her and her children’s due process rights. 29 See Griswold v. Homer Advisory Plan.

2025Air Serv., Inc., 120 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 2005). 27 Id. 28 She argues that the court assigned too much weight to the therapist’s testimony, that it conflated the modification hearing with her separate divorce proceedings, that the modification was an “over correction,” and that it violated her and her children’s due process rights. 29 See Griswold v. Homer Advisory Plan.

2025Comm’n, 484 P.3d 120, 128 (Alaska 2021) (treating inadequately briefed arguments as waived). -8- 2092

2021Jay argues that four separate issues each constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification hearing: (1) Alisa’s interference with the children’s therapy; (2) new evidence about Alisa’s parenting that was unavailable at the 14 Id. (quoting Bagby v. Bagby, 250 P.3d 1127, 1128 (Alaska 2011)). 15 Id. at 394 (quoting Hunter v. Conwell, 276 P.3d 413, 419 (Alaska 2012)). 16 Id. (quoting Hope P., 355 P.3d at 565 ). 17 Id. (quoting Heather W. v. Rudy R., 274 P.3d 478, 481-82 (Alaska 2012)). 18 Id. (quoting Hope P., 355 P.3d at 565 ). -8- 1816 time of the modification hearing;

2021Jay argues that four separate issues each constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification hearing: (1) Alisa’s interference with the children’s therapy; (2) new evidence about Alisa’s parenting that was unavailable at the 14 Id. (quoting Bagby v. Bagby, 250 P.3d 1127, 1128 (Alaska 2011)). 15 Id. at 394 (quoting Hunter v. Conwell, 276 P.3d 413, 419 (Alaska 2012)). 16 Id. (quoting Hope P., 355 P.3d at 565 ). 17 Id. (quoting Heather W. v. Rudy R., 274 P.3d 478, 481-82 (Alaska 2012)). 18 Id. (quoting Hope P., 355 P.3d at 565 ). -8- 1816 time of the modification hearing;

2021Jay argues that four separate issues each constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification hearing: (1) Alisa’s interference with the children’s therapy; (2) new evidence about Alisa’s parenting that was unavailable at the 14 Id. (quoting Bagby v. Bagby, 250 P.3d 1127, 1128 (Alaska 2011)). 15 Id. at 394 (quoting Hunter v. Conwell, 276 P.3d 413, 419 (Alaska 2012)). 16 Id. (quoting Hope P., 355 P.3d at 565 ). 17 Id. (quoting Heather W. v. Rudy R., 274 P.3d 478, 481-82 (Alaska 2012)). 18 Id. (quoting Hope P., 355 P.3d at 565 ). -8- 1816 time of the modification hearing;

2021Jay argues that four separate issues each constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification hearing: (1) Alisa’s interference with the children’s therapy; (2) new evidence about Alisa’s parenting that was unavailable at the 14 Id. (quoting Bagby v. Bagby, 250 P.3d 1127, 1128 (Alaska 2011)). 15 Id. at 394 (quoting Hunter v. Conwell, 276 P.3d 413, 419 (Alaska 2012)). 16 Id. (quoting Hope P., 355 P.3d at 565 ). 17 Id. (quoting Heather W. v. Rudy R., 274 P.3d 478, 481-82 (Alaska 2012)). 18 Id. (quoting Hope P., 355 P.3d at 565 ). -8- 1816 time of the modification hearing;

2020DISCUSSION “A parent seeking a modification of legal custody must make a prima facie showing of substantially changed circumstances sufficient to justify a modification hearing.”3 The superior court may deny a hearing on a motion to modify custody “if it considers [the] motion and finds it plain that the facts alleged in the moving papers, even if established, would not warrant a change in custody.”4 “[W]e review the [superior 3 Collier v. Harris, 261 P.3d 397, 403 (Alaska 2011) (citing Hunter v. Conwell, 219 P.3d 191, 195-97 (Alaska 2009)). 4 Maxwell v. Maxwell, 37 P.3d 424, 425 (Alaska 2001)

2020DISCUSSION “A parent seeking a modification of legal custody must make a prima facie showing of substantially changed circumstances sufficient to justify a modification hearing.”3 The superior court may deny a hearing on a motion to modify custody “if it considers [the] motion and finds it plain that the facts alleged in the moving papers, even if established, would not warrant a change in custody.”4 “[W]e review the [superior 3 Collier v. Harris, 261 P.3d 397, 403 (Alaska 2011) (citing Hunter v. Conwell, 219 P.3d 191, 195-97 (Alaska 2009)). 4 Maxwell v. Maxwell, 37 P.3d 424, 425 (Alaska 2001)

1992We emphasized the “relative ease with which his presence could have been secured, and the importance of the questions at issue in the modification hearing.” Id.

1992Cf. Ryfeul, 650 P.2d at 374 (where the husband’s “failure to attend the modification hearing was not negligent or intentional but was caused by factors beyond his immediate control”).

1991Such an argument misconstrues the notion of "due deference." Judge Michalski did not decide that the children had to be kept apart. [6] We also conclude that Judge Carlson's findings specified the negative effect that the changed circumstances had on the children precisely enough to bring his decision within the requirements of Lee, 790 P.2d at 1361 (holding that trial court must find "changed circumstances, considered in conjunction with other relevant facts bearing upon the child's best interests, warrant modification of the existing custody decree"). [7] In Gratrix , for example, the superi

1977See Nichols v. Nichols, 516 P.2d 732, 735-37 (Alaska 1973); Forde v. Sommers, 373 A.2d 358 (N.H.1977).

1974Sheridan v. Sheridan, 466 P.2d 821, 824 (Alaska 1970). (footnotes omitted) A court modifying a previous custody determination must be guided by what appears to be for the best interests of the child. 3 In the present case, we find that the lower court abused its discretion in modifying custody. *1133 At the modification hearing, counsel for appellant offered the testimony of the Horton’s two oldest daughters to the effect that (1) their father had engaged in incestuous relations with them from their childhood until their parents’ separation prior to their 1967 divorce; (2) their father attempt

1973A modification or waiver of any provision of this agreement shall be effective only if made in writing and executed by the same formality as this agreement after this agreement is signed. [2] Green v. Koslosky, 384 P.2d 951, 952 (Alaska 1963). [3] Nor can I agree with the majority that the superior court "could not properly have denied Savage permission to amend his will so long as Savage made the agreed testamentary gifts." First, Savage's new will did not provide for the agreed testamentary gift of the law practice or its value to the trust.

1973Green v. Koslosky, 384 P.2d 951, 952 (Alaska 1963). .